Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Brandon W. DeBruce
This appeal involves a plaintiff with a personal injury claim who has challenged the validity of a declaratory judgment involving the defendant tortfeasor and his insurer because the personal injury plaintiff was not made a party to the declaratory judgment action. The personal injury plaintiff brought an action for damages against the defendant tortfeasor in December 2013 in Hamilton County, prior to the filing of the instant declaratory judgment action, based upon an automobile accident that occurred in December 2012. The defendant tortfeasor in the personal injury action reportedly failed to notify his insurance company of the lawsuit or cooperate with his insurance company regarding an investigation into the accident, which allegedly amounted to a breach of the automobile insurance policy between them. In March 2015, the insurance company filed the instant action in the Bradley County Chancery Court against the defendant tortfeasor, seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurance company had no duty to defend or indemnify the defendant tortfeasor based on his alleged breach of the insurance contract. In June 2015, the Bradley County Chancery Court entered a declaratory judgment against the defendant tortfeasor, holding that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify him. In June 2017, the personal injury plaintiff filed a petition to set aside that declaratory judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, alleging that she was a missing indispensable party to the declaratory judgment action and requesting to intervene therein. Following a hearing, the Bradley County Chancery Court denied the personal injury plaintiff’s petition. The personal injury plaintiff has appealed. Having determined that the personal injury plaintiff had a sufficient interest in the declaratory judgment action and was therefore an indispensable party, we set aside the underlying declaratory judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Geremy Paul Mathis
The Appellant, Geremy Paul Mathis, was convicted by a Coffee County Circuit Court Jury of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress the “meth lab” discovered after an officer ordered the Appellant to exit the vehicle in which he was a passenger, (2) denying his motion for mistrial after a defense witness made repeated references to the Appellant’s previous incarceration, and (3) refusing to grant the alternative sentence of community corrections. The Appellant further contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Flippen, Jr.
The Defendant, Michael A. Flippen, Jr., entered a guilty plea to second degree murder, with the length of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the Defendant received a twenty-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in applying certain enhancement factors. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Countryside Center, LLC v. BPC of Memphis, LLC d/b/a Auto Radio, et al.
The defendant, the alleged guarantor of the obligations of BPC of Memphis, LLC, under a lease agreement, appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding the defendant personally liable for the tenant’s obligations under the lease. BPC, the tenant, occupied the leased premises from December 2012 until August 2015, at which time it stopped paying rent. After BPC and the defendant refused the plaintiff’s demands for payment, the plaintiff commenced this action against BPC and the defendant as the guarantor. In the answer to the complaint, the defendant denied signing any document that purports to establish his personal liability. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment that was properly supported by a statement of undisputed facts and affidavits pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56. The defendant’s response was supported by his affidavit in which he disputed the plaintiff’s statement of fact that he signed “the lease” or “the Personal Guarantee section” of the lease. The chancery court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment stating, in part, “[i]n the face of the mountain of evidence in the record submitted by Plaintiff, Defendants had the burden to bring forward evidence other than Mr. Panchikal’s blanket denial in order to create a genuine issue of material fact,” and “Defendants failed to meet their burden.” The court also stated it was “mindful that Defendants have attempted to put into question Paragraphs 10, 21, and 27 in Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Fact.” This appeal followed. We have determined that the defendant created a genuine dispute of a material fact by stating, inter alia, in his affidavit that “the documents claimed to bear my signature by the Plaintiffs are a forgery,” and “I never executed any guaranty section on any lease, contract or other document.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrea Spencer
The Appellant, Andrea Spencer, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for sentencing outside the statutory ranges and a Blakely v. Washington violation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dedrick Wiggins
Dedrick Wiggins (“Defendant”) was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to thirty-five years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s statement under the dying declaration hearsay exception and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua L. Carter v. State of Tennessee
Joshua L. Carter, Petitioner, was convicted in separate jury trials of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone; possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone; simple possession of marijuana; and evading arrest in case number 2011-B-1648 and of voluntary manslaughter, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and felony murder in case number 2011-D-3013. Petitioner received a total effective sentence of forty years as a multiple offender in case number 2011-B-1648 and received a life sentence in case number 2011-D-3013, to be served consecutively to his forty-year sentence. These cases were consolidated on appeal, and this court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court consolidated the petitions and denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that: (1) trial counsel in case number 2011-D-3013 failed to call an alibi witness; (2) trial counsel in case numbers 2011-B-1648 and 2011-D- 3013 failed to properly investigate the cases; and (3) trial counsel in case number 2011- B-1648 failed to withdraw. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wellington Thomas
Defendant, Wellington Thomas, pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”), second offense, and evading arrest. In doing so, Defendant reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of his traffic stop. The police officer that stopped Defendant observed Defendant’s vehicle touching the fog line twice and crossing the centerline dividing southbound lanes of traffic without a signal. The basis for the traffic stop cited by the police officer was that Defendant had failed to maintain his lane. Defendant filed a motion to suppress and contended that the traffic stop was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. After a review of the record and the dash camera video depicting Defendant’s driving, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Katherine Louise Holmes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Katherine Louise Holmes, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged her 2012 conviction of attempted first degree murder, alleging that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joshua Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett and Justin Bradley Stanfield
An Obion County grand jury indicted Tony Alan Winsett, Janet Michelle Stanfield, and Justin Bradley Stanfield for multiple drug and weapons charges based on the warrantless search of their home and the subsequent automobile stop involving defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield. The defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence against them based on an allegedly improper search. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the charges against them. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The State then filed an application for permission to appeal to this Court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11(a). We granted the State’s application and, upon review, hold that, with respect to defendants Winsett and Janet Stanfield, the warrantless search of the residence was constitutionally permissible based on defendant Winsett’s status as a parolee and the doctrine of common authority. However, we conclude that the warrantless search with respect to defendant Justin Stanfield was constitutionally unreasonable because he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and the State failed to carry its burden of proving that defendant Winsett exercised common authority over Justin Stanfield’s bedroom. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
Jonathon C. Hood v. Robert Baggett, Circuit Court Clerk
Appellant, Jonathan C. Hood, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett and Justin Bradley Stanfield - Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part
The warrantless search of the home of Tony Winsett, Janet Stanfield, and her son, Justin Stanfield, violated their rights under Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Winsett’s parolee status should not subject him, Ms. Stanfield or Mr. Stanfield to a warrantless and suspicionless search. The trial court did not err in suppressing evidence from the illegal search of the Winsett/Stanfield home. The majority does not err in suppressing the evidence as to Mr. Stanfield, although I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning. |
Obion | Supreme Court | |
Tullahoma Industries, LLC v. Navajo Air, LLC, Et Al.
A manufacturer of military uniforms entered into an agreement with its supplier of fabric and the manufacturer’s bank whereby the bank would disburse funds from the manufacturer’s account to pay invoices for fabric the supplier shipped to the manufacturer. After several months, the supplier learned that the process for paying the invoices was not being followed and sent the bank the unpaid invoices directly and demanded payment. The manufacturer filed a declaratory judgment action, naming the supplier and the bank as defendants, and asked the court to determine the “rights, status or other legal relations” under the agreement. The supplier filed a crossclaim against the bank, asserting claims for breach of the disbursement agreement, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), fraud in the inducement of contracting, and civil conspiracy to commit fraud in the inducement. The court granted summary judgment to the bank on all of the supplier’s claims except the civil conspiracy claim; the supplier appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Leah Louise Farnham Carter v. Myron Thomas Carter
This appeal concerns visitation and parenting responsibilities following a divorce. The trial court granted decision-making authority over both children, a son and a daughter, to the father. After granting both parties 50/50 visitation with the son, the court awarded the father most of the visitation time with the daughter. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Mahaffey
Defendant, Donald Ray Mahaffey, was convicted of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine; delivery of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine; conspiracy to sell and deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine; possession of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony; unlawful possession of a weapon after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon; possession of marijuana for resale; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cindy Hatfield, et al. v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, et al.
This appeal results from a jury trial on claims of negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act by a nursing home. In addition to finding the limited liability company nursing home liable for the resident’s injuries, the jury awarded extensive compensatory and punitive damages against the nursing home’s related administrative services provider, the nursing home’s parent companies, and the individual members of the parent companies. Defendants appeal, raising a variety of issues related to the jury impaneled, the evidence presented, and the finding of liability against the non-nursing home defendants. We reverse the jury’s decision finding material evidence to subject the nursing home’s parent companies and their members directly or vicariously liable in this case. We affirm the direct liability of the nursing home’s administrative services provider. Because the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury appears to be largely predicated on the liability of the non-nursing home defendants, we vacate the award and remand for a new hearing solely as to the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. In all other respects, the verdict is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie's Poolmart, Inc. v. Blue Wave Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC, et al.
This appeal concerns an employee who made preparations to start a competing business while still employed by his old company. Todd Heins (“Heins”) was a manager working for Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. (“Leslie’s”), a nationwide pool supply business, at its Bartlett Hills location in the Memphis, Tennessee area. Jay Karcher (“Karcher”), while a customer in Leslie’s Bartlett Hills store, approached Heins one day while he was working with an idea about starting a new pool supply business. Heins was intrigued and followed up with Karcher to found Blue Wave Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC (“Blue Wave”). Heins resigned from Leslie’s before Blue Wave opened for business. Heins’ friend and Leslie’s employee Chad Pitcock (“Pitcock”) also resigned and went to work for Blue Wave. Leslie’s sued Blue Wave, Heins, Pitcock, and Karcher (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and inducement to breach contract. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Defendants and dismissed Leslie’s complaint with prejudice. Leslie’s appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eugene David Sanders, Jr.
Defendant, Eugene David Sanders, Jr., appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated criminal trespass, for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to call Defendant’s court-appointed private investigator as a rebuttal witness. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Sinquarius Marks
The Appellant, Anthony Sinquarius Marks, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dewayne Wade
The defendant, Michael Dewayne Wade, appeals the revocation of his community corrections placement, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering the balance of his 12- year sentence to be served in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Ortiz
The Appellant, Jose Ortiz, was convicted of child abuse and aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and contends that “to enable reasonable appellate review[, this] court must establish a standard of performance for the trial court to satisfy its duty as the thirteenth juror.” Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven M. Wirth v. James W. Friedlob
Breach of contract and negligence action brought by disabled plaintiff who engaged nonattorney representative to assist in plaintiff’s application for social security disability benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant and denied the plaintiff’s motion to set the judgment aside, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(1). Plaintiff appeals; Determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60.02 motion, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brewers Rentals v. Otto Karl Appelt
This appeal arises from a detainer action. Brewers Rentals (“Brewers”) obtained a detainer warrant against tenant Otto Karl Appelt (“Appelt”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Appelt thereafter appealed to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”). Appelt paid a $500 appeal bond. However, Appelt did not post bond equal to one year’s rent as required by statute in order to retain possession during the appeal. Brewers filed a motion to dismiss and/or for possession in the Trial Court, which was granted. The Trial Court held that, as Appelt had neither surrendered possession nor posted the requisite bond, dismissal was required. Appelt appeals. We hold that Appelt’s failure to post bond equal to one year’s rent enables Brewers to regain possession immediately but does not deprive the Trial Court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Appelt’s appeal. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for this case to proceed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Leroy H.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. The child’s guardians, who had been granted custody of the child, filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court granted the guardians’ petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that four grounds for termination were proven—willful failure to visit, willful failure to provide child support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions—and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We vacate the trial court’s finding regarding one ground for termination but otherwise affirm the order terminating the father’s parental rights. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |