Opinions

Barri Green vs. Lanny George
02A01-9711-CH-00279
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis

William Winchester vs. Glenda Winchester
02A01-9802-CV-00046
Trial Court Judge: Whit A. Lafon

Phillip Wayne Crocker vs. Patricia L. Taylor Crocker - Concurring
02A01-9801-CH-00014
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

Patricia Louise Taylor Crocker (“Wife or “Appellant”) appeals the judgment of the trial court which granted divorce to Wife and Phillip Wayne Crocker (“Husband” or “Appellee”); awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $1,000.00 per month for a period of twenty-four (24) months; awarded Wife court costs and attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $4,000.00; awarded each party the separate property he/she respectively owned before marriage or inherited during marriage; and divided the property acquired during the marriage as follows:

Wife: 

 1.  Real property located at Three Way in Madison County upon which   Wife’s dancing school business was located. Value $53,500 Debt $37,500

Husband:

1. 33.5-acre Gibson County farm. Value $25,800 Debt $0

2. 115.5-acre Gibson County farm Value $95,200 Debt $95,000

Jerry Mack vs. Civil Serv.
02a01-9807-CH-00215
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

Jinks vs Jinks
03A01-9807-CV-00212

State vs. Bryant Dewayne Millen
02S01-9711-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Bryant Dewayne Millen
02S01-9711-CR-00106

State vs. Bryant Dewayne Millen
02S01-9711-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

State vs. Howard Atkins
02C01-9805-CC-00155

State vs. Gary Johnson
02C01-9803-CR-00082

State vs. Gary Johnson
02C01-9803-CR-00082

Anthony Jerome Stokes vs. State
03C01-9710-CR-00477
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

Randall Clyde Foster v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.
02S01-9802-CV-00013
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert A. Lanier, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff/Appellee, Randall Clyde Foster, sustained two successive on-the-job back injuries. He was treated for both injuries by Dr. Thomas D. Weems, a neurosurgeon. The first injury occurred on December 13, 1993, when plaintiff suffered a herniation at the L3-4 level of the spine when he lifted the door of a trailer. This action arose from the second injury that occurred on July 13, 1995, when the plaintiff sustained a herniated disc at the L4-5 level while attempting to lift a stand in a trailer. Both injuries required surgery. Dr. Weems opined that the plaintiff was anatomically impaired at 17 percent to the body as a whole after the first injury, but he rated the plaintiff's impairment to the body as a whole as only 16 percent after the second injury. Suit was filed for workers' compensation benefits arising from the first injury on July 1, 1996. The case was settled by the parties and an order approving the workers' compensation settlement was entered in the Circuit Court of Shelby County on October 2, 1996. The order approving the settlement recited that Dr. Weems had fixed the amount of permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole at 17 percent and the settlement was based upon a 36 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, for a total lump sum of $51,259.68. A certified copy of the order approving the settlement is before us. After trial of the instant case, arising from the accident that occurred on July 13, 1995 (the second accident), the trial court entered a judgment awarding the plaintiff a recovery based upon 3 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The judgment was erroneous in several respects. It recited that the treating physician had rated the plaintiff's permanent anatomical impairment to the body as a whole resulting from the first injury at 16 percent. Actually, Dr. Weems rated the impairment to the body as a whole from the first injury at 17 percent. More importantly, the judgment recited that the plaintiff had been awarded, pursuant to the settlement of the first accident, benefits upon 2

BVT Lebanon Shopping Center vs. Wal-Mart
01A01-9710-CV-00607
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers

Cavitt vs. TDOC
01A01-9712-CH-00713
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Mullinax vs. Mullinax
01A01-9803-CH-00137
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal

Admin. Bd., First United Methodist vs. Dept. Human Services
01A01-9804-CV-00193

State vs.Jasper D. Lewis
01C01-9604-CR-00162

Warner Dunlap vs. Richard Ayers
02A01-9801-CV-00025
Trial Court Judge: Dick Jerman, Jr.

State vs. Timothy Walton
02C01-9807-CC-00210
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore Jr.

State vs. Bernard Anderson
02C01-9710-CR-00394
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

Georgia/Newman Cross vs. City of Memphis
02A01-9807-CV-00199
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown

State vs. Earl Raines
E1999-01340-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

Harris v. Sabh-Mor Flo
03S01-9712-CH-00142
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. G. Richard Johnson,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Geraldine Harris, has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing her claim against her employer, Sabh-Mor Flo Industries. Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury during October 1994 to her arm and shoulder. After receiving some treatment, she returned to work at a wage equal to or greater than she had been receiving prior to the accident. In determining her entitlement to permanent disability benefits, the trial court found her return to work was meaningful within the scope of our statute, T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(1), and that since her medical impairment rating was 11%, the award of permanent disability was capped at 2 _ times the medical impairment, which resulted in a 27.5% disability award to the body as a whole. Upon her return to work, she was given another job where she worked for four or five weeks. When this job ended, she was assigned a job classified as a "service agent." This position involved her understanding the basic parts of a water heater in order to handle telephone customer complaints. She was also required to operate a computer. She received several weeks of training and attempted to perform her new duties. The record is quite clear she did not perform satisfactorily. She testified she could not do the work and needed more training and her employer also felt she could not do the work. She testified that after several days attempting to do the work, she was called to the office and was told, "we don't think you are going to make it." She was terminated on April 3, 1997 which was less than two months after the February 13th trial. The present action seeking a reconsideration of the original award of 27.5% disability under T.C.A. _ 5-6-241(a)(2) was instituted on May 2, 1997. At this hearing there was a dispute between the parties as to the exact reason for plaintiff 's discharge. Plaintiff contended she was terminated because she could not perform the duties she was asked to do. Defendant-employer contended she fell asleep on the job and was terminated for refusing to obey a direct order. 2

State vs. King David Johnson
01C01-9808-CC-00329