James Reed, et al., v. Jamie Hamilton, et ux.
W1999-00440-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Michael Maloan

This appeal arises from a dispute between neighboring landowners regarding whether there is an easement across the real property of Defendants Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton for the benefit of Plaintiffs Hulon O. Warlick, III, James Reed, and Wayne Matthews. Mr. Warlick filed a complaint and Mr. Reed and Mr. Matthews filed a similar complaint against the Hamiltons asking the trial court to declare the existence of such an easement. The court issued a number of orders in the Warlick and Reed/Matthews matters enjoining the Hamiltons from interfering with the easement and from obstructing or preventing Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, or Mr. Matthews from accessing their properties. The Hamiltons nevertheless performed a number of acts in violation of these orders. Consequently, the trial court found the Hamiltons in civil contempt and assessed sanctions and damages against them in the amount of $25,156.80, which is equal to the attorney’s fees incurred by Mr. Warlick, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Matthews. On appeal, the Hamiltons argue that the trial court was without authority to assess attorney’s fees against them. We hold that, under the circumstances of the case at bar, the trial court had the authority to assess attorney’s fees against the Hamiltons pursuant to section 29-9-105 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. We therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court.
 

Sean N. Geiger v. Percy Pitzer, et al.
W1999-01776-COA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

An inmate presently in custody in the Whiteville Correctional Facility sued the warden and the CEO and Chairman of Corrections Corporation of America in a pleading styled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. He seeks release from that facility contending that the State of Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) released him when it surrendered him to a facility outside the borders of the State of Wisconsin for incarceration. The trial court dismissed the cause of action and we affirm.
 

Washshukru Al-Jabbar A'La. v. Christine Bradley, et al.
E1999-01291-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

Plaintiff, an inmate in Brushy Mountain State Penitentiary, appeals the Trial Court’s dismissal of his civil suit for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the “capricious, arbitrary and unjust” operation of the Inmate Grievance Procedure, for “malfeasance”, and for “civil rights intimidation.” The Trial Court found that (1) the doctrine of res judicata prevents Plaintiff’s suit on one of his alleged claims because judgment has been entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on that claim; (2) all of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory except for that one claim already resolved, and, therefore, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) with respect to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, Plaintiff does not have a liberty interest in the Tennessee Department of Correction grievance policy, and, therefore, that allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s Statement of Issues in this appeal alleges abuse of discretion by the Trial Court “by dismissing his civil rights claims” and cites Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-701, 4-21-702 and 4-21-801. Construing Plaintiff’s pro se appeal liberally, we deem it as challenging all three bases upon which the Trial Court dismissed his Complaint. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Christine Berkley, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, etc. v. H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc.
E1999-00379-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the Trial Judge’s refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement
entered by the parties. Defendant has appealed. We reverse and remand with instructions to enforce the arbitration agreement. Tenn. R. App. P.3 Interlocutory Appeal by Permission from the Trial Court; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

Rebecca J. Amell, By Next of Kin Marvin H. Amell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
03S01-9905-CV-00056
Authoring Judge: Peoples, H.N., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Rex Henry Ogle
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (hereafter "Liberty Mutual") appeals an award of workers' compensation death benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee killed in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, made an award of $77,196 to be paid at the rate of $144.75 per week to the surviving spouse, who was the only dependent of the employee. Liberty Mutual contends that the maximum award to the surviving spouse with no other dependents is limited to $57,9 (4 weeks x $144.75). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the standard of review provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-225, but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S..W.2d 523 (Tenn.1991). Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute, "the question on appeal is one of law, and our scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying" the trial court's conclusions. Union Carbide Corp. v Huddleston, 854 S.W. 2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993); Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329, 43 S.W.2d 37 (1966). On March 27, 1998, Rebecca J. Amell sustained fatal injuries in the course and scope of her employment with Arrow Factory Store in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. She was survived by Marvin H. Amell, her spouse. Her average weekly wage was $289.49 generating a workers' compensation rate of $192.99. The maximum weekly benefit on March 27, 1998, as defined by T.C.A. _ 5-6-12(7)(a), was $492. Liberty Mutual asserts that T.C.A. _ 5-6-21(e)(1) limits the benefits payable to a surviving spouse with no dependent child to one-half of the employee's average weekly wage for 4 weeks. It cites Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996) as limiting the benefits to 4 weeks, and Schultz v. Majik Market, a Div. of 2

Rebecca J. Amell, By Next of Kin Marvin H. Amell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
03S01-9905-CV-00056
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Rex Henry Ogle
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (hereafter "Liberty Mutual") appeals an award of workers' compensation death benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee killed in the course and scope of her employment. The trial court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, made an award of $77,196 to be paid at the rate of $144.75 per week to the surviving spouse, who was the only dependent of the employee. Liberty Mutual contends that the maximum award to the surviving spouse with no other dependents is limited to $57,9 (4 weeks x $144.75). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appeal from a summary judgment order in a workers' compensation case is not controlled by the standard of review provided by T.C.A. _ 5-6-225, but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S..W.2d 523 (Tenn.1991). Where, as in this case, the facts are not in dispute, "the question on appeal is one of law, and our scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying" the trial court's conclusions. Union Carbide Corp. v Huddleston, 854 S.W. 2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993); Smith v. Norris, 218 Tenn. 329, 43 S.W.2d 37 (1966). On March 27, 1998, Rebecca J. Amell sustained fatal injuries in the course and scope of her employment with Arrow Factory Store in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. She was survived by Marvin H. Amell, her spouse. Her average weekly wage was $289.49 generating a workers' compensation rate of $192.99. The maximum weekly benefit on March 27, 1998, as defined by T.C.A. _ 5-6-12(7)(a), was $492. Liberty Mutual asserts that T.C.A. _ 5-6-21(e)(1) limits the benefits payable to a surviving spouse with no dependent child to one-half of the employee's average weekly wage for 4 weeks. It cites Spencer v. Towson Moving & Storage, Inc., 922 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1996) as limiting the benefits to 4 weeks, and Schultz v. Majik Market, a Div. of 2

Claude Willis v. Lola Mae Willis
W1999-01537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ron E. Harmon

This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Claude Willis and Defendant Lola Mae (Wright) Willis regarding the terms of their divorce. The trial court granted an absolute divorce to Ms. Wright,¹ divided the parties’ marital property, allocated the parties’ marital debt, and awarded Ms. Wright alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, Mr. Willis argues that the trial court’s division of marital property and allocation of marital debt are inequitable, and that, assuming an award of alimony is appropriate in the case at bar, the court should have awarded Ms. Wright rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. Additionally, Ms. Wright requests on appeal that her award of attorney’s fees be designated as alimony. We affirm the ruling of the trial court; however, we modify the court’s ruling to reflect that attorney’s fees are awarded to Ms. Wright as alimony.

Walter A. Farris, et al., v. William S. Todd, et al.
E1999-1574-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard

This appeal involves the question of whether the Appellants, Walter and Gordon Farris, complied with the statute of limitations when filing their complaint for legal malpractice and conversion. The Appellees, William S. Todd and Thomas S. Dossett, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellants moved to amend their complaint to include declaratory judgment relief for determination of the ownership rights of the parties in a particular art work. The Circuit Court for Sullivan County granted the motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the motion to amend. We affirm in part and vacate in part the Circuit Court’s judgment.
 

State of Tennessee v. Michael Anderson Peek, alias Big Country, alias Michael Peak alias Michael Anderson Peak
E1998-00038-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The defendant was convicted of fourteen felonies, consisting of various rape, robbery, and burglary charges arising from complaints of five victims. He received an effective sentence of ninety-nine years. Appealing these convictions, he alleged, inter alia, that the trial court should have severed the offenses, rather than allowing all five to be tried in a single trial; that blood, saliva, and hair samples should have been suppressed; that he should not have been shackled during the trial, and that his sentence was improper. Of these assignments, we find error in the trial court’s allowing the complaints of all five victims to be tried in a single trial, and in the court’s not following the required procedures before shackling the defendant during the trial. The errors were harmless and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Leon Goins
W1999-00157-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Lee Moore, Jr.

A jury found the defendant guilty of selling 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance.  He received a 15 year sentence as a Range II offender, consecutive to a prior felony. The defendant asserts error in allowing the state’s expert witness to testify to the aggregate weight of cocaine sold, when the witness did not test every particle of the submitted evidence. The defendant further asserts error in the trial court’s admitting a video tape of the sale and in the trial court’s sentencing. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Carlos C. Beasley
W1999-00426-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The appellant, Carlos C. Beasley, referred herein as “the defendant,” appeals as of right from a conviction for especially aggravated robbery by a Shelby County jury. The same jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, from which the defendant does not appeal. The Shelby County Criminal Court imposed a sentence of twenty-five (25) years for especially aggravated robbery in the Department of Correction. The defendant presents two appellate issues: 1) whether the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that every element of especially aggravated robbery has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and 2) whether the record shows that the trial court in its capacity as thirteenth (13th) juror failed to independently weigh the evidence upon consideration of the motion for a new trial.

Venessa Lynn Totty v. Michael Alan Totty
W1999-02426-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a final decree of divorce entered in the Shelby County
Circuit Court. The Husband appeals the trial court’s order claiming error in several aspects of the
decision, including the determination as to his alimony obligation.

State of Tennessee v. Roy D. Nelson
E1997-00021-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County which convicted the
defendant of aggravated arson. The defendant appealed and argued that the aggravated arson statute applies only when an individual other than the arsonist sustains serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, because he was the individual who sustained serious bodily injuries, the defendant contended that the aggravated arson statute was inapplicable. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that where a defendant sustains serious bodily injuries as the result of an arson he or she committed, that defendant may be convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 14-302(a)(2) (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Donald E. Griffin v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company
M1997-00042-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The appellant, Donald E. Griffin, brought suit seeking damages for injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck from the rear in Maury County by a car driven by Richard Vaughn. After obtaining a judgment against Vaughn in the amount of $225,000, Griffin learned that Vaughn had only $50,000 of liability insurance coverage. Griffin then requested that his uninsured motorist carrier, the appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), pay the remainder of the judgment up to its policy limit of $100,000. When Shelter refused the claim, Griffin brought this action against Shelter in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancellor granted summary judgment to Shelter, finding that Griffin had failed to comply with the notice provisions of the insurance policy and with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a). The Court of Appeals agreed that Griffin had failed to comply with the service provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a) and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Shelter. This Court thereafter granted Griffin’s application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed DROWOTA, J.,

Kenneth L. Storey v. Randall E. Nichols, et al.
E1998-00851-SC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor David H. Cate

The dispositive issue in this case is whether an appeal as of right from a trial court’s judgment in an attorney-disciplinary proceeding initiated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-201–2041 lies in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court. Because we hold that jurisdiction over an appeal as of right in a statutory disciplinary proceeding lies in the Court of Appeals, we reverse the intermediate appellate court’s order transferring the case to the Supreme Court, and we transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for its review on the merits. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Transfer Order of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Transferred to Court of Appeals
 

Beaman Pontiac vs. Gill
M1999-00666-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman

Trebing vs. Fleming Companies
M1999-00473-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

Trebing vs. Fleming Companies
M1999-00473-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes

State vs. Larry Brumit
M1999-00154-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: James K. Clayton, Jr.

State vs. Robert Bassett Brown
M1999-00867-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Acree
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Jabari Mandela vs. Jim Rose, et al
M1999-02552-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
The trial court summarily dismissed the plaintiff pro se prisoner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction before service of process was had or response filed. Based on the record before us, we reverse.

State vs. Samuel D. Land
M1999-01023-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter

Rocky Lee Coker vs. TN Dept. of Correction
M1999-02268-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for a declaratory judgment, claiming that his sentence reduction credits had been improperly calculated and that his "safety valve" release date had been wrongly cancelled. The trial court granted the state's motion for summary judgment and the petitioner appeals. We affirm.

Clifford Taylor vs. State, et al
M1999-02418-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
An inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction sought a declaratory judgment that the Department had incorrectly calculated his sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding no improper calculation. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Donald Curtis Reid
01C01-9903-CR-00077
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.