Jimmy L. Lane v. Schering-Plough Corporation, E2000-00829-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State Second Injury Fund has appealed the trial court's ruling that it was not entitled to a credit or setoff for payment of temporary total disability benefits against that portion of the permanent disability award which it is responsible to pay. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Ingram Book Company v. Rebecca Rowland M1999-01233-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Turnbull, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) (1999) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusion of law. In this case, the employee contends the trial court erred in finding no causal connection between her injury and employment and no permanent partial disability. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings and reverses its decision. Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right: Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded TURNBULL, SP. J., in which DROWOTA, J., and LOSER S. J. joined. D. Russell Thomas and Herbert M. Schaltegger, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rebecca Rowland. D. Brett Burrow and Delicia R. Bryant, Brewer, Krause & Brooks, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ingram Book Company. MEMORANDUM OPINION Background Rebecca Rowland ("Rowland"), the employee-appellant, is a forty-two years old mother of two who has been married for twenty-three years. She dropped out of school in the tenth grade but obtained her GED in 1984. She has worked at various unskilled jobs: Working as a waitress, cook and cashier; cleaning apartments; working as a housekeeper and supervisor for a hotel. Rowland worked for Ingram Book Company [Ingram], the employer-appellee, from 1993 to 1999. She first worked as an order puller, scanning books and placing them on shelves, and then worked as a shagger, locating books that order pullers could not locate. Her last job, prior to her alleged injury, was a job in which she was required to do forceful repetitive hand motions in cutting open cardboard boxes as well as dust mopping with a wide mop. After working in this last job four weeks, she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in April of 1997. Rowland was also diagnosed as having hypothyroidismin November 1997 and has taken medication since December 1997. She returned to work after the surgery and worked for Ingram for one and a half years. Then she left Ingram because of her dissatisfaction with management practices. According to Rowland's own trial testimony, which is unimpeached and uncontradicted, she continued to have pain in her hands, wrists and arms and to have diminished strength in her hands with regard to gripping or twisting. The parties submitted two medical depositions: the testimony of Dr. Martin and Dr. Gaw. Dr. David Martin, a plastic surgeon with additional training in carpel tunnel syndrome, first saw Ms. Rowland on June 19, 1997. Based on her complaints of numbness and pain, his clinical evaluation and the E.M.G. studies of Dr. Richard Lisella, Dr. Martin diagnosed bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome, greater on the left than on the right. He immediately scheduled Ms. Rowland for surgery on her left wrist which was performed on June 27, 1997. He prescribed a wrist splint for her right wrist, also on June 19, 1997. Dr. Martin released the employee to return to one-handed work on July 9,1997. Although the left wrist and hand were improved by surgery, the right handed symptoms increased with the one-handed work, and Dr. Martin scheduled and performed carpel tunnel release surgery on the right wrist on August 12, 1997. She was again released to return to one-handed duties on August 22, 1997. Some thirty-nine days after Ms. Rowland returned to work, Dr. Martin, on October 1, 1997, found that ... "her symptoms have completely resolved. She has mild, residual, right peri-incisional sensitivity which continues to improve." He kept a ten pound weight restriction in force for one month and opined that Ms. Rowland would retain a % [zero] permanent impairment. Dr. Martin treated Ms. Rowland under workers compensation, was paid for his services by workers compensation benefits provided by Ingram, and never made any medical note, nor does the record reveal he expressed any opinion, that the injury was not work related until he gave his deposition on July 1, 1999. Dr. David Gaw, an orthopaedic surgeon, saw Ms. Rowland one time, February 2, 1998. His examination lasted thirty to forty-five minutes. At that time, Ms. Rowland was complaining of continued weakness, transient tingling, pain on repetitive use, and was found to have a positive Phalens test and slightly diminished perception to pin prick. Based upon the patient's history, Dr. Gaw expressed the opinion "most likely cause is the type of work she described down at Ingram Books." He further opined that there was "no real question as to causation" if her history is true. Dr. Gaw assigned a 1%impairment to each arm. Neither of the experts testified that the thyroid [2]
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
State vs. G'dongalay Berry and Christopher Davis M1999-00824-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
A jury convicted the defendants of first degree murder in the shooting death of Adrian Dickerson. For this offense, the defendants received life sentences. They now appeal their convictions bringing three issues each. More specifically, G'dongalay Berry contends (1) that the trial court erred by not granting his request for a severance while allowing testimony concerning Berry's co-defendant's solicitation of a witness to commit a separate murder four months after this event; (2) that the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and, similarly, (3) that the evidence presented is "insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder." In addition, Christopher Davis alleges (1) that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing testimony concerning gang activity and membership; (2) that the trial court's admission of testimony regarding Davis' aforementioned solicitation to commit murder four months after this crime occurred constituted prejudicial error; and, (3) that should this court deem these alleged errors harmless individually, the cumulative effect of such mistakes deprived him of due process by making the trial fundamentally unfair. Having reviewed all of these issues and finding that none provide a basis for relief to either defendant, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Suzanne Burlew vs. Brad Burlew M1998-01177-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
The issue in this divorce case concerns the type and amount of alimony that should be awarded to the Wife. The trial court awarded her $220,000 of alimony in solido to be paid out in decreasing amounts over eight years, and declined to award her rehabilitative alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's in solido award but remanded the case to the trial court to award rehabilitative alimony of at least $1,000 per month for a reasonable period of time. Before this Court, the Husband/appellee argues that rehabilitative alimony is unnecessary and that the alimony in solido award is excessive. The Wife/appellant counters that the in solido award was not excessive; indeed, she argues that she should have been awarded alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court properly awarded alimony in solido rather than alimony in futuro. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Wife's request for rehabilitative alimony. Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. William "Butch" Osepczuk M1999-00846-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
William Osepczuk was convicted of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. He now appeals his conviction challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence based upon the non credible testimony of the victim and the erroneous admission of non relevant physical evidence. Finding the proof more than sufficient to support his conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Lawrence
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Carl Bolin M1999-00849-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Robert W. Wedemeyer
The defendant, Carl Dean Bolin, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum of four years and by ordering that his sentence be served in the Department of Correction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Montgomery
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Larry Wilkins M2000-01225-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
The appellant, Larry Wilkins, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to two counts of the class D felony of causing a computer system to be accessed for the purpose of obtaining $1,000 or more for himself or another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. For these offenses, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspending all but one year of the appellant's sentences and placing him on supervised probation for four years. Additionally, the trial court imposed fines amounting to $1,500 and ordered restitution amounting to $4,500. The appellant now appeals the trial court's sentencing determinations. Specifically, notwithstanding the trial court's imposition of alternative sentences of split confinement, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted him either total probation or placement in a community corrections program. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Williamson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Glenn Tidwell M2000-00538-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The State of Tennessee appeals from the trial court's dismissal of an indictment for DUI against the appellee, Glenn Tidwell. The trial court determined that the indictment should be dismissed because Tidwell's right to a speedy trial had been violated. After a review of the record, we find that the appellee's right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay in bringing him to trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Stephen T. Mays a/k/a Stephen T. Mayes M2000-00602-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The Appellant, Stephen T. Mays, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property over $10,000 and received two concurrent five-year sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed split confinement sentences and ordered the Appellant to serve a ninety-day period of confinement. The court also ordered restitution with scheduled payments over a ten-year period. On appeal, the Appellant argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to grant the Appellant's request for total probation; and (2) that the trial court improperly established restitution. After review, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is affirmed.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Randal L. Cheek M2000-00203-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This appeal presents review of a certified question of law following the Appellant's guilty pleas to possession of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement, the court imposed an effective sentence of one and one-half years, suspended after five days confinement followed by two years probation. Also, as part of the plea agreement, the Appellant explicitly reserved, with the consent of the trial court and the State, a certified question of law challenging the court's denial of the Appellant's motion to suppress. On appeal, the State contends that (1) the certified question of law is not contained in the final judgments nor is it incorporated by reference and (2) the question is not clearly stated so as to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue. After review, we find that the question of law presented fails to identify with sufficient clarity the scope and boundaries of the issue reserved. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed and this case is remanded to the trial court.
Williamson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Anterrian Jutiki Gunn M1999-02140-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
The State of Tennessee appeals from the trial court grant of the defendant's, Anterrian Juitiki Gunn, motion to suppress. We reverse the trial judge's decision and remand pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (e) for a determination of the essential facts necessary to determine the propriety of the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to suppress.
Robertson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Michael Carlton Bailey vs. State M1999-01065-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Burch
The appellant, Michael Carlton Bailey, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's determination that (1) he received the effective assistance of counsel, and (2) that he was not denied due process by the alleged violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 by two State witnesses.
Dickson
Court of Criminal Appeals
William Floyd vs. State M2000-00318-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: J. S. Daniel
William Floyd appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1998, Floyd pled guilty to two counts of rape and, under the terms of his plea agreement, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Floyd contends that his guilty pleas are involuntary because on the date his pleas were entered he was under the influence of prescribed psychotropic drugs. The petition was dismissed by the post-conviction court and this appeal follows. Finding that the evidence in the record does not support Floyd's claim, we affirm the lower court's dismissal.
Cannon
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. William Clouse M2000-00436-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: J. Richard Mcgregor
Van Buren
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. William Clouse M2000-00436-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: J. Richard Mcgregor
Van Buren
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Keith Slater M2000-00486-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
Following a confession, Keith Slater, the Defendant and Appellant, was indicted by a Giles County Grand Jury for premeditated first-degree murder. The Defendant moved to suppress his confession, but the trial court denied his motion. The Defendant was then tried, convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Defendant appealed that conviction, and a panel of this Court remanded the case to the trial court for another suppression hearing. The trial court held that hearing and again dismissed the Defendant's suppression motion. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings, we affirm its judgment.
Giles
Court of Criminal Appeals
Joseph Henry, et al vs. Bi-District Board of Urban Ministry, Inc., et al M2000-01128-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
This appeal arises from an action for negligence. Plaintiff was sleeping in a homeless day shelter when he was struck in the head by Assailant, who was another guest of the shelter. Plaintiff brought suit against Shelter and its controlling Board for failing to provide security. The trial court found that neither Shelter nor Board owed a duty to Plaintiff because providing security would place an onerous burden on the parties. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Dry Tech, Inc. vs. Ken Riddle, d/b/a Nu Steam M2000-01411-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from a breach of contract and/or quantum meruit action filed by the Appellee against the Appellant in the Chancery Court of Sumner County. The Appellant filed a counterclaim against the Appellee. The Appellant served upon the Appellee a request for admissions. The Appellee failed to respond within thirty days. The Appellant moved the trial court to enter an order deeming the matters contained in the request for admissions to have been admitted by the Appellee. The trial court denied the Appellant's motion and entered a judgment in favor of the Appellee on the complaint. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the Appellant on one of the claims of the counterclaim and dismissed the other two claims.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Jerry Luster vs. Alan Bargery, et al W2000-00022-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
Prisoner filed petition for habeas corpus alleging that he received an amended sentence of six years for drug violation instead of the original eight-year sentence with probation. Petitioner alleges that upon revocation of probation, he was ordered to serve the eight-year sentence instead of the six-year amended sentence. The trial court dismissed the petition, and petitioner has appealed.
Jerry Harbison v. Brakebill Nursing Home E1999-01413-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: HON. JOHN F. WEAVER
This case is before the Court upon motion for review filed by the plaintiff-appellant, Jerry Harbison, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference;
The defendant's automobile ran into the rear of the plaintiff's car. After the collision, the plaintiff learned that she had sustained a ruptured disk and commenced the underlying action, seeking compensation for both personal injury and property damage. At trial, the court admitted evidence that the plaintiff had been involved two prior accidents within the past ten months. The trial court granted a directed verdict to the plaintiff on the issue of liability for the accident, but left open the question of whether the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff's injuries. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,500 in damages, notwithstanding the fact that her undisputed medical expenses were substantially higher. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the admission of the prejudicial and irrelevant evidence of prior accidents was error and that the jury improperly speculated on the cause of her injuries. The evidence of the prior accidents was limited, included no proof of personal injuries, and included no connection between the mere occurrence of these accidents and the plaintiff's injuries. Because the evidence of the prior collisions invited speculation, we reverse.
This appeal involves the dissolution of a five-year marriage in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital estate, and ordered the husband to pay long-term spousal support. The trial court also directed the husband to maintain the wife's health insurance for three years and to reimburse her for medical expenses incurred prior to the divorce. On this appeal, the husband takes issue with the decision to award the wife the divorce, the classification and division of the marital property, and the long-term spousal support award. We have determined that the spousal support award should be modified and that the remaining portions of the trial court's decree should be affirmed.
This case arises from a dispute between neighbors over the use of an old road which connected Appellant's landlocked farm to a public roadway. The road crossed Appellees' property. After Appellees erected a locked gate across the old road, Appellant sought injunctive relief to permit access to the old road. After a trial, the court found that the old road was never a public road and that no prescriptive easement existed. The court declined to provide the requested relief. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings, we affirm.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to twelve years confinement as a standard, Range I offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, and that the trial court erred in its application of sentencing enhancement factors. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.