Tiffany Lewis Denyer v. Peninsula Hospital
E2003-01541-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court's award of 5 percent permanent partial disability to the arm was excessive. We disagree and affirm. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded H. DAVID CATE, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. R. Kim Burnette and John A. Willis, Knoxville, Tennessee, attorneys for appellant, Peninsula Hospital. Garry Ferraris, Knoxville, Tennessee, attorney for appellee, Tiffany Lewis Denyer. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Factual Background The employee, Tiffany Lewis Denyer, has a bachelor of science degree in nursing from St. Louis University. She was twenty-eight (28) years old at the time of trial. On February 2, 1997, she became employed as a psychiatric nurse with the employer, Peninsula Hospital. She has continued to work for the employer except for two periods of leave. The leave periods consisted of a three month period in the summer of 1998, when she worked at a summer camp for disabled youth, and for about six months in 2, when she worked as an occupational health nurse for Blount Memorial Hospital. After each leave she returned to work for the employer on a "PRN" or as needed basis, which provided that she would submit the hours she wanted to work and the employer would schedule her for work, if available. She continued to work in that capacity. When she returned to work for the employer after her second leave, she began to experience pain, cramping, numbness, tingling, decreased grip strength and fine motor skills in her right arm, which is her dominant arm. She also received a sprain from a restraint, which she reported to the employer. The employer provided her with a panel of three doctors, from which she chose Dr. C. Sanford Carlson, who she saw on May 9, 2. He treated her without success with steroid injections, splinting, anti-inflammatories and heat. On October 27, 2, Dr. Carlson performed right carpal tunnel surgery, releasing the median nerve which was plastered to the underside of the transverse carpal ligament. The employee returned to work on December 4, 2, and began to experience pain and swelling. She returned to Dr. Carlson on December 6, 2, and was taken off from work for a week and was assigned writing restrictions. Dr. Carlson concluded she reached maximum medical improvement on April 25, 21, and assigned her a permanent impairment of 5 percent to the right upper extremity based on the AMA Guidelines. Even though she continued to experience pain and cramping, Dr. Carlson placed her on no restrictions after the next two or three months, because carpal tunnel is a self-limited condition when released. He said his "usual admonition would be to do the best you can to get by, rest the hand, stretch the hand, modify technique." Dr. Carlson saw her the last time on August 13, 22, when he recommended she continue to work and decrease her writing requirements for the next four to five weeks. At this time he suggested she obtain a second opinion from another doctor. She went to Dr. E. B. Burns on February 21, and March 11, 23. Dr. Burns was in agreement with Dr. Carlson's treatment and recommended that she should tolerate the symptoms or change jobs. She has continued to work for the employer, although she continues to have problems writing on the patients' charts, and performing such nursing duties as drawing blood. She has requested and been assigned to the medicine room because it required less writing. The medicine room is a position which is not sought after by other nurses. She has purchased a typewriter, which she can use at times, to reduce the writing requirements. Since the hospital is a psychiatric locked facility she has had to learn to open the doors with her left arm and hand and to open the medicine bottles with a different technique. The employee describes her current symptoms relating to her arm, wrist, and hand, as follows: -2-

Marcus W. Keener v. State of Tennessee
M2003-01531-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Jones

The Defendant, Marcus W. Keener, petitioned for post-conviction relief from his jury-trial conviction of second degree murder, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The defendant now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wanda Moody v. Timothy Hutchison, Sheriff of Knox County
E2003-01325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

Knox County Commissioner Wanda Moody ("Plaintiff") made a Public Records Act request for numerous documents in the possession of Timothy Hutchison, the Sheriff of Knox County ("Defendant"). Defendant responded and provided some, but not all of the requested documents. Plaintiff eventually sought to have Defendant held in criminal contempt claiming at least fifty of his responses to the various document requests were false. After a trial on the criminal contempt charges, the Trial Court concluded Defendant made "at least six" false representations which amounted to criminal contempt, and imposed the maximum fine of $50 for each offense, for a total of $300. Defendant appeals claiming, among other things, that the proof failed to establish that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal contempt. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

State of Tennessee v. Fred Allen Owens
E2003-02003-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The Defendant, Fred Allen Owens, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings and also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anna Faye Floyd, et al., v. Johnny Tesar, et al.
E2004-00025-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

Anna Faye Floyd, Michael Everette Floyd, and David Earl Floyd, minor children, by and through their mother and natural guardian Linda Floyd ("Plaintiffs"), sued Johnny Tesar, Marsell Tesar, Jobey Green, Wilburn Green, and Martha Lee ("Defendants") to quiet title to land in Sevier County, Tennessee. After a bench trial, the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the minor Plaintiffs are the true owners of the land, and that Defendants Johnny Tesar and Marsell Tesar had committed fraud upon the Plaintiffs, knowingly clouded Plaintiffs' title, and trespassed upon Plaintiffs' land. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiffs damages and attorney's fees against Defendants Johnny Tesar and Marsell Tesar. Defendants appeal but raise no specific issues on appeal and point to no error in the record. We affirm.

State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. John Belder
W2003-02888-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry J. Logan

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Carroll County, terminating his parental rights. Specifically, Father asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, that termination is not in the best interest of the children, and that the Department of Children’s Services did not provide reasonable services. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right;

State of Tennessee v. Danny Avery Stewart and Dorothy Ann Stewart
M2003-00664-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The defendants, Danny Avery Stewart and Dorothy Ann Stewart, pled guilty to numerous drug charges and received effective sentences of thirty-one years and forty-two years, respectively. Their only contention on appeal is that their sentences are excessive because the trial court erred in the application of several enhancement factors. We conclude that the defendants have failed to show that the trial court erred in sentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Raymond R. Kennebrew v. State of Tennessee
E2003-01896-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

The petitioner, Raymond R. Kennebrew, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner asserts (1) that his pleas were neither knowingly nor voluntarily entered and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

Donald Terry Moore v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02417-CCA-MR3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The petitioner, Donald Terry Moore, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that (1) he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and (2) the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion to re-open the petition after the close of proof. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Mario Hernandez Castillo
E2003-01250-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

A Grainger County jury convicted the defendant of premeditated first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and theft under $500. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated first degree murder conviction and ordered the defendant to serve an effective life sentence. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement to law enforcement officials; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the defense to introduce proof that the victim regularly dealt in illegal drugs and firearms; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his murder convictions. We remand for entry of an order merging the theft conviction into the especially aggravated robbery conviction but otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ruffin Buildling Systems, Inc., v. Larry Gene Varner, an individual, et al.
E2003-1677-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard E. Ladd

Larry Gene Varner and Todd Duncan (“Defendants”) contracted with Joel Frazier d/b/a Timberline Construction Company (“Timberline”) for construction of a building on Defendants’ property. Timberline then contracted with Ruffin Building Systems, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) for Plaintiff to provide certain materials for the construction. Defendants paid Timberline, but Timberline never paid Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants on its materialman’s lien. The Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-115. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, a/k/a Otis Smith
W2000-02301-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The defendant, RichardOdom, was convicted of felonymurder and sentenced to death in 1992. This Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal but remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 21, 33 (Tenn. 1996). After the new sentencing proceeding, a jury again imposed the death sentence after finding that the evidence of one aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, the statutory elements of which involved the use of violence to the person, outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1991). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence. After the appeal was automatically docketed in this Court, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (1991), we entered an order specifying five issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by applying a 1998 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) and allowing the introduction of evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s prior felonies to support the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(2); (2) the trial court did not err in admitting photographs of the victim in this case but did err in admitting photographs of the victim of a prior felony offense committed by the defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for continuance to complete psychiatric or neuropsychological testing; (4) the death sentence was not invalid based on the failure of the indictment to charge the aggravating circumstance; and (5) the issue of whether the death penalty was excessive, arbitrary, or disproportionate in this case under the mandatory provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(A)-(D) need not be addressed at this time. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues and have included the relevant portions of that  opinion in the appendix to this opinion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for re-sentencing.

State of Tennessee v. Richard Odom, a/k/a Otis Smith - Dissenting
W2000-02301-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

Marvin Anthony Matthews, pro se v. State of Tennessee
W2003-02980-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The Petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Eddie Williams, Jr., pro se v. David Mills, Warden
W2004-00056-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Michael Armstrong
W2003-00317-CCA-RM-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

On May 22, 2001, the defendant, Michael Armstrong, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of operating a motor vehicle after having been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender and banned from driving. He was sentenced to one year in the work house and one year of probation. The defendant reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). This question concerns the admissibility into evidence of the defendant’s statement to police that he had driven to the police station to report two cars stolen from his employer. This statement was made in response to a police officer’s question as to how the defendant had gotten to the station. This question was asked after the police officer had found out the defendant was an habitual motor vehicle offender whose Tennessee driver’s license was revoked, but before any Miranda warnings were given to the defendant. The defendant’s response to this question formed the basis of his arrest. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress concluding that the defendant was not in custody at the time he answered the officer’s question. We find that the record clearly indicates the defendant was not in custody at the time he admitted he had driven to the police station and that therefore no Miranda warnings were required. The judgment of the trial court is therefore AFFIRMED.

Adrian Lenox v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00482-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief

State of Tennessee v. Eric Pendleton
M2003-01762-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated assault on July 29, 1987. On January 22, 2003, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. On May 14, 2003, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition without a hearing, and this motion was granted on May 15, 2003. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the petition is time barred, and the petitioner has not advanced any grounds for which the statute of limitations should be tolled.

Vulcan Materials Company v. Christopher Dale Watson
M2003-00975-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Ii Carol Mccoy, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer claims that the trial court erred (1) in finding work-related disability from aggravation of a back problem, (2) in denying reimbursement of overpayment of temporary total disability benefits by the Second Injury Fund, and (3) in ordering the employer to pay the employee's attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, CHIEF JUSTICE., and JOHN A. TURNBULL, SP. J. joined. D. Brett Burrow, Gordon C. Aulgur, Brewer, Krause & Brooks, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant Vulcan Materials Company. Jay R. Slobey, Blackburn & McCune, Nashville, Tennessee, for Christopher Dale Watson. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts On October 29, 1999, Vulcan Materials Company ("Vulcan") filed a complaint seeking a determination that Christopher Dale Watson was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for an alleged injury on January 27, 1999. Mr. Watson counter-claimed, alleging a disabling injury to his back in the course and scope of his employment. On December 1, 1999, a Workers' Compensation Specialist in the Tennessee Department of Labor issued an order directing Vulcan to provide medical treatment to Mr. Watson and to pay: Temporary Total Disability benefits for periods of time for which there is medical documentation of TTD disability. The continuation of payment of temporary total disability and medical benefits shall not be terminated by the Employer/Carrier unless an Order Terminating Benefits is issued by a Workers' Compensation Specialist or such benefits are terminated by a court of proper jurisdiction. Vulcan paid temporary total disability benefits to Mr. Watson as ordered until January 4, 22, when, pursuant to a Motion to Discontinue Temporary Total Disability Benefits filed December 21, 21, the trial court ordered that such payments be immediately discontinued. Following a trial on December 2, 22, the trial court issued a bench opinion in which it found that (1) Mr. Watson was only entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the time periods of February 9, 1999 through April 15, 1999 and February 2, 2 through March 21, 2, (2) since the employer had paid temporary total disability benefits from October 1, 1999 through January 4, 22, Vulcan should recover the overpayment from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-238(b), (3) Mr. Watson was entitled to 22 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, and (4) Mr. Watson's attorney should be awarded a fee of 2 percent. A judgment reflecting the findings of the trial court was entered. Vulcan filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment to allow an offset because the permanent partial disability award of $29,415.4 was less than the overpayment of temporary total disability in the amount of $43,736.73. The trial court granted the offset and then ordered the Second Injury Fund to reimburse Vulcan for the overpayment. The Second Injury Fund filed a motion stating that it was not a party to the suit and asked to be heard on the matter of the reimbursement. On February 21, 23, the trial court found that its order granting Vulcan's request for reimbursement of the overpayment of temporary total disability benefits by the Second Injury Fund was not permitted under the statutes because the employee's injury was found to be "compensable." The trial court found that Vulcan was entitled to credit for the overpayment of temporary total benefits and that Mr. Watson was entitled to no additional payment for permanent partial disability. The trial court ordered Vulcan to pay $5,883. (2 percent of the 2

Vulcan Materials Company v. Christopher Dale Watson
M2003-00975-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Ii Carol Mccoy, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer claims that the trial court erred (1) in finding work-related disability from aggravation of a back problem, (2) in denying reimbursement of overpayment of temporary total disability benefits by the Second Injury Fund, and (3) in ordering the employer to pay the employee's attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, CHIEF JUSTICE., and JOHN A. TURNBULL, SP. J. joined. D. Brett Burrow, Gordon C. Aulgur, Brewer, Krause & Brooks, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant Vulcan Materials Company. Jay R. Slobey, Blackburn & McCune, Nashville, Tennessee, for Christopher Dale Watson. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts On October 29, 1999, Vulcan Materials Company ("Vulcan") filed a complaint seeking a determination that Christopher Dale Watson was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for an alleged injury on January 27, 1999. Mr. Watson counter-claimed, alleging a disabling injury to his back in the course and scope of his employment. On December 1, 1999, a Workers' Compensation Specialist in the Tennessee Department of Labor issued an order directing Vulcan to provide medical treatment to Mr. Watson and to pay: Temporary Total Disability benefits for periods of time for which there is medical documentation of TTD disability. The continuation of payment of temporary total disability and medical benefits shall not be terminated by the Employer/Carrier unless an Order Terminating Benefits is issued by a Workers' Compensation Specialist or such benefits are terminated by a court of proper jurisdiction. Vulcan paid temporary total disability benefits to Mr. Watson as ordered until January 4, 22, when, pursuant to a Motion to Discontinue Temporary Total Disability Benefits filed December 21, 21, the trial court ordered that such payments be immediately discontinued. Following a trial on December 2, 22, the trial court issued a bench opinion in which it found that (1) Mr. Watson was only entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the time periods of February 9, 1999 through April 15, 1999 and February 2, 2 through March 21, 2, (2) since the employer had paid temporary total disability benefits from October 1, 1999 through January 4, 22, Vulcan should recover the overpayment from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-238(b), (3) Mr. Watson was entitled to 22 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, and (4) Mr. Watson's attorney should be awarded a fee of 2 percent. A judgment reflecting the findings of the trial court was entered. Vulcan filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment to allow an offset because the permanent partial disability award of $29,415.4 was less than the overpayment of temporary total disability in the amount of $43,736.73. The trial court granted the offset and then ordered the Second Injury Fund to reimburse Vulcan for the overpayment. The Second Injury Fund filed a motion stating that it was not a party to the suit and asked to be heard on the matter of the reimbursement. On February 21, 23, the trial court found that its order granting Vulcan's request for reimbursement of the overpayment of temporary total disability benefits by the Second Injury Fund was not permitted under the statutes because the employee's injury was found to be "compensable." The trial court found that Vulcan was entitled to credit for the overpayment of temporary total benefits and that Mr. Watson was entitled to no additional payment for permanent partial disability. The trial court ordered Vulcan to pay $5,883. (2 percent of the 2

Leon Terrell Phillips v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02090-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The petitioner, Leon Terrell Phillips, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted first degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which sentence was to be served at thirty percent. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Howard Buchanan v. State of Tennessee
M2003-01815-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

The petitioner, Howard Eugene Buchanan, was convicted by a jury in the Dickson County Circuit Court of aggravated kidnapping, assault, and evading arrest. He received a total effective sentence of eighteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the defense of alibi and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Lee Mason
M2002-01709-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

The defendant, Jeffery Lee Mason, was indicted for attempted first degree murder, felony escape and theft over $1000. He was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter and theft over $1000. He entered a plea of guilty to felony escape. The trial court imposed sentences of four years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, four years for theft over $1000, and two years for felony escape, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal of right, he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and theft over $1000; (2) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; and (3) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Lee Mason - Dissenting
M2002-01709-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

I am unable to join with the majority in concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter and that an instruction on this offense was warranted under the facts of this case. I find nothing in the record which establishes that, at the time of the attempted homicide, the defendant was “in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211(a) (2003). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent on the majority’s application of both the law and facts

State of Tennessee v. Cary Ray Davis
W2003-01202-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Tipton County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for one count of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to three years as a Range I Standard Offender. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve 180 days in incarceration and the balance of the sentence in community corrections. 1 The defendant argues two issues in his appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated assault because he was acting in self-defense; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation. We affirm the actions of the trial court.