Carlos Stokes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carlos Stokes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty-four years. He contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and requests that this court appoint a special judge to preside over this case on remand. We conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations. As a result, the judgment of the coram nobis court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. We decline to appoint a special judge for subsequent proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew D.
This is an appeal of a termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son. Ashley D. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
CHSPSC, LLC v. The California Credits Group, LLC
A tax group performed tax credit services on a contingency fee basis for a corporation that owned several hospitals in California. Four and half years after the corporation completed a transaction referred to as a “spinoff,” the tax group informed the corporation that the spinoff triggered a reorganization provision of the parties’ contract that entitled the tax group to a fee for unused tax credits related to one of the hospitals involved in the spinoff. The corporation filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment that no fee was owed because the spinoff did not trigger the contract’s reorganization provision. After conducting discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the tax group’s motion and granted summary judgment to the corporation after concluding that the parties’ conduct prior to the dispute showed that they intended the term “reorganization” to have a tax-based meaning that corresponded to the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of the term and that the spinoff did not constitute a reorganization under that definition. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
John Schmeeckle v. Hamilton County Tennessee Et Al.
This is the petitioner’s second petition to recuse based on the same allegations. Therefore, |
Court of Appeals | ||
Alan C. Cartwright v. Thomason Hendrix, P.C., et al.
Appellants, lawyers and their law firms, appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to dismiss this lawsuit under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that Appellants failed to establish that this claim relates to the protected right to petition. As such, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry B. Sexton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry B. Sexton, appeals as of right from the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his conviction for aggravated statutory rape, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, Petitioner contends that, during trial, his right to due process of law was violated when the trial court permitted the State to reopen proof following his motion for judgment of acquittal. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to: (1) communicate the State’s plea offer to him; (2) request a trial continuance following the issuance of an amended indictment; (3) prepare a mistake of fact defense and interview potential witnesses to support this defense; (4) request a jury instruction on mistake of fact; (5) argue at sentencing and on direct appeal that NCIC entries are not “reliable hearsay” for purposes of sentencing; (6) object during sentencing when the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-106(b)(5) and raise the issue on appeal; and (7) adequately argue during trial and on appeal the issue of the reopening of proof. Following a thorough review, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Dakota V.
This appeal arises out of proceedings in which a trial court denied a motion to recuse. The parents of the minor child at issue have attempted to appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Because the parents did not timely file a petition for recusal appeal, we dismiss the appeal. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Alice Cartwright Garner, et al. v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell, PLLC, et al.
In this case, the plaintiffs sued the former attorneys of her opponent in a multitude of unsuccessful actions involving family trusts. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that they were damaged by the tortious conduct of the attorneys under the tort of another doctrine. The defendant-attorneys filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the act was inapplicable. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brittany Linda Lou Davis
The defendant, Brittany Linda Lou Davis, appeals her Lincoln County Circuit Court jury convictions of delivering and selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting a recording of the controlled buy, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, and that the trial court erred by sentencing her as a Range III offender. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brett W. Houghton v. Malibu Boats, LLC
This appeal concerns standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Brett and Ceree Houghton (“Plaintiffs”) were the sole shareholders of Great Wakes Boating, Inc. (“GWB”), a Malibu Boats, LLC (“Defendant”) dealership. Defendant ended its dealership agreement with Plaintiffs, and GWB failed. Plaintiffs sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and promissory fraud. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $900,000 in damages for loss of equity in certain real property owned by GWB. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, Defendant argued for the first time that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Trial Court agreed and entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, deeming the other issues in Defendant’s motion moot. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing went to the merits and did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing is waived as untimely raised. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Dorer et al. v. Donna Hennessee
This appeal arises out of a property dispute. Although we agree with the Appellant that the trial court erred in pointing to the “good faith” of one of the Appellees when denying the Appellant any damages for Appellee’s construction of a fence on the Appellant’s land, and therefore remand this case for the entry of a judgment awarding the Appellant nominal damages for trespass, we conclude that the remainder of the Appellant’s grievances, and requests for additional relief, are waived due to insufficient briefing. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Parker v. Management & Marketing Concepts, Inc.
This is an appeal from an order striking a demand for a jury trial. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Sugg Wilson, Jr. v. Rebecca Lynn Blocker Wilson
This appeal concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce dispute. Clayton Sugg Wilson, Jr. (“Father”) and Rebecca Lynn Blocker Huston (“Mother”) were divorced in 2017, at which time Mother was named the primary residential parent of the parties’ one minor child, and Father was ordered to pay child support as well as one-half of their child’s uninsured medical expenses. Four years later, Father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, claiming that his income had decreased so much that Mother should pay him child support. Mother opposed Father’s petition and filed a petition for civil contempt and to enforce the parties’ permanent parenting plan, claiming that Father had repeatedly failed to pay his child support obligation and his share of their child’s uncovered medical expenses. The trial court found Father in civil contempt and awarded Mother an arrearage judgment. Based on his 2020 income, the court reduced Father’s monthly child support obligation. The court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees in bringing the contempt action. Father then filed a motion for apportionment of Mother’s attorney’s fees, which the trial court denied, finding that the fees awarded to Mother were reasonable. Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for apportionment of fees. We affirm the trial court in all respects. Finding that Mother is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5- 103(c), we remand for a determination and award thereof. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Madden et al. v. Metropolitan Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This case concerns the denial of a variance by the Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“the Board”). Landowners applied for a building permit to construct an auto repair shop on undeveloped property. The local fire code required new buildings of this type and size to have, inter alia, a water source that could supply 180,000 gallons at 1,500 gallons per minute for two hours. The property at issue did not have the requisite water supply. Thus, as a variance to the fire code, the landowners proposed to construct a 20,000-gallon water tank on the property and to install a “dry” fire suppression system inside the building. When their plan was rejected by the fire marshal, the landowners appealed to the Board and asked for approval of a variance. The Board denied the variance request, citing concerns over the safety of people, including firefighters and first responders. The owners then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board misapplied the law by failing to consider whether strict enforcement of the fire code would result in “manifest injustice.” Finding that the Board failed to distinguish the landowners’ request for a variance from an appeal, the trial court vacated the Board’s ruling and remanded the matter to the Board for review of the variance request. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully disagree with the trial court’s conclusion, reverse its judgment, and remand with instructions to affirm the decision of the Board. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Torrian Seantel Bishop
The Defendant, Torrian Seantel Bishop, pleaded guilty in the Obion County Circuit Court to the unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class B felony, and theft of property, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1) (Supp. 2023) (unlawful possession of a weapon), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twelve-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the search of his car. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quartes Williams v. Brandon Watwood, Warden
The Petitioner, Quartes Williams, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions for first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Cox v. Kyle Vaughan
The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her legal malpractice action against her former attorney. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to offer any proof in support of her claim of negligence against the defendant attorney. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Terrell Bradford
The Defendant, Marcus Terrell Bradford, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court Jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of 11 months, 29 days for the assault conviction and 30 days for the disorderly conduct conviction, to be served at 75% in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentences for the offenses, by ordering that the sentences run consecutively, and by not allowing any alternative sentencing options. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Antonio Benson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claim alleging that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to meaningfully present the Petitioner’s self-defense claim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Lynn Taylor
The Defendant, Anthony Lynn Taylor, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he absconded from probation and that the trial court failed to place sufficient findings on the record to justify placing his sentence into effect. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dashawn Patrick Sloan and Demetrius Trevon Higgins
A Davidson County Jury convicted DaShawn Patrick Slone1 and Demetrius Trevon Higgins, Defendants, of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse. The trial court imposed effective sentences of life plus six years for Defendant Slone and life plus four years for Defendant Higgins. On appeal, Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sheila Roberts on Behalf of Thomas Sam Edwards v. Nathan Hinkle, M.D.
This case involves a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and for |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Neal Davis
The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for access to the sealed Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) juvenile records relating to the victim’s mother’s records which were sealed to public inspection but provided to the parties prior to the defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of his motion. Additionally, the defendant has failed to establish review as a petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate. Therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phennix Givens
A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Phennix Givens, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective forty-six-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |