APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An employee sustained a compensable lower back injury, had surgery, returned to work, and settled his claim. Several months later, he re-injured his lower back. After several surgical procedures, he was unable to return to work. He filed this action for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer and the Second Injury Fund. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits, apportioning 50% of the award to the employer and 50% to the Fund. The Fund has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by assigning any liability to it because the later injury rendered the employee  totally disabled without regard to the first injury. We conclude that the trial court failed to provide the basis for its apportionment of liability between the Fund and the employer. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment to that extent and remand the case for further consideration on this issue.

The Petitioner, Michael Martin, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 convictions for attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated assault, and violating an order of protection and his effective eighteen-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) failed to interview and present a witness at the trial, (2) failed to object contemporaneously to the admission of the narrative portion of the order of protection, and (3) failed to include the transcript of the motion for a new trial hearing in the appellate record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Walter Francis Fitzpatrick, III, was indicted by the Monroe County Grand Jury for one count of tampering with government records. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with twenty days to serve in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his conviction. He argues that his indictment was faulty because the grand jury foreperson was not eligible to serve; that the trial court erred in ruling that Appellant could not testify regarding his proposed defense of necessity; and that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Donald Prescott, was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to serve twenty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant presents two issues for review. He asserts that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victim’s pre-trial and trial identifications of Defendant; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant Robert G. Rogers was on probation for multiple counts of aggravated burglary, theft over $10,000, and theft of $500 or less. His probation officer filed a probation violation warrant as a result of Appellant’s arrest in Bradley Count for extortion. The probation violation warrant was subsequently amended to allege that Appellant had absconded from supervision. At the conclusion of the probation violation hearing, the trial judge revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his originally imposed twenty-year sentence. Appellant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his sentence and that the trial judge should have recused herself. After a review of the record on appeal, we affirm the revocation of Appellant’s probation.

The petitioner, Maurice Williams, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of carjacking and aggravated robbery, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted appellant of three counts of facilitation of first degree murder and one count of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the facilitation of first degree murder convictions and sentenced appellant to seventeen years. The trial court also sentenced appellant to a concurrent sentence of eight years for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, appellant presents thirteen issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized in an extended warrantless search of his house; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce video footage of the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of blood samples taken from appellant without a warrant; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence; (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding evidence that had been destroyed; (6) whether the trial court erred by allowing a medical examiner to testify about an autopsy performed by another medical examiner; (7) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s three motions for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; (8) whether the trial court erred when it denied appellant’s request for a continuance in light of the State’s late disclosure of certain evidence; (9) whether the trial court erred by denying appellant’s request to strike a witness’s testimony when the testimony was internally contradictory; (10) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce graphic photographs of the victim’s injuries; (11) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; (12) whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions; and (13) whether appellant is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. Based on our thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count of attempted child neglect. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, this court reversed and dismissed one of the aggravated child neglect convictions based on insufficient evidence. State v. Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, No. M2009-02607-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2682173, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2011). Petitioner’s sentence was unaffected by this court’s decision. In her post-conviction petition, petitioner alleged that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied her petition, and she now appeals from that denial. Specifically, petitioner argues that trial counsel should have moved to suppress petitioner’s statements to police, that he did not ensure she understood the significance of her decision not to testify at trial despite being aware that she had a learning disability, and that he should have called a witness at trial or at the sentencing hearing to testify about her learning disability. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kelvin Reed, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to obtain an expert witness to testify regarding a 911 recording; and (2) for failing to “effectively address the issue of the lack of blood on the Petitioner’s person and possessions.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee asserted that he injured his lower back while working as a construction laborer for his employer. Approximately two years after the incident, the employee provided written notice of his injury to his employer. The employer denied the claim, contending that the employee failed to give timely notice of his injury and that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed with the employer and entered judgment in its favor. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted Appellant, Kenneth Spencer, of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove premeditation and that the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of weapons and ammunition. On appeal, the State concedes that the trial court erred, however, the error was harmless. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that premeditation existed and that the introduction of the evidence in question was error, but it was harmless error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties to this proceeding were divorced in 2003; in the final decree, Wife was awarded one-half of Husband’s military retirement. In 2005, the court modified the final decree to provide that the portion of Husband’s retirement pay designated for his disability benefits was not marital property and, therefore, was not to be included in the amount Wife received from Husband. Wife filed a contempt proceeding in 2011 alleging that Husband was failing to pay her the amount of his retirement pay he was required to pay. In March 2012, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it did not find Husband to be in contempt; Wife thereafter filed various motions seeking to have the court modify the manner in which Husband was computing the amount she would receive. Wife appeals the denial of relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside an order to dismiss for failure to prosecute in a personal injury action. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Following a five-day divorce trial, the trial court valued and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate, awarded $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to Wife, and declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. On cross-motions to alter or amend, the trial court altered its division of marital property as to several assets, and it modified the alimony award from $6,000 per month in alimony in futuro to $4,300 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four years. Wife then filed another post-trial motion, pro se, which the trial court denied. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for such other proceedings as may be necessary.

This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bernard Frazier, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we conclude that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel but that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. As such, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court.

Petitioner, Elijah Truitt, pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of greater than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell in Davidson County. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years for possession of cocaine and two years for possession of a firearm to be served consecutively. Petitioner was placed on community corrections. Petitioner’s community corrections sentence was eventually revoked and he was ordered to serve his original sentence as imposed. The trial court filed an amended judgment reflecting the revocation and imposition of the sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his sentence was illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner’s arguments are meritless. Therefore, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, James Garrett, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony convictions. He argues that he is entitled to relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary, and his conviction for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony violates the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c) and the prohibitions against double jeopardy. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Brian Hervery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his constitutional rights were violated by his being placed on a forty-eight-hour hold. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Shadeed Rasta, also known as Robert Williams, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 2009 conviction of felony murder. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Bryan Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Sedrick Williams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his judgment of conviction is facially void because it fails to reflect that he is to serve 100% of the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 8, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 9, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an appeal from a finding of contempt. When the parents of a six year old girl divorced, they agreed to name the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother subsequently acted in a hostile and uncooperative way towards the father, and her parenting time was reduced. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had failed to pay court-ordered child support for four consecutive months. Following a hearing, the trial court held the mother in contempt. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred by trying criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding. She also argues that the trial court’s order was invalid, because it did not specifically state that her actions were “willful.” We affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of a child on May 21, 1997. He filed a petition for post- conviction relief on July 25, 2013. He now appeals from the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he contends that the State breached a condition of his plea agreement, that the breach occurred outside of the statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings, and that due process should preclude the strict application of the statute of limitations in his case. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.