APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Chancery Court of Davidson County granted summary judgment to the Tennessee Jaycees and the other appellees, on the ground that the statute of limitations had passed prior to the filing of the appellants' wrongful death complaint against them. Because we do not find that the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the trial court.

In this divorce case, the defendant/wife has appealed from that portion of the divorce decree which granted to the plaintiff/husband sole custody of the daughter of the parties, aged 4 1/2 years at the time of judgment, 5 years at the present time.

This is a contract dispute in which the chancellor found that the uncontradicted proof showed that the plaintiff had no cause of action for the acts alleged in the complaint. We reverse on the single ground of estoppel and remand for further proceedings on that issue alone.

In this case the husband has appealed the trial judge's award of $14,750 to the wife as her share of the marital property. The trial judge made the following findings: that the husband's property had increased in value during the marriage in the amount, when added to the value of some property acquired by the parties, of $34,000; that the cattle acquired by the parties had a negative value of $4,500, leaving a net value of $29,500; that the wife had made a contribution to the preservation and appreciation of the property; that the wife had a greater need than the husband; and that the husband had a greater ability to produce income in the future. Taking the net increase in the marital estate of $29,500 the trial judge then awarded half of it to the wife.

The Circuit Court of Sumner County awarded the purchaser of a home a judgment against the sellers and their real estate agent, for deceptive practices as defined in the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Because we find that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the plaintiff suffered any ascertainable harm from a deceptive act, we reverse.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Gloria and Edward Keene, from the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to defendant/appellee, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. ("Cracker Barrel").

This appeal arises from post-divorce decree proceedings to increase and enforce child
support. On October 11, 1994, the Trial Court entered an order finding the husband guilty of
willful contempt, awarded the wife judgment for $10,054 arrears child support, increased
weekly payments, awarded attorneys' fees and ordered the husband to be confined in the
workhouse for six months.

This appeal involves a suit brought by an employee against his employer asserting that the employer's actions, in connection with the employee's demotion and subsequent termination, violated The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), T.C.A. § 4-21-101 (1991), et. seq. The employee also alleges that the employer's actions in connection with the demotion and termination were slanderous and constituted outrageous conduct. Plaintiff employee, Charles K. Newsom, appeals from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Textron Aerostructures, Inc., and Gary Smith,1 and the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in so doing. The pertinent facts are as follows.

In 1987 the United States Supreme Court placed limits on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in federal court. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). This appeal calls upon us to decide whether similar limitations should be placed on the use of private lawyers to prosecute criminal contempt cases in state court. The majority has declined to adopt the reasoning of the Young decision based on an
unduly narrow view of this court's responsibility. I cannot join the majority’s opinion. Instead, I would find that the resolution of this important question must await another day because the appellant has waived his right to raise the issue by failing to make a timely demand for another prosecutor in the trial court.

This appeal involves a suit primarily based onthe Public Employee Political Freedom Act of 1980, T.C.A. §§ 8-50-601 - 8-50-604 (1993) (hereinafter PEPFA). Plaintiff, Judy Pewitt, appeals from the circuit court's summary judgment order dismissing Pewitt's PEPFA and retaliatory discharge claims against defendants, Lillie Buford, Cliff Frensley, and Williamson County