APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Lincoln County jury convicted Carla Jo Fitch of murder in the first degree. The trial court approved the verdict and imposed a sentence of life in the Tennessee State Penitentiary for Women. Her motion for a new trial was denied, and she has appealed to this Court. The defense presents four main issues, of which the first three issues have sub-issues.

I concur with Judge Cornelius' reversal of this case, but write separately to address other issues.

The defendant, Arnold V. Porter, appeals from a jury conviction in the Circuit Court of Coffee County for two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. The defendant received two two-year sentences as a Range I, standard offender to be served concurrently in addition to a fine of twenty-five hundred dollars in each count. In this appeal as of right, he presents the following issues:

I. whether the evidence is sufficient to support guilty verdicts for felony reckless endangerment,
II. whether he was denied a fair trial because the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community,
III. whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and
IV. whether the trial court abused its discretion in raising his bond pending appeal.

On June 28, 1994, Plaintiff Jack Keller sued the defendants in the Davidson County Circuit Court claiming a breach of fiduciary duty by fraudulently failing to disclose the contents of a contract amendment signed in 1960. Jordan Keller, to whom a part of the contract rights had been assigned, joined his father as plaintiff.

In this action, plaintiff was awarded judgment for work performed under a contract, and defendant has appealed, insisting that plaintiff did not perform in accordance with the agreement between the parties.

Appellant, Gordon Burks, (Burks) brought this negligence action against Appellee, Pride Construction Company, Inc., (Pride) and various other defendants, in the Circuit Court of Shelby County. Pride's motion for summary judgment was granted and, from that judgment, Burks appeals.

I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority opinion holding that the appellants have standing to maintain this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act. In my opinion this case does not involve present rights that have accrued under presently existing facts. See Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. App. 1992).

Indian Hills ClubHomeowners' Association ("Plaintiff"), filed suit against Clayton and Cindy Cooper ("Defendants"), seeking an injunction prohibiting Defendants from building a driveway extension/parking pad and walkway onto their property. The trial court granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction, holding that the proposed construction would violate certain restrictions of record that prohibited any construction or improvements without approval from the Board of Directors of the Indian Hills  Homeowners' Association. Defendants have raised three issues for our consideration: (1) whether the Plaintiff's denial of Defendants' application and approval rested upon a lawful and legitimate basis; (2) whether the  Board's decision to deny the application was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of control; and (3) whether it would be unfair and inequitable to enforce the restrictive covenant. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the trial court and order that the injunction be dissolved.

This case comes before us as an interlocutory appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9. The 1This suit was originally filed by a total of fifteen limited partnerships. The claims of the five Keystone Partnerships; to wit: Keystone 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1983-2 Oil an Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Keystone 1984-2 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; and Midco 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership, are not at issue in this appeal. 2 Appellant, Citizens Bank of Tennessee (hereinafter "Citizens"), appeals the chancellor's denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs below, a group of ten
limited partnerships; to wit: Exchequer Associates Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership 1982-1; Exchequer 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Exchequer 1983-2 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnerships; Exchequer Synergy 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; First Energy 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; First Energy 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord 1983-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord II 1984-1 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; Overlord III 1984 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership; and Overlord IV 1984 Oil and Gas Drilling Partnership (hereinafter "Partnerships").1

Appellant D. Dean Graves ("Graves") appeals the chancellor's decision requiring 2 Graves to specifically perform a contract by purchasing an $85,000 parcel of real estate offered for sale by the Appellees, Donald L. Mott ("Mott") and Murl Kennamore ("Kennamore").