APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a decedent’s testamentary obligation to distribute his estate in accord with a marital dissolution agreement. The trial court determined that the decedent’s codicil obligated his estate to pay joint debts that the decedent incurred with his fiancè, and his estate could not seek contribution from fiancè for paying more than half of the debts. The trial court also determined that this distribution did not violate the marital dissolution agreement that decedent had negotiated with his ex-wife. We affirm the trial court on these two determinations. We, however, reverse the trial court’s finding that the estate was not required to reimburse fiancè for payments that she made on the debts after the decedent’s death and before the trial court ordered the estate to pay the debt.

Defendant, Re’Licka Dejuan Allen, was indicted on two counts of aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. The State refused to comply with Defendant’s requests for discovery by withholding the contents of Defendant’s computer hard drive and other computer materials alleged to contain incriminating evidence. The State refused to disclose the requested discovery despite the trial court’s issuance of two protective orders, the ruling of the appellate court on interlocutory appeal, and a third protective order by the trial court requiring disclosure. After a final hearing, the trial court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the indictment against Defendant. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based upon the perceived threat of federal prosecution to defense counsel. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment and remand for trial.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). While operating a forklift at her place of employment, an employee injured her back. She subsequently made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted an award of 30% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred by (1) basing the award on an impairment rating offered by a physician who was not on the authorized list of the employer and (2) declining to apply the 1.5 multiplier cap described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008). The employee sought additional medical expenses, including mileage, and temporary total disability benefits. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the award of benefits and modified to include additional medical expenses. The cause is remanded for a determination of those expenses.

After Lawrence County landowners installed a gate across an unpaved rural road, the County filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights of all the parties whose properties adjoined that road, as well as the right of the County to remove the obstruction. The landowners who installed the gate argued that the road had never been legally declared a county road and that the gate was necessary to prevent their neighbors from trespassing on their property. After a hearing, the trial court found (1) that the road was a county road and (2) that its entire length was contained in an easement which no one was allowed to obstruct. The court accordingly ordered the landowners to remove the gate. We affirm.

The petitioner, Raymond Writer, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was void because the trial court did not follow the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner did not allege a ground upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. In response, the State filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, George Allen King, pled guilty to one count of robbery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to eight years as a Range II multiple offender. He was placed on enhanced probation. After the revocation of his probation within a year of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argued that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not entered into voluntarily. At the conclusion of a hearing on the matter, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred because Petitioner was under the influence of drugs at the time he entered the plea and that he believed he was to receive a six-year sentence as opposed to an eight-year sentence. Because we find no credible evidence in the record to support Petitioner’s claims, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Omowale A. Shabazz, filed in the Morgan County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Defendant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated
robbery and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the
Department of Correction. Defendant raised several issues in his original direct appeal, including
whether the trial court erred in finding that he had implicitly waived his right to the assistance of
counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial. Without addressing the other issues, this court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the implicit waiver or forfeiture of counsel issue. See State v. Michael Small, No. W2003-02014-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3327845, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 15, 2006). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney. Defendant now appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in finding that his actions warranted the forfeiture of counsel, and (2) the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kevin B. Thompson, appeals from the Hardin County Circuit Court’s probation revocation for his two-year effective sentence for his guilty pleas to violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony, and violation of the registration law, a Class C misdemeanor. He claims that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in incarceration. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.

Shelby County Sheriff’s Deputy appealed the termination of his employment for violation of SOR-104–Personal Conduct to the Civil Service Merit Board. The Board modified the punishment to suspension without pay. The Sheriff’s Department appealed the Board’s modification to the Shelby County Chancery Court, which upheld the Board’s decision. The Sheriff’s Department appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Jerome Emmett Huntley, was convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years, six months and thirty days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial after Jimmy Calloway testified in rebuttal that the defendant said he did not want to “go back to prison for six more years.” A criminal defendant is entitled to impartial and unbiased jurors who are not influenced by inadmissible and prejudicial information such as the defendant’s being convicted of another crime. See State v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tenn. 1987).

The Defendant, Christopher Brian Knight, was convicted of one count of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial; (3) he was deprived of a fair trial before an impartial judge; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (5) he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to confirm that he had personally decided to waive his right to testify; and (6) the trial court improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence. We conclude that all of these contentions lack merit. We accordingly affirm.

The Petitioner pled guilty in Sullivan County, Tennessee, to one count of robbery and one count of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to five years for his robbery conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his evading arrest conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his judgments were void because neither judgment ordered his sentences to be served consecutively to his unserved sentence in Maryland. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

In 1996, a Hamilton County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Delivetrick D. Blocker, for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. In 1997, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years for especially aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2008, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) the indictment charging him with murder was fatally defective because it did not allege an overt act; (2) the indictment charging him with especially aggravated robbery was fatally defective because it varied from the judgment convicting him of attempted especially aggravated robbery, which requires proof of an overt act; and (3) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order his sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Virgil Samuels, pled guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated rape. The defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty-five years to be served as a violent offender. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a nuisance case. The plaintiff landowner filed a complaint alleging a continuous nuisance caused by grading completed on adjacent property. The plaintiff alleged that the grading had altered the natural drainage pattern, causing damage to her house. The complaint sought damages and injunctive relief. The defendants sought summary judgment, raising the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court agreed and granted defendants’ motion. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute, we reverse. 

The defendant appeals as of right from his Hamilton County jury conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting unduly prejudicial autopsy photographs of the victim and that the evidence was insufficient to show that he premeditated the killing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant hospital filed suit against Appellee insurance company for damages arising from Appellee’s alleged impairment of the Appellant’s hospital lien. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant hospital, finding that Appellant had perfected its lien under Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-101, and that the Appellee had impaired that lien pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §29-22-104. The trial court, however, limited Appellant’s recovery to the amount of coverage under the insurance policy. We affirm as modified herein.

The petitioner, Jason Crawford, appeals the circuit court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the appeal as untimely filed or, in the alternative, affirm the circuit court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to timely file his notice of appeal and his claims do not warrant consideration in the “interest of justice.” Therefore, his appeal is dismissed.

This is an wrongful death action arising under a theory of premises liability. Plaintiff’s husband died as a result of injuries he sustained after tripping over a piece of concrete embedded in a dirt path. Plaintiff alleged that two of the defendants, who were under a separate maintenance contract with the owner of the property, failed to exercise the required due care in the maintance, inspection, and repairs of the path. The trial court granted directed verdicts for both defendants after finding that neither owed a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. We agree that defendant Brooks Shaw did not have a duty to maintain the path. However, we have determined that defendant Town and Country did owe a duty to Plaintiff’s husband. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact for the jury to decide. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Jimmy Stuart Mynatt, appeals his convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life plus twenty-five years.  On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress statements made to the police; and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This is a wrongful death action brought under a theory of medical malpractice. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Plaintiffs filed their complaint after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. After careful review, we find that Plaintiffs had notice of their claim no later than February 27, 2003, and their lawsuit was not timely filed. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerry Timberlake, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on his failure to verify the petition under oath. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.