APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jamie Tenerio Rice, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. Following his guilty plea to sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of both the mother and father as to their minor daughter. After a trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed and that termination would be in the child’s best interest. The father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not ordering that he undergo a psychological evaluation. After review of the record, we find that counsel for father did not ask the trial court to have the father undergo a psychological evaluation, and that the issue is therefore waived on appeal. The father does not dispute that grounds for termination and the best interest of the child were established by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Vicki Hogan, of driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as ten days in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that both of her convictions should be reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce into evidence the result of her breathalyzer test, which the Memphis Police Department administered more than three hours after her arrest, in direct contravention to the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant’s DUI per se conviction should be reversed. However, the appellant has waived her claim regarding the DUI conviction because she failed to comply with Rule 24(c), Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires that an appellant’s statement of the evidence convey a “complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.”

The Defendant, Johnny Benard Temple, was convicted of eight counts of delivery of .5 ounces or more of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, and two counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. He was sentenced as a career offender to an effective sentence of 102 years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied his two requests for a continuance; and (2) the trial court ordered consecutive sentencing in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 We conclude that these arguments lack merit and accordingly affirm. Because of certain inconsistencies between the Defendant’s sentences as announced at his sentencing hearing and his sentences as recorded on his judgment forms, however, we remand for clarification and entry of corrected judgments.

The petitioner, Calvin Scott, appeals as of right the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner alleged that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this appeal is whether the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board had cause to terminate Derek Davis’ employment for violating the Department’s drug-free workplace program. Upon review, we find that: (1) the Court of Appeals applied the incorrect standard of review in reviewing the Board’s decision; (2) the positive urine specimen test result was admissible evidence for the Board to consider; and (3) the Board’s decision to terminate Mr. Davis’ employment was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence that is both substantial and material. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

On appeal, Regions Financial Corporation (“Regions”) asserts numerous reasons why the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel should not bar its claim against the Defendants National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa. (“National Union”) St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (“St. Paul”), and Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin City”) (collectively “Defendant Excess Insurers”). Regions originally sued Defendants in federal court seeking indemnification pursuant to its insurance contract, and the District Court granted Defendants summary judgment because Regions failed to give simultaneous notice. Regions has now sued Defendant Excess Insurers in circuit court for breach of the same insurance contract. Regions claims that during the federal court appeal it discovered new evidence that it had given simultaneous notice to Defendant Excess Insurers through their agent. Regions claims, however, that it could not have discovered this evidence earlier because Defendant Excess Insurers concealed the agency relationship. The trial court granted Defendant Excess Insurers’ motions for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We affirm.

In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in allowing the executor of the plaintiff’s estate to be substituted as the party plaintiff where the party plaintiff died before suit was filed in his individual capacity. We are also asked to determine whether the defendant waived the issue of plaintiff’s capacity by first raising the issue in a post-answer motion to dismiss. We find that a suit brought in the name of a deceased person amounts to a nullity, and thus, is not amenable to substitution. We further find that an objection based on the fact that the plaintiff was deceased when the complaint was filed can be made at any time during the proceedings, in any appropriate manner, and such objection stops the cause at whatever stage it may be, whenever made known to the court.

The Wife in this divorce action takes issue with the grounds upon which the trial court granted the divorce, the distribution of marital property, the calculation of Husband’s monthly income and the designation of life insurance. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court denied appellant Roy Samuel Batson’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits on the basis that Mr. Batson failed to establish that his disability was caused by his work. Mr. Batson has appealed. After our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Mr. Batson has failed to carry his burden of proof with respect to causation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Mr. Batson’s claim for benefits.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ricky Terrell Cox (hereinafter “Cox”), was convicted by a jury of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to twenty-two years at one hundred percent for the three especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and four years at thirty percent for the aggravated assault convictions, to be served concurrently. He was also sentenced to nine years at thirty percent for the especially aggravated burglary conviction, nine years at thirty percent for the attempted second degree murder conviction, and eighteen months at thirty percent for the unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, which were to be served concurrently to one another but consecutively to the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty-one years. On appeal, Cox argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting his prior juvenile conviction for impeachment purposes, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the State failed to prevent or correct the false testimony of two of the State’s witnesses, and (4) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action for wrongful death and loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed the action upon determining it was filed beyond the one-year statutory limitations period. We affirm.

This is a shareholder class action which was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim. The case alleges breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing against members of the Board of Directors who procured and approved a merger. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to allow the case to go forward, and, therefore, dismissal was in error. The decision below is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Ira Ishmael Muhammad, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of attempted second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated assault. Based upon the imposition of consecutive sentencing, he received an effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence based upon application of enhancement factors absent a finding by the jury and in imposing a consecutive sentence; (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to request recusal of the trial judge and district attorney and appellate counsel’s failure to pursue two issues on direct appeal; and (3) he should not have been convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter as the crime is an impossibility under the law. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This case arises from a dispute over a contract for the sale of land. In the contract, Appellee Sellers made no warranty concerning the exact acreage of the tract. Appellant Buyer was given the right to have the tract inspected and surveyed prior to closing; however, he did not exercise that right. At the closing, Appellant also executed a waiver to any claims arising from a determination that the assumed acreage was incorrect. A survey performed after the closing indicated that the tract was approximately three acres less than the parties thought. Appellant Buyer brought suit against Appellee Sellers on grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Employee sustained a compensable injury to his left knee. After surgery and recovery, his treating physician assigned 2% impairment to the left leg. At Employee’s request, an IME was conducted with the evaluating physician assigning 7% impairment. To resolve the disparity, the parties selected a neutral physician from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) to conduct an examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) (2005). That physician assigned 3% impairment to the leg. Employee obtained a second medical evaluation from a fourth physician, who assigned 13% impairment. The trial court, affording the statutory presumption of correctness to the MIR physician’s rating, concluded that 3% was “the accurate impairment rating” and that this rating had not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Applying the 3% impairment rating in conjunction with the statutory cap of 1½ times the anatomical impairment, the trial court awarded 4.5% permanent partial disability to the leg. On appeal, Employee contends that he successfully rebutted the statutory presumption. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

While working at Employer’s warehouse, Employee fell approximately ten feet from a ladder onto a metal catwalk. He was treated in an emergency room for closed head trauma and arm, hip, and neck pain. Employee sought treatment from a psychiatrist for depression and anxiety and was diagnosed with major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and alcohol dependence in remission. Employee’s psychiatrist opined that as a result of the fall at work, Employee was unable to function within a work environment and that the impairment was permanent. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits. On appeal, Employer challenges the trial court’s findings with regard to both causation and vocational disability. After review, we affirm.1

This is a post-divorce action seeking a change in child custody. The initial action was filed by the natural mother, the Appellee herein, and the trial court determined that primary residential custody should be with her. The paternal grandparents, the Appellants herein, also moved the court for custody of the two minor children. The trial court denied the grandparents’ petition for custody. The grandparents appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

The defendant, William Eugene Cantrell, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and burglary of a motor vehicle, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to three years and one year, to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of continuous confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Janis Sue Watson, appeals the order of the Hamblen County Criminal Court that dismissed her petition for post-conviction relief. The criminal court held that the petition, which challenged the petitioner’s 2004 convictions of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, was barred by the statute of limitations. The State has moved this court to summarily affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of the Court of Criminal Appeals 20. Because the record supports the State’s motion, we affirm the order of the criminal court pursuant to Rule 20.

The petitioner, Lavon Mario Davis, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Knox County from his convictions for second degree murder and attempted first degree murder, both Class A felonies. He was sentenced to twenty years for the second degree murder conviction and twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. He contends that: he received ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court lacked authority to accept the guilty plea to second degree murder; and the trial court lacked a sufficient factual basis to accept his guilty plea to attempted first degree murder. We affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The Father, C.E.S., and Mother, L.L.S., were not married at the time of the birth of their minor child, A.C.S., on September 27, 2006. The birth certificate was initially caused to reflect the child’s surname as that of Mother. On November 17, 2006, the Father filed a petition in the Juvenile Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, to establish parentage for joint custody. An Order of Parentage, reserving the issue of changing the child’s surname, was entered by the Juvenile Court, through Special Referee, on February 27, 2007. The Juvenile Court Referee subsequently ordered that the child’s surname be changed to that of Father by Order entered December 13, 2007. Following an appeal of the Referee’s decision, the Juvenile Court, by Special Judge, affirmed the Referee’s decision and ordered that the surname of the child be changed to that of Father. Mother appealed, claiming that Father failed in meeting his burden of proof of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that changing the minor child’s surname was in the best interest of the child. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained a compensable injury to both of his shoulders in March 2005. The treating physician assigned 6% permanent anatomical impairment to the body as a whole. Employee suffered a second injury to his shoulders in February 2006. The same physician assigned an impairment of  7% to the body as a whole, which he described as a “cumulative” impairment for both injuries. Employee returned to work for Employer at wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage. The trial court awarded 9% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the first injury, and 10.5% permanent partial disability for the second injury. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the medical testimony. We agree, and modify the judgment accordingly. Employee contends that the trial court erred by denying, on the basis of sovereign immunity, his motion for discretionary costs. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

Because the state, as the appellant, failed to meet its burden of proving that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by suppressing the evidence, I must respectfully dissent from the majority.

The petitioner, Bryan Lee Cable, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.