APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Derrick Futch, was convicted of two counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery, Class D felonies, and one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years for each conviction of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery and two years for his conviction of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the three offenses for trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach the defendant’s testimony with evidence of a prior conviction; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors violated due process and the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition alleged that the trial court unconstitutionally merged the provision requiring a minimum life sentence for first degree murder and the provision prohibiting instructions on possible penalties to the jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Luther Mowery, was convicted of failure to obey a traffic signal and ordered to pay court costs. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, a claim with which the State agrees. Following our review, we, likewise, agree and, accordingly, reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

The defendant, Stacey Wayne Creekmore, presents for review a certified question of law following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(I). As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless stop. The defendant argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, as required under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable work-related injury and that Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was not barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Andrew Campbell, pled guilty in eight cases, which were consolidated for this appeal, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; five counts of theft under $1000, a Class D felony; ten counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and fourteen counts of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting the length and alignment of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to dismiss the counterclaim filed against the plaintiff. Prior to the trial of the case, the plaintiff filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions contending the filing of defendant’s counterclaim violated Rule 11. Thereafter, the case went to trial on the plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s counterclaim. At the close of the proof, the defendant voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims. After the trial was concluded, the trial court held that the defendant and its attorneys violated Rule 11 because the evidence presented at trial revealed that the counterclaim had no basis in fact or law and they failed to dismiss the counterclaim when the motion for sanctions was filed. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by evaluating the issue with the wisdom of hindsight instead of examining the circumstances existing at the time the counterclaim was signed by the attorneys, and for imposing sanctions for failing to voluntarily dismiss the counterclaim, because Rule 11 does not impose a duty to review or reevaluate a pleading once filed or to take affirmative steps thereafter to dismiss a previously filed pleading. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eric Wayne Dunn, pleaded guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and leaving the scene of a property damage accident, a Class C misdemeanor. For the offense of DUI, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail. For the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, he was sentenced to thirty days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail, and he was required to pay restitution to the victim. His sentence for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident was to be served concurrently with his DUI sentence. The Defendant-Appellant entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve certified questions of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. In an addendum to the judgment of the conviction for DUI, he set out two certified questions of law: whether he was unlawfully seized at his residence and returned to the accident scene and whether his alleged seizure would preclude admission of the breath test. Because this addendum was not entered by the clerk until after the notice of appeal was filed in this matter, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and, therefore, it is dismissed. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2 to reflect the correct conviction offense of DUI (.08% or more) and a corrected judgment in Count 1 to reflect the dismissal of the offense of    DUI.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action in the Chancery Court for Maury County, alleging that he developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to a substance in his workplace. The employer denied liability. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded benefits for temporary total and permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, by finding that the statutory notice requirement was satisfied, and by awarding temporary disability benefits. In the alternative, the employer asserts that the judgment is excessive. We have determined that the awards for temporary total and  permanent partial disability should be reduced.

Inmate filed a petition for certiorari, seeking a review of a decision of the prison disciplinary review board, affirmed by the Commissioner of Corrections, finding him in violation of Tennessee Department of Corrections policy. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding it was not filed within sixty days of the entry of the order for which review was sought. Finding no error, we affirm the action of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the above-captioned appeal. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal as a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, viewing the action as an original petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is time-barred. Accordingly, the action of the lower court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Parents of two children appeal the termination of their parental rights, asserting that the grounds for termination do not exist under the facts presented. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1988, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of third degree burglary and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, to be served on intensive probation. In 1989, he was transferred to regular probation. In 1990, probation violation warrants were filed, alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer and that he had absconded. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the order of the trial court.

The appellant, Justin K. Boldus, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the Dickson County General Sessions Court’s finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to ten days in jail. On appeal, the appellant raises various issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt of court. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is dismissed.

The petitioner, Dontae Lamont Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this action for workers’ compensation benefits, the deceased spouse of William W. Brown, Jr., died of lung cancer. He contended that her cancer was caused by exposure to chemicals in the workplace. The employer, Erachem Comilog, Inc., contended that the cancer was caused by cigarette smoking. The trial court found for Erachem. Husband has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling.1 We affirm the judgment.

The plaintiff claimed that he suffered neck and back injuries after the automobile in which he was riding was rear-ended by the defendant’s automobile. The defendant admitted breach of the standard of care, but the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the result of the accident, and he was not awarded any recovery. The trial court awarded the defendant $645.95 in discretionary costs to cover the court reporter fees he incurred for depositions. The plaintiff argues on appeal that there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. For his part, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him all of the discretionary costs he requested. We affirm the jury verdict, but we remand the issue of the award of discretionary costs.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. Mother appeals, claiming that the trial court should have dismissed the termination petition because the petitioners lacked standing, or alternatively, because the petition failed to contain a notice provision required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9A. Mother also claims that the trial court looked to the wrong four-month period when determining whether she failed to visit and erred in finding that her failure to visit was willful. She also claims that termination was not in her son’s best interest. Finally, Mother claims that her due process rights were violated in various ways. We affirm.

The defendant, Halbert B. Dodd, II, was indicted on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion and the prosecutor denied the defendant’s application. The trial court granted the defendant’s writ of certiorari and determined that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The defendant’s motion for an interlocutory appeal was granted. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the prosecutor’s abuse of discretion was evidenced by his: (1) characterization of the defendant’s past behavior as a “history of criminal behavior”; (2) failure to consider evidence which tended to show that the defendant was amenable to correction; (3) reliance on the defendant’s failure to admit guilt; and (4) failure to consider all factors favorable to diversion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the order of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority that upholds the determination of the trial court that the defendant’s May 11, 2005, statement was admissible. While I recognize the difficulty of securing an attorney qualified to represent the defendant in this first degree felony murder case, I believe that the nearly two-month gap between his arrest and his confession to the offenses compels our concluding that the confession was inadmissible.

I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I depart slightly from the majority’s chosen pathway to those results. Specifically, I would hold that the issues raised on appeal were precluded by the absence of a timely motion for new trial rather than by their absence from such a motion.

The defendant, Jeffrey D. Allen, was convicted by a Crockett County jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that the sequestered jury was improperly separated and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement to police, ruling a witness unavailable, admitting prior bad act evidence, and allowing improper opinion evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect that the defendant received a life sentence for his first degree murder conviction.