APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Troy Tackett, pled guilty to one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court ordered him to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In reliance on plaintiff’s experts, the trial court granted defendant doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim pertaining to defendant’s failure to admit plaintiff into the hospital. The trial court later granted the defendant doctor summary judgment on the remaining malpractice claims finding that the plaintiff’s medical expert proof previously relied upon by defendant failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim since the defendant doctor relied solely on plaintiff’s experts, whose testimony was later found inadmissable. We also reverse the summary judgment of the remaining malpractice claims since the defendant doctor never presented proof to negate an element of those claims. Consequently, the plaintiff had no duty to create issues of fact at the summary judgment phase.

Appellant, David Scott Winfrey, pled guilty in Sumner County to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor conviction. In addition, the trial court ordered Appellant to serve ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court based the imposition of the consecutive sentences on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(g). On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, in ordering incarceration above time already served, and in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error with the length of the sentences imposed. However, we have determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-113(g) authorizes sentences for violation of an order of protection to run consecutively to other convictions stemming from the same underlying facts, as opposed to authorizing sentences for violation of an order of protection to run consecutively to each other. Therefore, we vacate the sentences imposed by the trial court and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

The defendant, Candice Parrish, pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following her guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of four years but granted her request for judicial diversion. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of her diverted probationary sentence, and, following a sentencing hearing, the trial court removed the defendant from judicial diversion and sentenced her to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in ordering a sentence of total confinement. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

The defendant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, was found guilty as charged of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to sixteen years as a violent offender. On appeal, she argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; and the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on the composition of the jury. After careful review, we find that plain error exists in the omission of jury instruction for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We are, therefore, compelled to remand for a new trial.

An inspector cited an entertainer and the sexually oriented business in which she worked for violating an ordinance governing certain requirements for entertainers and businesses engaging in sexually oriented entertainment. The Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board upheld the citations and fined the entertainer and the business $500 each. They appealed and the chancery court affirmed. They now appeal to the Court of Appeals. We find that the board did not have authority to assess the fine. We affirm the board and the chancery court’s finding that the ordinance was violated, and since the board has authority to impose other sanctions, we remand the matter to the chancery court with instructions to return the matter to the board.

Following a jury trial, Defendants, J. C. Fair and Krederick Fair, were convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. Each Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to eighteen years. On appeal, both Defendants argue (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their conviction of aggravated robbery; (2) that the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motions for a mistrial; and (3) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. Defendant J. C. Fair also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Margaret Gail Moore, while working as a fuel clerk at a truck stop, was attacked and beaten during a robbery, suffering multiple injuries. Ms. Moore sought permanent disability benefits for physical and mental injuries. She presented testimony of two evaluating physicians, who estimated her total anatomical impairment at 62% to 82% to the body as a whole. The employer, Mountain Empire Oil Company, presented testimony of two evaluating physicians who estimated her impairment to be 14.5%. The trial court awarded 93% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by basing its award on the testimony of the evaluating physicians presented by the employee.1 We affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves a claim of tortious inducement to breach a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement. The plaintiff staffing agency employed the defendant therapists at a State residential care facility for severely disabled persons. The plaintiff agency staffed the facility under an exclusive contract which was set to expire by its own terms in June 2003. The therapists had executed restrictive covenants in their employment agreements with the plaintiff staffing agency under which they were prohibited from working at the State facility for one year after the termination of their employment with the plaintiff. The State requested bids to staff the facility under a new contract. Through the bidding process, the defendant staffing agency was awarded the contract. The defendant agency then met with the defendant therapists (who were incumbent employees), staffed through the plaintiff agency, and offered to hire them to continue working at the facility. The defendant staffing agency was aware of the non-compete covenants and agreed to indemnify the defendant therapists if the plaintiff staffing agency tried to enforce the covenants. The defendant therapists accepted positions with the defendant agency and continued working at the facility. The plaintiff agency filed this lawsuit against the individual defendant therapists and the defendant agency. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the non-compete covenants were enforceable, that the defendant therapists had breached their covenants, and that the defendant staffing agency had tortiously induced the individual defendant therapists to breach their employment contracts. The defendants now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, while the plaintiff agency had a legitimate protectable business interest, the non-compete covenants are not enforceable in light of the hardship to the defendant therapists and the adverse impact on the public interest.

This appeal involves the plaintiff’s negligence claim which arose from a motor vehicle accident with the defendant. Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff’s positive drug test to be admitted as evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court’s jury instructions were improper and that the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence. Reviewing plaintiff’s first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug test as evidence. Likewise, we find that the jury instructions were proper and that there is material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a wrongful death case against a municipality. In 1987, the plaintiff’s teenage son was shot and killed by a police officer. The plaintiff sued the officer and the municipality, asserting claims under both federal and state law. Years of proceedings and delay ensued. By 2005, the only remaining claims were state law claims against the municipality. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage award under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

I write separately to state that I believe the issue is controlled by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24, particularly subsections (c), (e) and (f), wherein the respective rights and responsibilities of the appellant, the appellee and the trial court are stated.

The Defendant-Appellant, Latoya Lynn Townsend, pleaded guilty to facilitation to distribute cocaine, a Class C felony, and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. For the facilitation offense, she was sentenced to three years at Westate, a community based alternative to imprisonment. For the marijuana offense, she was sentenced to two years at Westate, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the facilitation offense, and ordered to pay a fine. The Defendant-Appellant, Tobias Toby Horton, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony. For the cocaine offense, he was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and he was ordered to pay a fine. For the marijuana offense, he was sentenced to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, which was to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the cocaine offense and his sentence for a prior probation violation. Townsend and Horton, as a part of their conditional plea agreements, attempted to reserve certified questions of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. In agreed orders filed contemporaneously with their judgment forms, they each set out the following certified question of law: whether the search of the residence leased by Townsend was unconstitutional in violation of Article I, section 7, of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because the certified questions fail to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and, therefore, it is dismissed.

This application for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal concerns how an appealing party may use a trial court’s recording of a hearing. We grant the appellant’s Rule 10 application.¹ Furthermore, we reverse the chancellor’s June 5, 2009 order and remand the matter for the chancellor to rule on appellee’s objections and resolve the parties’ differences as to the content of the transcript or statement of the evidence.

The petitioner, Michael Lebron Anderson, was convicted of burglary of a building other than a habitation and was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jerome Dance, appeals the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine over .5 grams, Class B felonies, and one count of sale of cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. Subsequently, he was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to an effective term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) object to an insufficient Notice of Enhancement Factors filed by the State; (2) file a motion for recusal of the trial judge; (3) adequately prepare for the sentencing hearing; (4) inform the petitioner of a plea offer and to adequately advise him that he would not be sentenced as a Range I offender if he proceeded to trial; and (5) pursue a Rule 11 application to appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court or to properly withdraw. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Heard, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Dock Walker, proceeding pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is currently an inmate in the West Tennessee State Prison as a result of his conviction for assault with the intent to commit murder, for which he was sentenced to a term of sixty years. On appeal, he argues that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing the petition because his sixty-year sentence is illegal, as it was not authorized by statute and is in violation of ex post facto provisions. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her work as an aesthetician. She was referred to an orthopaedic surgeon, who concluded that her condition was not related to her employment. She had surgery on both arms. An evaluating physician testified that her condition was caused by her employment. The trial court ruled that she failed to sustain her burden of proof with regards to causation. On appeal, she contends that the evidence preponderates against that finding. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Timothy Ray Azbill, was convicted of aggravated burglary, rape of a child, and especially aggravated kidnapping. For his conviction of aggravated burglary, the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. For his convictions of rape of a child and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The court ordered that the sentences were to run concurrently but consecutively to the sentence on a prior conviction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions, but determined that the trial court had erroneously begun at the midpoint of the statutory range and remanded the case for resentencing for rape of a child and especially aggravated kidnapping. On remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for each conviction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to consider mitigating evidence offered by the defendant and summarily imposed the sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, William R. Cook, was charged with driving under the influence (first offense)(“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-403. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop that led to the charges against him. The Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved for our consideration a certified question of law regarding the constitutionality of the traffic stop supporting the charge against him. After our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The indictment charging the Defendant with DUI is dismissed.

Employee was a passenger in an automobile, which was involved in a collision. It is undisputed that the accident arose from and occurred in the course of his employment. The trial court awarded future medical benefits but declined to award permanent disability benefits. We affirm the judgment.1

A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Charles Nash, of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. The defendant asserts that he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel before the statement began, thus rendering the statement violative of his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of the judgments.

After a trial by jury, the Petitioner, Jordan Hill, was convicted of criminal attempt: aggravated robbery and convicted felon in possession of a handgun by a Shelby County jury. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief claiming “[t]he post-conviction court erred when it denied the Appellant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and effectively placed its imprimatur on trial counsel’s performance as effective although the proof irrefutably showed that trial counsel had not meaningfully conferred with the Defendant prior to trial[.]” Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.