APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted the defendant, Manuel Haynes, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, twenty years for the first count consecutive to fifteen years for the second count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors when sentencing the defendant on the first count; (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (4) the trial court erred by failing to re-read portions of the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on the intoxication of a juror. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. ("Hartford") filed this suit against Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co. ("Mr. Penney"), seeking compensation for additional workers' compensation insurance premiums, as well as court costs and service of process fees. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of Hartford for $12,316 plus costs. Hartford subsequently filed a motion seeking pre-judgment interest, which was granted after a hearing resulting in an additional award of $4,823.77. Mr. Penney appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Brent Richardson, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, carjacking, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of life plus forty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend two counts of the indictment after the jury had been sworn and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dennis Ray Bailey, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Dickson County of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after serving 45 days in confinement, and ordered to pay a $600 fine. Bailey claims on appeal that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jesse B. Gilliland, was arrested at the Cool Springs Mall in Franklin, Tennessee for videotaping underneath women's skirts. Officers obtained a search warrant and while conducting the search, discovered marijuana. The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for one count of possession of marijuana weighing less than a half of an ounce. Appellant filed a motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause for the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant entered a negotiated plea to the marijuana charge with a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, Appellant reserved a certified question arguing that there was not probable cause to support the search warrant because the facts as alleged, of Appellant photographing underneath women's skirts in a public place, did not constitute a crime. On appeal, the State concedes that the facts as presented do not actually constitute crime under our State's current statutory scheme. Therefore, we must reverse trial court's judgment, order that the evidence found as a result of the execution of the search warrant be suppressed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Donald Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of an ex parte order of protection filed by Wife. After finding that Wife failed to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the order of protection and assessed the costs against Wife. Wife appeals. We reverse.

Appellant, Patty Sue Lawrence, was convicted of two counts of prostitution, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of submitting a false police report, a Class D felony. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of three years in custody. She appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

This appeal involves the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The plaintiff professor was a department head at the defendant university. As the department head, the plaintiff evaluated a subordinate professor. The dean of the university instructed the plaintiff to remove negative information from the evaluation; the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff was then removed from his position as department head. He continued at the university as a tenured professor. The plaintiff sued the university asserting a claim under the Public Protection Act, alleging that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities. The trial court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis, inter alia, that the plaintiff was neither terminated nor discharged. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the removal of the plaintiff from his position as department head, when he remained employed as a professor, is not a termination or discharge under the Public Protection Act.

The Petitioner, Bruce Huffines, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for forgery, a Class E felony. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Julie Petty, for one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. These charges came about as a result of Appellant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl who was a student at the school where Appellant was a substitute teacher and softball coach. Appellant entered an open plea to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years with one year to be served in confinement and the remaining three years to be served on probation. Appellant appeals from the trial court's imposition of this sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have imposed a three-year sentence with the entire sentence to be served on probation. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Larry McKay, and his co-defendant, Michael Sample, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that the prosecution violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Eugene Sample, and his co-defendant, Larry McKay, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay and Sample, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that: (1) the State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him; (2) the State knowingly presented false testimony; and (3) his sentence of death violates Apprendi because the jury imposed the sentence based upon aggravating circumstances that were not contained in the indictment, presented to the grand jury, or proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ernest Hurd, appeals as of right from the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to set aside the judgment declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO). See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 55-10-601, et seq. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the default judgment declaring him to be a MVHO is void because it was not properly certified under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Therefore, he argues that he cannot be convicted of violating the MVHO statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-10-616. Following our review, we hold that the default judgment met the requirements of Rule 58 and that, even if the judgment had not met these requirements, a delay of over sixteen years in challenging the judgment precludes any relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Israel Dean Bolinger, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, failing to apply the physical facts rule, denying certain redactions in a statement, and in determining his sentence. We affirm.

In January 2007, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Timothy Webber, for one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the death of a homeless woman and the beating of a man. On October 22, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to be served at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not explain to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a "knowing killing." In addition, Petitioner alleged that because he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues. In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that trial counsel and the trial court explained to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a knowing killing and that Petitioner understood that fact. Therefore, he was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

On March 13, 2007, Appellant, Catherin Vaughn, pled guilty in Rutherford County Circuit Court to child abuse of a child under the age of six. The trial court ordered her to serve three years on probation. On December 18, 2008, Appellant made several threatening comments about a juvenile court judge in front of the worker who was teaching Appellant parenting skills and anger management. These threats were reported to the police. As a result, on January 1, 2009, Appellant was arrested for retaliation for past actions against a judge. A probation violation warrant was filed against Appellant. The trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated her probation. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve twenty-one days in incarceration and serve two more years on probation. Appellant appeals from the revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a conservatorship case. Appellee filed a petition to appoint a conservator for her father, the Appellant herein. The trial court granted the petition, appointing co-conservators for Appellant, and charging fees and expenses to the Appellant's funds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 34-1-114. Appellant appeals. Finding that the record is incomplete and, as such, does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that Appellant was in need of the court's assistance, and that the trial court failed to properly follow the statutory mandates required for appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand.

The petitioner, Frederick Carey, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of the sale of cocaine, Class B felonies, two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of resisting official detention, a Class B misdemeanor. The petitioner agreed to a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each Class B felony, to be served concurrently, and to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. On appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel presented an unenforceable plea agreement upon which he relied in choosing to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves dismissal for failure to prosecute. After receiving an adverse judgment in general sessions court, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. At the circuit court hearing on his appeal, the defendant failed to appear because he mistakenly went to the wrong court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and remanded the case to general sessions for entry of a final judgment. The defendant now appeals. We affirm.