APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony about items in the Defendant's possession when he was arrested; (2) the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for Community Corrections. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Plaintiff motorist filed suit against defendant motorist and her employer, seeking damages she sustained in a motor vehicle accident in which defendant motorist rear-ended her vehicle. Defendants appeal a jury award asserting there is no material evidence to support the award. Finding the verdict of the jury to be supported by the evidence, we affirm the judgment.

An Anderson County jury found Appellant Michael J. Bell guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, appellant claims that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted an inculpatory statement he made to police; (2) there was insufficient evidence for a finding of premeditation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted an autopsy report; (4) the trial court erred in giving the jury a "sequential" determination jury instruction; (5) the trial court improperly reiterated the sequential determination jury instruction in its verdict forms; and (6) the trial court improperly characterized appellant's statement to the police as a "confession" in its instructions to the jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Adam Clyde Braseel, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to fifteen years for each Class A felony conviction, three years for his Class C felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for murder, especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault and argues that the pre-trial identification processes were unduly suggestive. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that defendant's convictions of the attempted first degree premeditated murder of Rebecca Hill in count four of the indictment and the aggravated assault of Ms. Hill in count five violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge defendant's conviction of aggravated assault into hisc conviction of attempted first degree murder. We also find that the trial court's judgments of conviction for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder do not clearly reflect the trial court's merger of the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgments as to defendant's convictions of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and assault, and his effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. We remand solely for the correction and entry of appropriate judgments consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Alphanza Dale Pitts, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-403; -103 (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant as a persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the prosecutor made improper comments during opening and closing arguments, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term of fifteen years for aggravated burglary. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the Tennessee Claims Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the State of Tennessee arising from the death of a young child who had been removed from his mother's home and placed in the custody of the mother's aunt by order of the juvenile court. The child and his two brothers were removed from their mother's care because of her use of cocaine. At the mother's request and after an investigation, the Department of Children's Services recommended to the juvenile court that custody of the children be awarded to the mother's aunt. Less than a month after the court entered the order of custody, the mother reported concerns about the children's well-being to the Department. A case worker investigated the aunt's home and found no basis to remove the children. Ten days later, one of the children, a five-year-old boy, died from extensive injuries allegedly inflicted by the aunt's nineteen-year-old daughter who lived in the home. The child's mother filed a wrongful death claim against the State alleging negligence on the part of the Department. The Claims Commissioner denied the claim, finding that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (1999 & Supp. 2009) and that, in any event, the mother had failed to prove negligence by the Department. We hold that the Claims Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim because the child was not in the care, custody, and control of the State.

The petitioner, Michael Lynn Stanton, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the denial pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief in which petitioner alleged that his guilty plea was based on a coerced confession, he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and newly discovered evidence of perjury by a State witness requires a reversal of his guilty plea. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Charles O. Rogers, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to attempted robbery, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years. The trial court imposed a sentence of split confinement, ordering the defendant to serve sixty days, on consecutive weekends, in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Following the filing of a violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry Phillip Haley, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sixty year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from the victim; and (2) the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process in violation of State v. Anthony and State v. Dixon. Initial review of the record reveals that the defendant has waived both issues based upon his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Further review leads us to the conclusion that neither issue rises to the level of plain error. As such, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that it delivered materials and provided labor for the installation of a fire protection system on the property of defendant and defendant had failed to pay money still owed under the contract. Plaintiff sought a materialmen's lien to enforce any judgment obtained against defendant for the amount of monies owed under the contract. Defendants answered, filed a counter-complaint and raised multiple defenses. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled in plaintiff's favor, holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover monetary damages and the materialmen's lien would be enforced. Defendants have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Emanuel Oliver, appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt to unlawfully possess a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent in the Shelby County Correction Center. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for prosecution has run and that he should not be held responsible for his plea agreement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, George T. Haynie, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2007 guilty-pleaded convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and failure to appear. Discerning no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Larry D. Guthrie, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and he received a sentence of six years and one month in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court's denial of his request for two special jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother's parental rights to her three children were terminated. We affirm, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not meet the reasonable requirements of the parenting plans and that persistent conditions existed. We further find that DCS used reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Finally, we find that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

The Defendant, David Freeman Clay, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and three counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for each sexual battery conviction and six months for each assault conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of nine years and six months in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to fulfill its duties to approve the jury verdict under Rule 33 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gary C. Bullington, was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI"), felony evading arrest, driving on a revoked license, and two counts of vehicular assault. State v. Bullington, No. M2005-02227-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1816325, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 27, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2006). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court initially determined that the petition was not time-barred because Petitioner did not receive notice of the denial of permission to appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that counsel was ineffective in two areas but denied post-conviction relief on the basis that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice as a result of the deficiency. Petitioner now appeals the denial of postconviction relief. After a review of the record, we determine Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Paris Johnson, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Campbell County Criminal Court for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in prison for the aggravated assault and to thirty days' incarceration for the public intoxication, to be served concurrently. The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Range III, persistent offender; and (3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We hold that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but we remand the case for resentencing for the aggravated assault conviction.

Cecilia and Charles Owensby had a homeowners insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). After their house burned down, the Owensbys filed a claim pursuant to the policy. State Farm eventually denied the claim, asserting that Cecilia Owensby had made four material misrepresentations when applying for the insurance and that each of these misrepresentations increased State Farm's risk of loss. The plaintiffs asserted that any inaccurate information contained on the application was the fault of the insurance agent who filled out the application on Cecilia Owensby's behalf. The plaintiffs sued both State Farm and Darius Miller ("Miller"), the insurance agent. State Farm and Miller filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and, as modified, affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tony E.Cannon, Jr., of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. State v. Tony E. Cannon, Jr., No. M2007-00557- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2448341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 18, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues on appeal pertain to a nonconforming, grandfathered billboard that was destroyed by a natural disaster in 1998. The original billboard, which was erected prior to the enactment of the Billboard Regulation and Control Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 54-21-101, et seq., was allowed to remain as a nonconforming, grandfathered device. After the nonconforming billboard was destroyed by a natural disaster, TDOT authorized Appellants to rebuild the billboard provided that it was rebuilt to the original size "using like materials" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.04(2) (1998). The original billboard stood on two wooden posts and had a metal facing. When Appellants rebuilt the billboard by erecting it on a steel monopole instead of two wooden poles, TDOT filed a Notice of Charges stating the new billboard failed to comply with the regulation because it was not rebuilt with "like materials." Following a hearing, the administrative judge concluded that the billboard was in violation of the regulation, which decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of TDOT and the chancery court. Appellants contend on appeal that the billboard is in compliance with the regulation and that the removal of the billboard constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. We affirm the finding that the billboard was not in compliance with the regulation as it was not rebuilt using "like materials."

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Bobby Reed Aldridge, pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of theft over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received in a collateral proceeding for violating his probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.