APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal in a termination of parental rights case. Finding that the statutory grounds of substantial non-compliance with a permanency plan and persistence of conditions, and that termination is in the best interest of the children, have all been shown by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.

In this action to terminate the parental rights of both parents of J.E.K., the Trial Court, after hearing evidence, ruled that several statutory grounds for termination of both parents' parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence, as well as clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interest for the parents' rights to be terminated. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Petitioner, Michael Hoover, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his postconviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of his plea of guilty, and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this medical malpractice action, defendants filed affidavits along with a summary judgment motion, setting forth that they had met the standard of care in their treatment of plaintiff, Sherri J. Hager. The hearing on the summary judgment was continued and plaintiffs were directed to furnish the Court with an affidavit to support their claims. Plaintiffs filed the affidavit of a physician who specialized in internal medicine, who opined that defendants failed to meet the standard of care in treating plaintiff, but stated repeatedly in the deposition that he could not offer an opinion on causation of any injury that would merit an award of damages, since he was an internal medicine specialist. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and, on appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiff was injured in an accident while in an automobile operated by defendant. Plaintiff's action charges defendant with negligent operation of the motor vehicle, causing the accident and her resulting injuries. Defendant was operating her vehicle on a wet roadway. She skidded, which she claims was the sole cause of the accident. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether defendant was negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle, independent of the vehicle's skidding, and remand the case for trial.

Appellant Christopher J. Johnson pled guilty to selling marijuana and especially aggravated burglary. He was given an effective sentence of 8 years, suspended and to be served on probation. He was then charged with violating the terms of his probation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that the sentences be served in confinement. He appeals, arguing that revoking his probation in full was excessive. Upon review, we affirm.

The defendant, David Franklin Henning, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced as a career offender to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and fifteen years. On appeal, he raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence; and (2) whether he was inappropriately sentenced as a career offender. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Sixteen "citizen plaintiffs" filed this ouster suit against Scott Moore and Paul Pinkston, Knox
County Commissioners. Plaintiffs demanded a jury, which the Trial Court disallowed and,
following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge found that Scott Moore should be removed
from office, but held the petitioners were unsuccessful in their attempt to oust Paul Pinkston.
The parties have appealed and we hold that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury to decide the
factual issues in dispute and vacate the Trial Court's Judgment as to Paul Pinkston and
remand for a new trial. The Judgment as to Scott Moore is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Cannon, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his open guilty pleas to aggravated burglary and aggravated assault which resulted in two twelve-year sentences to be served consecutively. He claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise him that he could potentially avoid his two consecutive twelve-year sentences by exercising his right to a jury trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr., was charged with one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the search warrant authorizing the search was defective. The Davidson County Criminal Court granted his motion. The State now appeals that grant. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the  lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless  homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony  murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count.

The Petitioner, Demetrius L. Lancaster, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a school zone, being a convicted felon in possession of a weapon, and sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. He received an effective fourteen-year sentence, as a Range I, standard offender for these convictions, which sentence was to be served consecutively to a prior seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner then filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition and subsequently entered an order denying relief. The Petitioner appeals. Because the record on appeal does not include a transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction court, we conclude that the Petitioner has waived the issues argued on appeal. We must presume that the post-conviction court correctly denied post-conviction relief and, therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the petitioner’s appeal or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Arthur W. Stamey, III, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that the coram nobis court erred by permitting two witnesses to testify for the State and by concluding that those witnesses were more credible than the petitioner. He also claims that the court erred by concluding that a letter of recantation written by the victim did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order dismissing Petitioners’ petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption upon determining that the petition was invalid as a matter of law where it was jointly filed by the child’s maternal great-aunt and her daughter, the child’s aunt. The trial court awarded Father sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse the award of sanctions to Father and dismiss the remainder of the appeal on the grounds
of mootness.

The defendant, Michael Hugo Brooks, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of DUI, third offense, and was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months, 29 days, with 120 days to serve in the county jail followed by probation. The sole issue the defendant raises in this appeal is whether the trial court committed plain error by denying his motion to suppress. Based on our review, we conclude that he has not shown the existence of plain error in the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Justin Michael Scott, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to vehicular assault and driving on a revoked license. He received a total effective sentence of three years, to be suspended after service of six months in the Knox County Jail. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s failure to grant a sentence of full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Nathaniel Richardson, pled guilty to second degree murder in Shelby County and received a twenty-year sentence. At the guilty plea hearing, Appellant reserved the following certified questions of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure:
1) Whether the trial court erred by denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress all the evidence taken from the trunk of the car that was seized by the police on September 13, 2004? Whether the seizure of the car from the parking lot where [Appellant] worked in the absence of a search warrant violated the U.S. Const. amend. IV and amend. XIV and Art. 1 § 7 and § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and in violation of Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; thereby[ ] requiring that the evidence taken from the trunk be suppressed? A search warrant was later signed on September 15, 2004[,] and the vehicle was searched. 2) Whether the trial court erred by determining that [Appellant] was legally competent to stand trial. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where officers had probable cause to seize Appellant’s car. We decline to address Appellant’s remaining arguments regarding his statements to police, detention by police, and validity of the search warrant as they were not presented in the certified questions presented. Further, we determine that the issue regarding Appellant’s competency is not dispositive and, therefore, not a proper certified question. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of an auto accident. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appeals, arguing that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove causation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of the defendant.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Lia Bonds, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Lia Bonds, No. W2006-01943-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3254711 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 2, 2007). This Court, however, vacated Defendant’s sentence because she was improperly sentenced under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. On remand, Defendant waived her ex post facto rights to be sentenced under the 1989 Sentencing Act, and the trial court sentenced Defendant under the 2005 amendments to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length of her sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the warrantless search of his residence and adjoining property, the Defendant, Monty Blackwell, was charged by presentment from the Grainger County grand jury with manufacture of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia related to the manufacture of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, and theft of property valued at over five hundred dollars. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the warrantless entry onto his property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in case no. 06-04210. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in case no. 06-04210 consecutively to his effective sentence of thirty-two years in case nos. 06-04209 and 07-01739, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during the crossexamination of a witness for the defense; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the imposition of consecutive sentencing violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed an action in Chancery Court. He later filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit and immediately refiled his action in Circuit Court. An order dismissing the Chancery Court action was filed several days later. The employer moved to dismiss the Circuit Court action, noting that the Chancery Court action was still pending at the time the Circuit Court action was filed. The Circuit Court granted the motion. Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. We affirm the judgment.