APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a complaint filed with the Claims Commission in which Christopher Turner (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary damages for being incarcerated by the State of Tennessee (“the State”) beyond his sentence expiration date due to the failure of the Tennessee Department of Correction to award the pretrial jail credits and “street time” ordered by the criminal court as provided by his plea agreement. The amended complaint alleged “negligent care, custody, and control of persons,” “negligent care of personal property,” “negligent operation of machinery or equipment (computer systems),” and “breach of written contract.” The State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion and dismissed the case on the ground that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because “the allegations in the Complaint fall outside the categories set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307.” Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Commission’s determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. However, both parties contend, and we agree, that instead of dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, the Commission was required to transfer the case to the Board of Claims. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a)(5) (“Claims not within the jurisdiction of the claims commission shall be sent to the board of claims.”). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to transfer the case to the Board of Claims.

The Defendant, Willie Taylor, was convicted of rape, assault, and promoting prostitution.
The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred by not suppressing his
statement to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
rape and assault. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Keith Ward, of rape of a child, and the trial
court sentenced him to 32.5 years in prison, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner appealed,
and this court affirmed the conviction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for postconviction
relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
meet with him, review discovery with him, and develop an effective strategy before trial.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner
maintains his arguments. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

This appeal concerns a dispute between a landlord and a tenant. 495 Kings Stable, LLC
(“Plaintiff”), through its owner, filed a forcible entry and detainer warrant against Kimberly
Pate (“Defendant”) in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County. Plaintiff prevailed,
and Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). After
a trial, the Trial Court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding it damages and attorney’s fees.
Defendant appeals arguing, among other things, that she was constructively evicted
because of conditions such as a raccoon in the house. Plaintiff raises separate issues. We
affirm the Trial Court’s determinations that Defendant was not constructively evicted and
that she breached the lease by failing to pay rent as required. Defendant did not afford
Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged problems. However, we find that the
Trial Court erred in declining to award Plaintiff damages for the remaining months of the
lease. We vacate the Trial Court’s award of damages and remand for the Trial Court to
award Plaintiff additional damages for the remaining months of the lease. In addition,
although Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the lease, the Trial Court
erred by failing to apply the factors used for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s
fees found at Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5. We vacate the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Plaintiff and remand for the Trial Court to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s
fees—including reasonable post-trial and appellate attorney’s fees—applying the Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5 factors.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
appellants’ motion for recusal. After considering the trial court’s ruling under the
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B de novo standard of review, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court denying recusal.

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. After reviewing the
record, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence provided at trial to
support the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, but not the ground of substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan. We also conclude that the trial court failed to
make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the ground of
failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility
of the child. Thus, we (1) affirm the trial court’s finding that the ground of abandonment
by failure to visit was established, (2) reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of
substantial noncompliance was established, and (3) vacate the trial court’s finding that the
ground of failure to manifest was established. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that
terminating Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.

Defendant, Jerry Lynn Huskey, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his sentence of
probation for aggravated domestic assault, theft under $1,000, evading arrest, and resisting
arrest, and ordering him to serve his original six-year sentence in confinement. Following
our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

The Defendant, Claude James Feagins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for an
alternative sentence. The Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, misdemeanor theft, felony
theft (Class D), and reckless endangerment. A six-year effective sentence resulted, with
the manner of serviced to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. After a
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years of
incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. After review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Leslie Lamont Coleman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a prior felony murder case. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the only proof connecting him to the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of his alleged accomplice; (2) the trial court committed plain error by ruling the State could question the defendant about his prior felony murder conviction under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 if he chose to testify; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by imposing the maximum Range II sentence of twenty years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a disputed strip of land along the edge of Norris Lake in Campbell County, Tennessee. The defendants in this case are lot owners of residential lakefront property in a planned development. The plaintiffs are the neighborhood home owner’s association and the company operating the marina in the development. The plaintiffs claim, based upon a note in the original plat map of the development, that a “one-foot buffer” zone along the defendants’ lots was reserved to the original developer. According to the plaintiffs, the marina company thus controls the shoreline in the area at issue and is at liberty, with permission from the Tennessee Valley Authority, to expand the existing marina. The defendants, on the other hand, dispute the existence of the buffer and claim that their lot boundaries extend right up to the shoreline. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, and, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the plat note at issue did not reserve any interest in the disputed strip to the original developer. Plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

Appellant city residents sued the City of Memphis for breach of contract, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel related to inadequate garbage
collection services provided by the City. Residents also sought a constructive trust and a
declaratory judgment. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract action upon its
conclusion that the provision of garbage collection services was a government function that
did not create an enforceable contract between the city and its residents. The trial court
dismissed the residents’ other contractual claims on the basis that they were barred by
sovereign immunity. Finally, the trial court dismissed the claims for constructive trust and
declaratory judgment upon its conclusion that they did not state a claim for relief under the
circumstances. We affirm.

This appeal invoves a claim for adverse possession. Gilbert Lopez and his wife Wendy Lopez claimed ownership of a 1.25 acre parcel of land (“Lot 39”) adjacent to their property under the theory of common law adverse possession. Deidra Sharp, owner of a tract also adjacent to Lot 39, presented evidence of her unencumbered title to Lot 39. Ms. Sharp established that she and her predecessors in title had paid taxes on Lot 39 and argued that the Lopezes did not prove their possession was uninterrupted, continuous, exclusive, or adverse for the requisite twenty year period. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the Lopezes did not “indicate ownership of [Lot 39] nor did [they] do anything that would rise to the level of more than a trespass.” The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony by making explicit credibility determinations in favor of Ms. Sharp and her witnesses. The trial court also held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110(a), which generally bars a claim to real estate when the claimant has failed to pay taxes on the claimed property, applies to bar the adverse possession claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following his conviction for first degree murder, the Petitioner, Jose Lemanuel Hall, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to meet with him adequately and failed to object to the State’s opening statement. He also argues that the requirement to show actual prejudice in post-conviction proceedings is overly burdensome and conflicts with constitutional protections. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the purchaser of real property, alleging that the purchase was a fraudulent conveyance. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined on the undisputed facts that the purchase was in good faith and without notice of Plaintiffs’ claims and for reasonably equivalent value. We conclude that the undisputed facts show that the purchaser was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We also discern no abuse of discretion in a separate decision by the court to set aside the dismissal of the purchaser’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs. So we affirm.

Defendant, Johnny DeWayne Boyd, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and incest. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the State’s failure to file a bill of particulars, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to continue trial after a court security officer tested positive for COVID-19 and by failing to comply with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Order on COVID-19 protocol. Following a review of the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff, a female secretary at a high
school, sued the county school board for discrimination alleging that she was terminated
because of her sex in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Following a bench
trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages. The school board
appeals, asserting that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
We have determined that the plaintiff failed to identify a “similarly situated” employee and
therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. We reverse the
judgment of the trial court.

Tabila Aida Tekle was charged in the Monroe County Criminal Court with two counts of
harassment and one count of retaliation for past action for statements she made on
Facebook about employees of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The
Defendant filed motions to dismiss the indictment, asserting that her statements were
protected by the right to free speech, and the trial court dismissed the charges. The State
appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the harassment charges, arguing that the court made a
pretrial factual determination about an element of the offense, which was a determination
for the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse
the judgments of the trial court, reinstate the charges for harassment, and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Curtis Morris, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Shelby County convictions for first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, and aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s: (1) failure to call an expert witness to rebut the State’s experts and bolster Petitioner’s testimony that the victim’s death was accidental; (2) making “material misstatements” regarding the evidence in counsel’s opening statement; (3) failure to adequately prepare to cross-examine one of the State’s experts and failure to request a McDaniel hearing to challenge the expert’s testimony; (4) failure to file any pretrial motions; (5) failure to object, during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Petitioner, to the prosecutor’s repeated use of the word “stomping” to characterize Petitioner’s direct examination testimony; (6) failure to request proper jury instructions regarding the mens rea required for a conviction for aggravated child abuse; and (7) failure to present evidence of child custody proceedings in which Petitioner sought and won custody of his children. Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to one of her children. The trial court found that Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established four grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This appeal arises from a divorce case. The husband filed a petition for divorce, and the
wife filed a counter-petition. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce dividing the
marital estate and granting the divorce in the wife’s favor on the grounds of adultery and
inappropriate marital conduct. The husband appeals. We affirm as modified.

The Defendant, Vincent John Elliott, Jr., pled guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. Also on appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to eighteen years instead of the minimum sentence of fifteen years. Upon review, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the Defendant’s certified question and respectfully dismiss that portion of the appeal. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence in all respects.

The Petitioner, Cody Ricky Cofer, was convicted in the Cumberland County Criminal
Court of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted especially
aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of two consecutive life terms. The
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence,
and the coram nobis court denied the petition without a hearing because the petition was
untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by summarily
denying the petition without first considering whether the statute of limitations should be
tolled on due process grounds. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal because
the Petitioner’s notice of appeal also was untimely. Based upon the oral arguments, the
record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and conclude that the appeal should
be dismissed.

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
this appeal.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the petitioner proved five statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree that clear and convincing evidence supports three grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. So we affirm.

Defendant, Juan Lasean Perry, appeals the denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.