APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the results reached by the majority opinion; yet, I choose to write
separately because my opinion differs from the majority in how we arrive at that same result.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Elgy Smith, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, both Class B felonies; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, both Class E felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged each pair of convictions and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five persistent offender for the cocaine offense and five years as a Range III, persistent offender for the marijuana offense. Finding the Defendant to be a professional criminal, the trial court also ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bykeem Bret Jenkins, pleaded guilty in 2007 in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and received a two-year suspended sentence. In response to a timely petition for violation of the defendant's probation, the trial court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals from the order of confinement. We affirm the trial court's order.

In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm.

The petitioner, Justin Rashard Forrest, appeals the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery in case number 07-337; aggravated burglary and theft in case number 07-285; and possession of marijuana and especially aggravated robbery in 07-286. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied his petition. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Michelle Shoemaker, was unsuccessful in her direct appeal to this Court from her convictions in Jackson County for first degree murder, conspiracy and tampering with evidence. These convictions resulted in an effective life sentence. See State v. Michelle Shoemaker, No. M2005-02652-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3095446 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 2, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. March 12, 2007). Following her unsuccessful direct appeal, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel by both her trial and appellate counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of her petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has been unable to prove that either trial or appellate counsel were ineffective. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

A Davidson County jury found the defendant, Antonio Vaughn, guilty of possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced him, as a Range III career offender, to serve 12 years, at 100 percent, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Charles Owens, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. He received a sentence of twenty-four years. State v. Charles Owens, No. M2005-02571-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1094136, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 20, 2007). Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,the post-conviction court denied the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied the petition for relief. We agree with the post-conviction court that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to various things at trial, in part because this Court had already determined on direct appeal that the alleged "prosecutorial misconduct" at trial did not affect the outcome of trial. Accordingly, because we determine that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for  approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly.

The Defendant-Appellant, Harry Richard, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Shelby County to driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in a county workhouse. This sentence was suspended, and Richard was ordered to serve eleven months and twenty-eight days on probation. He was also assessed a six hundred dollar fine and ordered to pay fifteen dollars in other fees. Richard claims on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, he reserved the following certified questions of law: (1) “Whether there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop for speeding”; (2) “Whether there was probable cause to arrest Harry Richard for DUI”; and (3) “Whether placing Harry Richard in the back of the squad car was a ‘brief detention’ in this instance.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Appellees, as shareholders, leased a commercial building and property from a relative. When the relative died, the property was left to numerous heirs, including Appellees and the non-shareholder Appellants, and Appellee Carolyn Lyle was named property manager. Appellees fell behind on their rent owed pursuant to the lease, but ultimately repaid the arrearage, and disbursements were made to the property co-owners. Appellants sued, claiming that Lyle should be removed as property manager, that she was obligated to declare the lease in default and to re-let the property, and that the Appellees breached their fiduciary duties to the other property co-owners. The trial court denied Appellants' claims, and we affirm.

The plaintiff made a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house burned. The insurer denied the claim because, after the policy was issued, the plaintiff deeded the property to his sons so that it would pass to them if he died, and he did not notify the insurer. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a “warranty of ownership” under the policy, that he had a duty to disclose the change of ownership after the policy issued, and that he violated a provision of the policy addressing concealment and fraud. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the insurer to pay him approximately $72,000 in accordance with the policy limits. The trial court also awarded discretionary costs to the plaintiff, but it denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The insurer appeals, claiming that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy for various reasons, and that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff discretionary costs. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to the insurance policy and its award of discretionary costs, and we vacate the portion of the judgment denying the request for prejudgment interest and remand for such an award.

In Maury County on June 17, 2002, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to two six-year sentences to be served consecutively. He was placed on probation. After violating probation, he was placed on Community Corrections. On July 10, 2008, Appellant's Community Corrections officer filed a violation report. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellants Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his full twelve year sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused it discretion in revoking his Community Corrections sentence and that the trial court did not have authority to impose the full twelve year sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Community Corrections sentence. However, we agree with Appellant that he had previously served the first six-year consecutive sentence, and the trial court can only impose the remaining six-year sentence. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of the Community Corrections sentence, and modify Appellant's sentence to six years.

The Petitioner, Erodito D. Lopez-Carranza, was charged with one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). On May 2, 2005, he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, accepting an out-of-range sentence of seven years in the Department of Correction, to be served as a multiple offender at thirty-five percent. On July 6, 2009, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Hickman County. On July 24, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The habeas corpus court granted the motion. The Petitioner now appeals that grant. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Brian David Black, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for theft of property over $500, a Class E felony, and ordering him to serve his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to be served, rather than imposing some less severe sanction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marquentis Johnson, pleaded guilty on June 20, 2005 to two counts of theft over $1,000, Class D felonies, and one count of theft over $500, a Class E felony, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to four years for each count of theft over $1,000 and two years for theft over $500, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of four years in Community Corrections. The Circuit Court of Madison County revoked the defendant's community corrections sentence and resentenced him as a standard offender to serve each sentence consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the circuit court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The Petitioner, Jeffery T. Siler, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that due process considerations toll the one-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief and entitle him to a delayed appeal. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, George Hardin, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's order summarily dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner seeks to re-litigate a previously litigated claim. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Rodney Nelson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, in three separate cases, pled guilty to eight counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and received an effective sentence of 21.6 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, the petitioner raises the single issue of whether his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial.

The defendant, Corterrius Worthy, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. The defendant entered an open guilty plea to one count of robbery, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant to a term of three years. The court also denied the defendant's request for probation and ordered that the sentence be served in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and failing to grant probation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rodney Nelson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, in three separate cases, pled guilty to eight counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and received an effective sentence of 21.6 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, the petitioner raises the single issue of whether his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial.

The petitioner, Derrick D. Futch, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to 8 years, at 100 percent, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court summarily dismissed. The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Ray Pinson, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He was sentenced as a child rapist to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pinson claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Steve Carl King, of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted statements the Defendant gave to Illinois police; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify although the State had failed to disclose their existence in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on the victim's recanted testimony. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Defendant-Appellant, Darrell Anderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life. In this appeal, he presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving a description of photographs that were not in evidence in response to a jury question; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the truthfulness of an officer's testimony; (4) whether the trial court erred in making comments in the presence of the jury which were unfairly prejudicial; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence; (6) whether he was unfairly prejudiced by the conduct of the State; (7) whether the trial court erred in qualifying an expert and admitting his conclusions; and (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the State's duty to preserve evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.