APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a conservatorship case. Appellee filed a petition to appoint a conservator for her father, the Appellant herein. The trial court granted the petition, appointing co-conservators for Appellant, and charging fees and expenses to the Appellant's funds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 34-1-114. Appellant appeals. Finding that the record is incomplete and, as such, does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that Appellant was in need of the court's assistance, and that the trial court failed to properly follow the statutory mandates required for appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand.

On March 13, 2007, Appellant, Catherin Vaughn, pled guilty in Rutherford County Circuit Court to child abuse of a child under the age of six. The trial court ordered her to serve three years on probation. On December 18, 2008, Appellant made several threatening comments about a juvenile court judge in front of the worker who was teaching Appellant parenting skills and anger management. These threats were reported to the police. As a result, on January 1, 2009, Appellant was arrested for retaliation for past actions against a judge. A probation violation warrant was filed against Appellant. The trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated her probation. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve twenty-one days in incarceration and serve two more years on probation. Appellant appeals from the revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Frederick Carey, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of the sale of cocaine, Class B felonies, two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of resisting official detention, a Class B misdemeanor. The petitioner agreed to a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each Class B felony, to be served concurrently, and to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. On appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel presented an unenforceable plea agreement upon which he relied in choosing to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves dismissal for failure to prosecute. After receiving an adverse judgment in general sessions court, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. At the circuit court hearing on his appeal, the defendant failed to appear because he mistakenly went to the wrong court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and remanded the case to general sessions for entry of a final judgment. The defendant now appeals. We affirm.

In January 2007, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Timothy Webber, for one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the death of a homeless woman and the beating of a man. On October 22, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to be served at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not explain to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a "knowing killing." In addition, Petitioner alleged that because he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues. In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that trial counsel and the trial court explained to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a knowing killing and that Petitioner understood that fact. Therefore, he was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Linda Pinkins, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, on July 22, 2009. The trial court sentenced her to three years in the workhouse and ordered that she serve six months in confinement and five years on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and by sentencing her to a term of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James David Allen, III, pled guilty to vandalism, a Class E felony, and received a sentence of two years of probation under the judicial diversion program. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Following the filing of a violation of probation warrant and an amended violation of probation warrant, the Defendant was sentenced to serve seven consecutive weekends in the Blount County Jail. Following the service of the seven weekends in jail, the Defendant was directed to return to supervised probation for the balance of his sentence. On April 7, 2009, a second violation of probation warrant was filed. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's sentence of probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of the two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings.

The plaintiff had filed suit for divorce against defendant and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had a prior marriage and theirs was a bigamous relationship. The Trial Judge held that defendant had a prior marriage and voided the parties' marriage ab initio and dismissed the action. Plaintiff has appealed. We hold that under Texas law where they married, and California law where they resided prior to coming to Tennessee, they could, under the statute, enter into a common-law marriage after the spouse was divorced in the prior marriage. The disputed issue of fact in the summary judgment is whether the parties entered into a common-law marriage after the plaintiff's prior marriage ended. We remand for a determination of this factual issue.

The petitioner, Demario Tabb, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective life sentence without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that counsel was ineffective by failing to remain with the petitioner after a failed proffer session to ensure that he was escorted back to his cell in light of the fact that the petitioner gave an incriminating statement to police after counsel left. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip G. Harris, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, in the Circuit Court for Coffee County. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a violent offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment order did not impose lifetime community supervision following the expiration of Harris' sentence as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524. Consequently, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment order. The trial court entered a corrected judgment order that imposed lifetime community supervision. On appeal, Harris challenges the validity of his guilty plea and the constitutionality of the lifetime supervision statute. The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide for an appeal as of right. Upon review, we agree with the State and dismiss Harris' appeal.

The defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of twelve years for the robbery and six years for each assault, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the imposition of consecutive sentences, specifically contending that the court erred in relying upon his juvenile record to establish that he was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident.

The defendant, Daniel Lopez, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies. He was sentenced to life for each murder conviction and to twenty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in: denying his request to give a jury instruction for accomplice testimony; sustaining the State's objection to testimony of a co-defendant; granting the State's motion to have an anonymous jury; denying his motion for a mistrial; and instructing the jury to disregard a question from defense counsel during cross-examination. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years at 100% for aggravated rape consecutive to five years at 30% for aggravated burglary, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by misapplying enhancement factors and ordering the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Jones Milton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dominic Delvekio Carter, was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple rapist to an effective sentence of fifty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Vincent Byron Rose, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Dell Hilton, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received an eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, and a concurrent, three-year sentence for aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, Hilton claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danurico Dujuan Grundy, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Circuit Court for Dickson County. On November 17, 2005, he pled guilty to theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and five counts of uttering a forged instrument under $1,000, a Class E felony. Grundy received an effective sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was ordered to pay $26.50 to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and $546.50 in court costs. On appeal, Grundy claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentences of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Ann Ross, appeals from the Bedford County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from her guilty plea to first degree murder and her life sentence. In her appeal, the Petitioner argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel coerced her into pleading guilty to first degree murder and failed to adequately prepare her case, investigate witnesses, and defend her. She also contends that she was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to enter her guilty plea because she was under the influence of certain medications. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.