APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the judgment and in the reasoning of all but Sections III and IV.B of the majority’s opinion. In Section III, the majority holds that “the first step” in addressing whether to apply the peer review privilege set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-219(e) “is to determine whether the subject matter of the underlying proceeding is within the subject matter covered by the statute.” In Section IV.B, the majority relies on the rationale developed in Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2010), observing “that the privilege in [section] 63-6-219(e) applies only to peer review proceedings regarding a physician’s professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.” The majority determines “that some, but not all, of the functions of the Quality Review Committee [at Cleveland Community Hospital] were peer review proceedings involving the professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine of the physicians on the hospital’s medical staff.”

While the majority’s narrow interpretation of the statutory peer review privilege has appeal, I cannot reconcile its result with the basic principles of statutory construction. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ronald Lee Stewart, guilty of aggravated burglary, theft, and vandalism. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III persistent offender to a total effective sentence of thirteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that his convictions "violate[] the Sixth Amendment because of juror fatigue" and that the trial court erroneously found him to be a persistent offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, William Ladonte Davis, pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to sell and conspiracy to sell cocaine, receiving sentences of eleven years and five years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing, specifically contending that he should have been sentenced to probation or community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Travis Jay Lester, pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to introduction of contraband into a penal facility, resisting arrest, and two counts of assault. He received a total effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Maurice Darnell Tyler, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Sidney Leonard Pigg, III, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of Class D felony theft of property. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-103. The trial court imposed a three-year sentence for this conviction, which was to be suspended following service of sixty days. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Marquise Harris, has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) was subject to an illegal search, seizure, and arrest; and (3) he received an unconstitutional enhancement of his sentences. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A junior creditor sued the senior creditor claiming that the senior creditor's involvement in the sale of collateral, used trailers for tractor-trailer trucks, was commercially unreasonable. We agree with the trial court that the senior creditor, a bank, was subject to the commercially reasonable disposition of collateral rule. However, we hold that the bank's approval of the sale, arranged by the debtor, was not commercially unreasonable. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This is a dispute between two companies that supply parts in the automotive industry. Company A claims that Company B tortiously interfered with its contract and with its business relationships. The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to causation and that Company B conclusively established the affirmative defense of justification. We affirm the decision of the trial court because Company B negated the element of causation.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, for these convictions. Under the same indictment, the Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for this conviction, to be served consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of twentyone years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that consecutive sentencing was improper. Because the record on appeal does not include the necessary transcripts of what transpired in the trial court, we conclude that the Defendant has waived the issues argued on appeal. We must presume that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and that the sentencing ruling of the trial court was correct; therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Bernard Henry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The plaintiff home builder filed a complaint for breach of contract against a woman who refused to close on the sale of a home she had contracted to purchase. When the defendant failed to timely respond, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment and served the motion on the defendant by mailing a copy to her. She did not open the envelope, but wrote "return to sender" on it, and placed it back into the mail. The trial court granted the plaintiff a default judgment. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant argues on appeal that she did not receive actual notice of the motion for default judgment, and that the trial court should have granted her motion to set it aside amend because of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Demance Marshall Beasley, was charged with: one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39- 13-403(b), -12-107(a); one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-202(c), -12-107(a); and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(e)(1). Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by foreclosing crossexamination of the victims regarding their drug usage; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After the parties' divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent and Father was ordered to pay $3,250.00 per month child support. Father filed two petitions seeking a reduction of his support obligation, which were denied. The parties then agreed that Father would pay $2,500.00 per month support through March 1, 2014. Thereafter, Father filed a third petition to reduce support claiming decreased income and increased parenting time. Subsequently, the parties signed an agreement allowing substantially equal parenting time, which was filed with the trial court, but never signed by the trial judge. The trial court denied Father's third petition for modification, finding both that he had failed to prove a significant variance and that he was contractually bound to his $2,500.00 agreement. The trial court also awarded Mother's attorney his $15,000.00 fee. We affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to Mother's attorney as well as its refusal to reduce Father's child support obligation due to his allegedly decreased income. However, we remand to the trial court for consideration of whether Father's child support obligation should be reduced due to increased parenting time, and for entry of the parties' Agreed Parenting Plan Order. We decline to award Mother her attorney fees incurred on appeal.

Officers of a church appeal the trial court holding that under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102 the members of the church have a statutory right to church records. We find that the members have a right to the records described in subsection (a) of the statute since such access is unconditional and since enforcing this right does not entangle the court in religious affairs in violation of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. However, the members failed to articulate a "proper purpose" as required in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 48-66-102(c) to gain access to those records described in subsection (b) of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse in part.

The defendant, Tracy Lynn Cope, was convicted of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and one count of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years for the Class A felony, twenty years for the Class B felony, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify that the defendant broke his hand by hitting her in the face; trial counsel was ineffective; and he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

On August 13, 2007, Petitioner, Moncelle Voorhies, pled guilty in Rutherford County to sale of cocaine under .5 grams. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on August 11, 2008, alleging that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily and that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now brings this appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of his petition. After a review of the record and arguments on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that he was afforded effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Cedric Antonio Conner, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received a six-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's refusal to grant him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Yolanda D. Barefield, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she alleges that she entered an involuntary guilty plea due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we remand to the trial court for appointment of counsel and a hearing regarding the issue of whether the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to her guilty plea to felony escape.

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lee Barnett, of attempted aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, ordering him to serve seventy-five days in jail and the balance of his sentence on probation. The defendant appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Terance Rose, stands convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to three years for reckless homicide and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the state to amend the indictment over the defendant’s objection, (2) the sheriff’s deputies violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches, and (3) the deputies took his third statement in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a juvenile court custody proceeding. The mother filed a petition for legitimation in the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court entered an order finding that the defendant father is the child’s natural father, designating the mother as the child’s primary residential parent and granting weekend parenting time to the father. After a protracted dispute over parenting time, the Juvenile Court entered an order designating the father to be the child’s primary residential parent, with no provision for parenting time for the mother. The mother then appealed to the Circuit Court. After several years of Circuit Court proceedings, the case was transferred to another Circuit Court judge who ultimately entered an order dismissing the appeal. The mother appealed the Circuit Court’s order. After remand, the Circuit Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. We affirm the designation of the father as the primary residential parent but find that the Juvenile Court erred in not providing for parenting time for the mother, and remand the case to the Juvenile
Court for entry of an order providing for parenting time for the petitioner mother.

Petitioner Lemar J. White was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. After this court affirmed his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he claims both attorneys should have challenged the validity of his warrantless arrest because the State did not supply a sufficient basis for finding probable cause. We affirm.

A Williamson County jury convicted the petitioner, Mark A. Shiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to ninety-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions but modified his sentence to thirty-two years. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that  received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he (1) did not object when the trial court ordered the spectators to move so they could not see the presentation of video evidence; (2) did not object when the trial court ordered that part of the defendant’s testimony be stricken from the record; (3) did not obtain a copy of the audio-taped conversation between the petitioner and the victim, object to the recording’s  admission as evidence, or properly prepare the petitioner for cross-examination about the recording; (4) did not properly object or move for a mistrial during the state’s cross-examination of the petitioner; (5) did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of expert testimony; (6) did not object to the trial court’s questioning of state witnesses; (7) did not seek an extraordinary appeal when the trial court refused to compel the state to provide copies of videotape evidence; and (8) did not object to the state’s use of the term “vaginal shots.” Additionally, the petitioner avers that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficient performance post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.