APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Christopher M. Black, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Two law firms seek accelerated interlocutory review of the denial of their motion to
disqualify the trial judge. Because there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s
impartiality, we reverse and remand for reassignment.

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of real property. Because of the profound
deficiencies with Appellants’ brief, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of damages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

This appeal arises from a divorce case. The wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging
irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted a
divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital
estate, awarded alimony, and entered a judgment for unpaid child support. The husband
appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This
Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.
Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been
entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A mother relocated less than fifty radial miles, but more than fifty driving miles, from the father. The trial court held that the parental relocation statute applied because the mother relocated more than fifty miles away and, even if she had not, she moved close enough to fifty miles that application of the relocation statute was appropriate. We find that the radial distance should be used to determine whether the relocation statute is triggered. By that standard, the mother did not move more than fifty miles away, and the relocation statute does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.

A mother appeals an order setting aside a default judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

After the trial court issued a temporary injunction affirming a trust’s appointment of a new
trustee, the former trustee’s attorney in other matters sent a letter to financial institutions
holding trust assets. The letter stated that the attorney represented the trust, construed the
trial court’s order as being without factual basis or legal authority, and requested the
institutions freeze the trust’s assets. Trust beneficiaries and the new trustee brought a
motion to hold the former trustee and the attorney in civil contempt. Finding that the former
trustee was unaware of the letter, but that the attorney meant the letter to thwart the efforts
of the new trustee in violation of the trial court’s order, the trial court granted the motion
only as to the attorney, who was ordered to pay attorney’s fees related to remedying the
effects of the letter. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds
for termination, including abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest a
willingness and ability to assume custody, and mental incompetence. The trial court also
found that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Father’s parental rights. We
conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports each of the grounds for termination
found by the juvenile court and the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the
best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

This is an appeal from a custody order. In its order, the trial court named Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarded Father less than equal parenting time. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court failed to maximize his parenting time in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). Because we find no indication from the record that the trial court’s disposition was made in consideration of the legislative intent of section 36-6-106(a)’s requirement that courts are to fashion custody arrangements to maximize a parent’s time with their child, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for reconsideration of Father’s parenting time.

A railroad worker developed cancer after working for thirty years in a railroad yard. The
worker sued the railroad, alleging violations of federal law. She proffered two experts to
prove elements of her claim. The railroad moved to exclude the expert testimony as
unreliable. The railroad also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the worker could
not prove her claim without the testimony of both experts. The trial court excluded the
expert testimony and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce criminal contempt case. The trial court found Appellant guilty of
one count of criminal contempt based on Appellant’s alleged violation of the trial court’s
order. Because Appellant’s actions do not, in fact, violate the plain language of the trial
court’s order, we reverse.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her two children on the grounds of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113-(g)(1); substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans under section 36-1-113(g)(2); persistence of conditions under section 36-1-113(g)(3); and the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody under section 36-1- 113(g)(14). The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff initiated this action related to the alleged misconduct of sheriff’s deputies in
general sessions court. After voluntarily dismissing the general sessions court action, the
plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court found that the plaintiff could not
appeal a nonsuit from general sessions court and dismissed the action as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.

A landlord entered into a commercial lease agreement with a limited liability company. When the company dissolved, one of its former members continued to occupy the leased property but never requested that the lease be assigned to her. Several years later, the landlord sent notice to the property that he was terminating the lease. When the former member of the company refused to vacate the premises, the landlord filed a detainer warrant to recover possession of the property. The former member filed a countercomplaint seeking specific performance of an option to purchase included in the lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the landlord on the specific performance claim after determining that the former member did not have the right to exercise the option to purchase because she was not the tenant under the lease. After a trial on the issue of whether the landlord terminated the lease agreement, the trial court concluded that the landlord properly terminated the lease agreement and was entitled to possession of the property. The former member appealed, challenging the trial court’s summary judgment determination and the court’s determination that the landlord was entitled to possession of the property. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

In this action for breach of an employment contract filed by a plaintiff/employee against
the defendant company/employer and two individual defendants, the trial court entered an
order granting a motion to dismiss filed by the individual defendants. Upon a subsequent
motion filed by the defendant company, the trial court entered an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the company and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with
prejudice. The plaintiff has appealed, raising an issue regarding the dismissal of the
individual defendants from the case. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract action brought by a nontenured teacher against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for nonrenewal of her teaching contract for the 2018–2019 school year. The teacher alleges that the nonrenewal of her yearly teaching contract was ineffective because the decision to nonrenew was improperly delegated by the Director of Schools to the principal. The school district contends that the decision to nonrenew is delegable and that the teacher lacks a private cause of action because the school district provided her with timely notice of her nonrenewal. The trial court summarily ruled in favor of the teacher, awarding her damages for breach of contract. The school district appeals, reiterating its same arguments. For the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher to be effective, the proper authority must make the decision to nonrenew, and the school district must provide timely notice to the teacher. Because the decision to nonrenew requires the Director of Schools to exercise his or her independent judgment and discretion, the Director of Schools may not delegate this authority. In this case, the Director of Schools did not exercise his independent judgment and discretion in the decision to not renew the teacher’s contract; thus, the purported nonrenewal was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. It is undisputed that Appellee performed under the
parties’ contract, and Appellant did not. Appellant raised affirmative defenses, including
waiver, anticipatory breach, and laches. The trial court denied the defenses of waiver and
anticipatory breach, enforced the contract, and entered judgment against Appellant for the
amount due thereunder. The trial court denied Appellee attorney’s fees and costs under the
contract based on the application of laches. We reverse the trial court’s finding of laches.
However, because Appellee did not raise an issue concerning the denial of his attorney’s
fees and costs, we leave undisturbed that portion of the trial court’s order. The trial court’s
order is otherwise affirmed.

A pro se petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of the denial of her motion to
disqualify the trial judge. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of the motion for
disqualification.

Jay Dee Garrity, Defendant, was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to consecutive sentences of 17 years for each conviction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; 2) it was plain error for the trial court to admit portions of the victim’s recorded interview; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in running Defendant’s sentences consecutively and his sentence is presumptively vindictive; 4) the trial court improperly restricted Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim; 5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness at trial without giving sufficient notice to Defendant; 6) the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction; and 7) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order finding that Husband’s alimony to Wife
constituted alimony in solido and that Husband was in breach of the parties’ marital
dissolution agreement for failure to pay alimony to Wife in accordance with their
agreement. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm.

In this defamation lawsuit, the defendants filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the
Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). Following the filing of various documents
and declarations by the parties, the trial court denied the petition based upon its analysis
of the burden-shifting framework outlined in the TPPA’s dismissal procedure. The
defendants have appealed. Determining that the trial court’s analysis concerning the
TPPA’s dismissal procedure was incomplete, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the
defendants’ petition to dismiss was not frivolous, and we accordingly decline to award
attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiffs on appeal.

Appellant/employee brought this retaliatory discharge case against Appellee, his former
employer. Appellant alleged that he was fired in retaliation for claiming workers’
compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, finding that Appellant failed to meet his burden to show a causal connection
between the filing of his workers’ compensation claim and the termination of his
employment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner, Tevin Dominique Lumpkin, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his
conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to file a motion to
dismiss related to the State’s failure to collect, test, or maintain blood droplets from the
crime scene. He also argues that his due process rights were violated by the lost evidence
and because the post-conviction court did not force a witness to testify or, alternatively,
speak to post-conviction counsel. Lastly, he argues that the cumulative effect of these
errors requires relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.