APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In December 2006, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Eric Cathey, for one count of felony first degree murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. These charges were the result of the death of appellant's two-month-old daughter. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found appellant guilty of all three counts. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and merged the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence of life with parole for the felony first degree murder and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served concurrently. Appellant now appeals his convictions and sentence arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State's use of its peremptory challenges at jury selection; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that appellant's issues do not require reversal. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Husband appeals the trial court's order under Rule 35 requiring the parties in this divorce action to undergo a mental examination and the court's alleged reliance on that examination. He also appeals the trial court's finding that the home titled solely to husband had transmuted to marital property. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Davis, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court found that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The parties were previously before this Court in an appeal by reason of an easement claim by the plaintiff. This Court ruled that plaintiff had an easement, and we remanded the case to the trial court and defendants filed a motion to determine the extent of the easement. A trial ensued and the trial judge ordered defendants to remove a gate and a fence which impaired plaintiff's use of her easement. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified.

The petitioner, Jevon Bryant, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that: counsel was ineffective; the trial court erred in denying his request to wear his wedding ring at trial; the prosecution made improper comments during voir dire; his prior felony should not have been stipulated for admission; his relatives were improperly banned from the courtroom; and his right to the Confrontation Clause was violated. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Terry Byington, was convicted of DUI, fourth offense, and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for this Class E felony, with a minimum of 150 days to be served day for day. On direct appeal, this Court held that he waived all issues presented except for the sentencing issue and a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, because the motion for new trial was not timely filed, and was therefor a nullify. See State v. Terry Lynn Byington, No. E2003-02316-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606993, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 1004) perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Dec. 28, 2004). Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and, pursuant to T.C.A. _ 40-30-113, a delayed appeal was ordered by the post-conviction court. Upon delayed appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal because the order denying the motion for new trial was not in the record. The Supreme Court granted defendant's application for permission to appeal, and subsequently vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case to this Court "for review of the issues raised by [Defendant] in his motion for new trial." See State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. 2009). After review of the issues presented, the briefs of the parties, and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Hugo Mendez, pled guilty in 2007, to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and to leaving the scene of an accident causing death, a Class E felony. The agreement provided for sentences of eight years and one year for the respective convictions, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. Nonetheless, the record indicates that the defendant remained incarcerated in the Shelby County Jail. Approximately two years later, the defendant filed a pro se petition requesting that he be allowed to serve the balance of the sentence on probation. The trial court issued an order summarily denying the petition without conducting a hearing. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and also challenges findings which he alleges were set forth in the order. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment. After reviewing the record, we find that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Tony Lee Crowe, was convicted by a Putnam County Jury of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced to sixteen years incarceration, to be served at 100%. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion for new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence and recanted testimony. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Warren A. Hakanson and Sylvia Harris sued Judith K. Holland both as Trustee of the G.W. Hakanson Living Trust dated November 19, 1996 ("the Trust"), and individually, seeking, among other things, to have Ms. Holland removed as Trustee and to have the Trust correctly administered. The case was tried, and the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Trust, as written, did not comport with the intent of G.W. Hakanson, that Ms. Holland had proposed a distribution which she believed met G.W. Hakanson's intent, that Ms. Holland remain as Trustee, and that prior distributions to Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris should be added back into the Trust with Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris each to receive $247,800 from the Trust and then the remaining Trust assets divided equally three ways with Mr. Hakanson, Ms. Harris, and Ms. Holland each to receive one-third. Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris appeal to this Court. We reverse, in part, finding and holding that there is no ambiguity in the written Trust and that the Trust shall be distributed in accordance with its clear written directions. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's order.

The Defendant, Daniel Henderson Jones, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his motions to withdraw guilty pleas and for reduction of sentences following his negotiated guilty pleas in case number S52,468 to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; in case number S53,126 to one count of possession of .5 grams of cocaine for sale, a Class B felony; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of maintaining a dwelling where drugs are sold or used, a Class D felony; and in case number S53,127 to possession of cocaine for sale, a Class C felony. He received a total effective sentence of twenty years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions and that his sentences were imposed absent the trial court making required findings relative to enhancement and mitigating factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gary Dewayne Pitts, appeals from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court revoking his probation. In January 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony simple possession of cocaine and vandalism over $500 and received an effective three-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. His sentence was partially suspended, and he was placed on probation. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the defendant violated his probation by using illegal drugs. After a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement so that the defendant could be evaluated for a drug and mental health program. Based upon the results of the assessment evincing an unwillingness on the part of the defendant to abide by the terms of the program, the trial court concluded that the defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original three-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that the remainder of his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

These consolidates lawsuits involve claims by Linda Smith, Melinda Mischlich, Jennifer Hayles, and Fernando Hayles ("Plaintiffs") surrounding two homes purchased by plaintiffs located in a subdivision developed by Harry Lane or an affiliated limited liability company. The trial court granted rescission of the contracts and awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees. The trial court stated that the amount of attorney fees would be determined at a future hearing. Prior to the hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, several defendants filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff but did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 52.01, we vacate and remand.

Appellant, Matthew Steven Wright, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to the charge and received a sentence of four years. The trial court suspended the sentence to three years and ten months of probation after the service of thirty-five days in incarceration. After the issuance of a probation violation warrant and hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation and ordered him to serve his sentence. Appellant seeks a review of the denial of his probation. We determine that the trial court made adequate findings of fact with regard to the denial of probation. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Curtis Glenn Hearon, appeals from the sentencing judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment but remand the case for further findings and rulings on the issue of pretrial jail credit.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant, Patricia Howell, of aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her to four years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, suspended to probation after the service of five months. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the victim's injury did not constitute serious bodily injury; thus, she should have been convicted of assault. Following our review, we agree with the Defendant and remand the case for entry of a modified judgment.

The pro se Petitioner, Kevin O. Hooks, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for first degree felony murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Antonio M. Miller, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try him as an adult; (2) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement; (3) he was not given a psychological evaluation or a pretrial suppression hearing to challenge his confession; (4) he was not allowed to develop alibi witnesses; and (5) his nineteen-year sentence at one hundred percent is incorrect. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice case. Vicki P. Jacobs ("the Plaintiff") alleges that the failure of Stephen A. Mitchell, M.D., an otolaryngologist, and K. James Schumacher, M.D., a neuroradiologist, to diagnose cancer in the left sinus of her late husband, Harris N. Jacobs ("the Decedent"), in May 2000 caused his death in November 2001. The trial court granted all defendants summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff, in the face of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the element of causation. The court's ruling was premised, in part, on the court's holding that the affidavit of one of the experts was not timely filed and also because, according to the court, the plaintiff's experts gave deposition testimony that superseded and canceled out their assertions in affidavits. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the court's grant of summary judgment and an earlier order allowing the defendants to conduct ex parte interviews of treating physicians of the decedent. We vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, James Mark Thornton, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus wherein he challenged his judgments in Cocke County case numbers 6617, 6618, 6820, and 9827. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that he received concurrent sentences when consecutive sentences were statutorily required. He also contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas in each of the four cases because the concurrent sentence alignment was a bargained for element of each plea. We agree that the judgment in case number 6820 is void, but because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is restrained of his liberty by virtue of the void judgment, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

We review this post-conviction case to determine the validity of defendant's guilty plea when the trial court did not specifically ask the defendant "How do you plead?" and he did not respond with the words, "Guilty" or "Not guilty." We hold that the defendant's guilty plea was valid because the facts and circumstances of the case show that the defendant intended to plead guilty, affirmatively admitted his guilt, stated that he was entering his plea voluntarily, and believed that he was pleading guilty. Accordingly, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, and the guilty plea proceedings in this case substantially complied with the mandates of federal and state law. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and we remand for reinstatement of the defendant's conviction under the accepted plea agreement.

The Defendant, Michael Orlando Freeman, pled guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, in the Criminal Court of Hamilton County with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors to his sentence and in its denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Anthony L. Davis, and his codefendant, Michael Ray Crockett, for the felony murder, premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery of victim Edgar Moreno-Gutierrez and for the especially aggravated robbery and two counts of felony murder of victim Michael Adams. The trial court severed the defendant's trials, and in his first trial a Davidson County jury convicted him of the felony murder, premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery of victim Moreno- Gutierrez. The trial court merged the premeditated murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to life plus twenty-three years. In his second trial, a Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of the especially aggravated robbery andd two counts of the felony murder of victim Adams. The trial court merged the two felonyd murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life plus eighteen years, to be served consecutively to his sentence from his first trial. The two cases were consolidated on appeal. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing in his first trial. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her son. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child by not immediately seeking medical care and by not immediately reporting her child's injuries to medical providers or the authorities. Therefore, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights. We affirm.