APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Paul Wallace Dinwiddie, Jr., of two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and by allowing a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert witness. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. Upon our review, we find no error in the convictions; however, we remand to the trial court to merge the two aggravated sexual battery jury verdicts into one conviction judgment and the two aggravated rape jury verdicts into one conviction judgment.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Sedric Holt, for nine counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to five counts of robbery, all Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to five years each in counts two, three, seven, and eight, and four years in count four. Counts two and three were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to count four. Counts seven and eight were ordered to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to counts two, three, and four for an effective fourteen year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, defendant argues that his sentence is excessive and that he should have been granted an alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mark C. Noles, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of both a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Petitioner was convicted in Rutherford County of attempted aggravated arson in 2004 and sentenced to serve seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the form of a pro se petition. See State v. Mark C. Noles, No. M2006-015340CCA0R30CD, 2007 WL 3274422, at *1-7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 6, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008). Counsel was appointed and an amended petition for post-conviction relief and petition for writ of error coram nobis were filed. Among other things, Petitioner sought relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he recently discovered new evidence indicating that one of the main witnesses at trial had recanted his testimony. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis as time-barred and denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the following issues are presented for review: (1) whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when trial counsel failed to advise Petitioner of the right to allocution, failed to subpoena a witness, and failed on appeal to contest the jury instructions; (2) whether the post-conviction court improperly refused to recuse itself from the post-conviction proceedings; (3) whether the post-conviction court improperly refused to allow Petitioner to present two witnesses at the post-conviction hearing; and (4) whether the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Further, we determine that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse itself; that the post-conviction court did not deny Petitioner the right to present witnesses at the post-conviction hearing; and that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This parental rights termination case was filed by Christopher W. ("Father") and Sara R. ("Stepmother") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linsie K. ("Mother") to her daughter Tristyn K. ("the Child"). Stepmother also seeks to adopt the Child, who currently is four years old. Following a trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding various grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, we vacate the trial court's judgment finding grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights, and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Defendant, Courtney Hunt-Guy, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and evading arrest and vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to an effective term of three years, six months in the county workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by not applying the mental health mitigating factor to his felony theft conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Wayne L. Holt, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of first degree felony murder, one count of premeditated first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. State v. Wayne L. Holt, No. M2001-00945-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31465263, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 5, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003). At trial, a motion for judgment of acquittal was granted by the trial court as to the count of first degree felony murder and to the count of especially aggravated robbery. On the remaining charge of first degree murder, the jury convicted petitioner of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. He received a thirty-year sentence. A direct appeal was unsuccessful. Id. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis that, inter alia, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition for relief. After a thorough review on appeal, we determine petitioner has failed to prove he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tony Alton Pitts, was convicted of vehicular assault, a Class D felony, as well as violations of the financial responsibility law and the vehicle registration law, both Class C misdemeanors. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying him full probation and a restricted license. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

In three separate cases, the Defendant, Floyd Rodriquez Johnson, pled guilty to two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The defendant agreed to allow the trial court to sentence him and agreed he was a Range II offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Defendant, Daniel Leon McCaig, appeals from the order of Dyer County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In May 2007, the Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual battery and received a five-year sentence. He was placed on probation. Thereafter, on July 22, 2008, he pleaded guilty to a violation of the sex offender registry law and theft under $500. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of two years for these new convictions, said sentence to be suspended and served on probation. This new sentence was to be served consecutively to the five-year sentence, resulting in an effective seven-year sentence on probation. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. The violation report was later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probationary sentence and ordered that his original seven-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence does not support full revocation of his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Nicholas Shane Brewer, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, in May 2006, receiving a negotiated sentence of six years, as a Range I standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He did not seek a direct appeal or post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on September 23, 2009. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court erred by summarily dismissing his petition, arguing that (1) the original judgment against him was void because it did not reflect the mandatory imposition of a sentence of community supervision for life, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend the judgment; (2) he entered his guilty plea involuntarily and unknowingly; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

I agree with the majority that the absence of any evidence of the requirements of the permanency plan[s] sounds the “death knell” for the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with those requirements. If we do not know what the requirements were – and we clearly do not – we cannot intelligently determine whether those requirements were satisfied or not. I completely concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the extent that decision is based upon a finding that she failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the plan(s).

The defendant, Michael D. Hurst, has appealed the Blount County Circuit Court's September 4, 2009 revocation of his community corrections placement which resulted in his serving the balance of his 2004 eight-year, guilty pleaded sentence for drug possession. The State has moved the court to summarily affirm the circuit court's revocation order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record supports the State's motion, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

The defendant, Rodney Northern, pleaded guilty to one count of theft in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served as 50 days' incarceration with the remainder on supervised probation. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would later determine the amount of restitution, and after a hearing the trial court ordered $10,500 in restitution to the victim, Melvin Hance. On appeal, the defendant challenges the amount of restitution. After review of the record, we hold that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the trial court failed to enter a final judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derrick Lemon Goode, was convicted 1 of ten counts of forgery, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-114(c). The trial court merged each even-numbered count with the odd-numbered count preceding it, leaving convictions for Counts One, Three, Five, Seven, and Nine. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years and six months for each count. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve these five sentences consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of seventeen and one-half years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and; (2) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

he Defendant, Raymond Bradley, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-11-403(b), -14-403(b). He was sentenced to four years to be served on probation. He was also ordered to pay a total of $15,500 in restitution at a rate of $323 per month. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution and in determining that he had the ability to pay the ordered monthly payments. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antoinette Feaster, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 417(i)(5). She was sentenced, as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, she contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the cocaine underlying her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness, who was not listed on the defendant's indictment or in discovery material, to testify; (3) the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect a single offense to be presented to the jury; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; (5) the trial court erred in charging the jury; (6) the trial court erred in declining to allow the jury to consider the search at issue in this case; and (7) the trial court erred in denying the defendant a community corrections sentence. After our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress due to an unlawful initial stop. We accordingly reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Brandon Forbes, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 with an agreed total effective sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following the denial of alternative sentencing, the Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tennessee Regulatory Authority - The City of Chattanooga has appealed the decision by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority establishing a rate for the appellee, Tennessee American Water Company. The Tennessee American Water Company filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the issues before this Court are moot. We hold the issues on appeal are moot and in our discretion decline to consider the issues as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The appeal is dismissed.

After the parties were divorced for two years, the father sought to reduce his child support obligation and change the custody of the child which had been agreed upon at the time of the divorce. The trial court heard evidence and modified the visitation schedule, but vested the mother with primary custody all based on Tenn. Code Ann. _36-6-101(a)(2)(C). He also increased the child support obligation of the father, and the father has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I believe the record contains final orders addressing all issues in the trial court, and I do not believe the failure to place all of the orders in a single judgment document bars our reviewing the restitution issue in this appeal.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.