APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Ryan Smith, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to amend the judgment in his statutory rape case to eliminate the requirement that he register as a sex offender, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 39-202(20)(A)(ii), which defines when a statutory rape conviction triggers sex offender registry requirements. Based on our review, we agree that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and that the defendant's conviction does not require his registration as a sex offender. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for the court to amend the defendant's judgment to remove the defendant's placement on the sex offender registry.

The petitioner, Damien Tolson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree premeditated murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Don Birdwell, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of vandalism of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent sentences of three years, six months for his aggravated assault conviction, and two years, six months, for his vandalism conviction, for an effective sentence of three years, six months. The trial court ordered defendant to serve ninety days in confinement, after which the sentence was suspended and defendant placed on probation. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; (2) the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Vicky Benson (“Employee”) developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in 2002, as a result of her work for New Gray Cemetery (“Employer”). Her claim was accepted. She had surgery on her right arm in 2004 and returned to work. After her return, she was terminated for reasons not related to her injury. She continued to receive conservative medical treatment from time to time. She found new employment in 2006. In September 2007, her treating physician recommended surgery for her left arm. Employer denied the claim, contending that her subsequent employer was liable for the condition and its effects. The trial court ruled that Employee’s condition had been worsened by her later employment, and dismissed the claim. On appeal, Employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

In June of 2008, Kelly D. McAlister ("Wife") filed a Petition to Enforce Final Decree against Robert A. McAlister ("Husband") seeking, among other things, to enforce the parties' final decree of divorce entered in June of 2000. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 2, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that the house at issue shall be sold and the net proceeds divided by the percentages stated in the divorce decree, and that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce using a fraction with the denominator being the number of months worked by Husband when he retires and the numerator being the number of months of the seventeen year marriage with Wife to receive one- half of the calculated amount. Wife appeals to this Court. We affirm as to the division of the house, reverse as to the calculation of the pension based upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce, and order that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon the amount of the pension at the time Husband retires based upon the formula stated in the divorce decree.

On April 10, 2000, William D. Chapman, II ("the Deceased") was involved in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of his injuries, he was admitted to Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center in Kingsport where he came under the care of trauma surgeons, the defendants, James V. Lewis, M.D., and George M. Testerman, Jr., M.D., as well as other physicians and medical personnel. The plaintiff, Cathy L. Chapman, brought this wrongful death action against the defendants based upon her allegation that they were guilty of medical malpractice in the treatment of her husband; she claims that their malpractice caused the death of the Deceased on April 15, 2000. Following eight days of a jury trial in July 2008, counsel for the parties made their closing arguments. During the defense's argument, counsel for the plaintiff objected when counsel for Dr. Testerman projected on a video screen what purported to be the Q. and A. trial testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Philip Witorsch. The trial court overruled the objection and thereafter the jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants. Later, the trial court, acting on the plaintiff's motion, reversed itself and held that the defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for the use of the projected testimony. The court also pointed out that the defendants failed to give the plaintiff prior notice of their intention to use portions of the trial transcript in closing argument. As a consequence, the court granted the plaintiff a new trial. The defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial and reinstate the court's judgment in favor of the defendants.

Employee sued her employer under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her race. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We reverse the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Barry Brown, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of three counts of aggravated robbery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress his statement, in preparing for trial, and in failing to present any mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Michael Maples, was convicted by a Hamblen County Criminal Court jury of one count of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and six years, respectively, to be served concurrently in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to provide exculpatory evidence pretrial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2008, Lena Michelle Silvey Rolen ("Mother") sued Charles Martin Wilson ("Father") alleging, in part, that Father had failed to pay child support as ordered. Father responded and filed a counter-claim seeking custody. After a trial, the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Father was in contempt for willful failure to pay child support as ordered, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to justify a change in custody. Mother was awarded a judgment against Father for the child support arrearage, among other things. Father appeals to this Court. Because the record on appeal contains no transcript and no Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) statement of the evidence, we affirm.

This appeal involves a father's child support and alimony arrearages. The trial court found the father in contempt and sentenced him to ten days in jail, with three days suspended. The court also awarded interest on the alimony and child support arrearages. We affirm in part and reverse and vacate in part.

The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Barnett, was convicted of statutory rape, a Class E felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to violating the sexual offender registry laws, a Class E felony, in exchange for concurrent sentencing on all of his convictions. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years for each of the Class E felonies and four years for the Class D felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a sentence imposed in an unrelated case. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of statutory rape, coercion of a witness, and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction of coercion of a witness. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relating to the defendant's other convictions.

The Petitioner, Steven Dousay, pled guilty in Williamson County to theft over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition in the Williamson County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas corpus court dismissed. The petitioner appeals, and, after a review of the record in this case, we conclude the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Wendy Blair (“Employee”) sustained injuries as a result of a fall which occurred in the course of her work as a sales agent for Wyndham Vacation Ownership (“Employer”). The trial court found that she suffered permanent injuries to her neck and lower back due to the fall and that she had not made a meaningful return to work. The trial court awarded Employee 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed from that judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred in its finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return towork. Consequently, we modify the judgment to award 19.5% PPD to the body as a whole.

The father has appealed from the trial court's order naming the mother as the primary residential parent and allowing her to move to Indiana with the parties' minor child. Because the trial court's order does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Brandyce Lusby, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her guilty plea convictions for second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence for which she received an effective sentence of forty years. The petitioner challenged the performance of trial counsel and the voluntariness of her guilty plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jocelyn D. Mims, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and one count of attempted introduction of contraband into a penal institution, Class D felonies. She received concurrent terms of two years as a Range I, standard offender for these convictions. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion. She challenges that ruling on appeal. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the Sumner County Criminal Court.

Appellant William Robert Wilson, was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") after being observed driving erratically by a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office. The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted appellant for one count of DUI; one count of DUI, third offense; one count of driving on a revoked license; and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial and his waiver of proof regarding DUI, third offense, appellant was convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license and entered a plea to DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months and 1 twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense and five months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with service of 130 days in confinement and the remainder in a community-based alternative program. Appellant appeals arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss his case because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on the State's duty to preserve evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have found no basis for reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Orlando Knox, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered best interest pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of burglary, a Class B felony; two counts of vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The agreement prescribed an eight-year sentence, which was to be suspended following service of six months. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the case and prepare for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jeffrey Lee Arnold, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, but reserved a certified question for appeal. The question presented is whether law enforcement officers who entered the defendant's house and discovered the marijuana forming the basis for the charge in this cause, had the right to enter under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the marijuana was lawfully seized from the defendant, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant, Tarrence Parham, stands convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court's admission of his prior conviction of reckless homicide for impeachment purposes and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified to reflect that the defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault is merged into his conviction for attempted second degree murder.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and, pursuant to their agreement, divided the bulk of their property. The parties litigated the issue of how the proceeds from the sale of a piece of improved real estate should be distributed. Following a hearing, at which each of the parties testified, the court awarded Delmer Coleman Wyatt ("Husband") $6,500, the stipulated pre-marital value of the unimproved lot, based upon Husband's ownership of the lot before the parties' marriage. It then divided the remaining net proceeds from the sale of the improved property, i.e., $111,376.37, equally between Husband and his wife, Barbara Ann Wyatt ("Wife"). Husband appeals. We affirm.

This is an action to enforce a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for a subdivision. The trial court found the defendant homeowners erected a fence without having obtained proper approval from the Architectural Control Committee, that the fence was in violation of restrictive covenants, and that the fence must be removed. We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that defendants failed to obtain the necessary approval to construct the fence and that the fence is in violation of restrictive covenants; thus, we affirm.

The defendant, Jennifer LeeAnn Nowlin, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II multiple offender to eight years for aggravated burglary concurrent with six years for the conspiracy charge, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged a compensable injury to his right shoulder and a compensable mental injury. His employer denied that the alleged mental injury was compensable. The trial court found both injuries to be compensable and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for the mental injury and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The employee contends that the trial court erred by accepting the impairment rating of the Medical Impairment Rating Registry physician and in the trial court’s application of the concurrent injury rule. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable mental injury and modify the judgment accordingly.