APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, James Parker, aka "Self," was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; and delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class A felony. The alternate delivery counts merged into the sale counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to six years for sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, eight years for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, eight years for sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and twenty-five years for sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. The court ordered that the twenty-five-year sentence be served consecutively to the other sentences, which were to be served concurrently, for an effective term of thirty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, the judgment in count seven incorrectly identifies the defendant's conviction for delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school as a Class B felony; therefore, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

This is a child custody dispute between a biological father and the children's maternal grandmother. The trial court awarded custody to the grandmother. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the father on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The father appeals, arguing that the Department of Children's Services did not clearly and convincingly show that it made reasonable efforts to help him address his addiction to methamphetamine, clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination, or clearly and convincingly demonstrate that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Because DCS did not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with his children, we reverse.

Brenda Carrol Bivens ("Wife") filed this divorce action against Donald Eugene Bivens ("Husband") in the Hamilton County Circuit Court in the Eleventh Judicial District. At the time of the parties' separation, they lived in Grundy County in the Twelfth Judicial District. Husband has lived in Grundy County his entire adult life. Husband filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue which he claims was granted orally by the trial court. No order dismissing the case ever was entered. The trial court later entered a final decree and marital dissolution agreement submitted by Wife and signed by Husband. Husband filed a motion to set aside the final decree. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Husband had waived any objection to venue and refused to set aside the final decree. Husband appeals. We conclude that Husband did not waive his objections to venue and that the proper venue in this case never has been Hamilton County. Accordingly, we vacate entry of the final decree and remand this case to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County with instructions to transfer this case to an appropriate court in Grundy County.

Katrina B. Martins and her husband filed suit against Williamson Medical Center for injuries sustained when Ms. Martins fell in her hospital room. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim based on medical malpractice and dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that the complaint sounded in common law negligence. We affirm.

This tort action arises out of a two-vehicle accident. Plaintiff sued defendant under a negligence theory and sought damages. After a jury trial, the jury equally allocated fault between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict is not supported by material evidence and that the trial court erred in permitting testimony regarding plaintiff's intention to use a shortcut. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. The mother of the child tested positive for cocaine when the child was born, and DCS removed the child from the mother's custody and developed a safety plan for the mother. The child was eventually placed in the custody of the petitioners, who are the mother's cousin and her husband. During the time period at issue, the mother's visitation with the child consisted primarily of attending family gatherings and visiting with the child at these gatherings. She paid no child support. After the mother went to the petitioners' home to say that she intended to seek custody of the child, the petitioners filed this petition for termination of the mother's parental rights and for adoption of the child. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. The mother now appeals. We affirm the trial court's finding of abandonment for failure to support and for willful failure to engage in more than token visitation with the child during the four-month time period preceding the filing of the termination petition, and affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

The Petitioner, Milton L. Byrd, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking his 1992 convictions of aggravated assault and second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the judgments are void because (1) they were imposed in contravention of the law concerning the service of sentences for offenses committed while on bail, and (2) he was erroneously declared infamous. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Plaintiff was incarcerated in jail on an arrest warrant that authorized bail of $1,500.00, which defendants failed to honor until the elapse of a 12 hour period. The trial judge held the defendants violated the statute governing the arrest warrant, and that the violation amounted to a constitutional violation entitling the plaintiff to damages. We granted an interlocutory appeal on these two rulings by the trial judge. We uphold the trial judge's determination that the defendants violated the statute by holding plaintiff for 12 hours before allowing bond, but reverse the trial court's holding that plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated and remand the case to the trial court.

The Defendant, Keith A. Whited, was charged with first degree murder, driving under the influence (fourth offense), and driving on a revoked license. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, driving under the influence (fourth offense), a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-210(c); 55-10-403(a)(1), -50-504(a)(1). In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (2) the testimony of the three eyewitnesses for the State was tainted and should have been disregarded; (3) the police investigation was mishandled and the crime scene was not protected; and (4) the lead investigator's testimony was inconsistent and should have been disregarded. After our review, we affirm the defendant's convictions. We remand solely for the purpose of entry of a corrected judgment form for the second degree murder conviction.

The defendants, Anthony Hall, Eric Murrell, and Erica Williams were convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. Defendants Murrell and Hall were sentenced to eighteen years and Defendant Williams was sentenced to fifteen years, in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claimant, an employee of Wal-Mart, was charged with possession of cocaine and pled guilty to a misdemeanor possession, and was then discharged for violating company policy. Claimant was not at work nor on Wal-Mart's property when the offense occurred. The agency found that claimant was discharged under disqualifying conditions and denied unemployment benefits. Throughout the appeals process, denial of benefits was upheld. On appeal to this Court, we hold that claimant violated Wal-Mart's policies by failing to report his conviction under a criminal drug statute to his employer within three days as required under the employer's policy. We affirm the denial of unemployment benefits to claimant.

The defendant, O'Neal Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joel Keener, appeals as of right the Warren County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2005, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of facilitation of manufacturing methamphetamine and sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the denial of his petition was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that counsel failed to seek severance of the charges, failed to seek suppression of the petitioner's statement, and failed to challenge admission of a photograph showing iodinestained hands. He argues that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Baldomero Galindo, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in dismissing his motion for new trial on the basis it was untimely, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his inculpatory statement, and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to disclose discovery materials in a timely manner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated child abuse, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to obtain a defense expert medical witness and that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13, which restricts funding for expert witnesses in non-capital postconviction proceedings, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Daniel Stewart, entered open guilty pleas to two counts of Class C felony theft, one count of forgery, and one count of passing a worthless check, also Class C felonies, for which petitioner was sentenced, following a sentencing hearing, as a Range I standard offender to six years confinement for each count, to be served concurrently. In this appeal from the court's denial of his post-conviction petition, petitioner asserts that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) his guilty plea was entered involuntarily; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding waiving his right to appeal he did not effectively waive his right to appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Justin Dewayne Rogers, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred in admitting the victim's medical records in violation of his right to confrontation. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Defendant, Eddie Lattimore, was found guilty by a Dekalb County Circuit Court jury of possession of schedule II hydromorphone with the intent to sell, a Class C felony; possession of schedule II morphine, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. __ 39-17-417(a)(4), -418(a), -425(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years' confinement for possession of hydromorphone with intent to sell and to eleven months, twenty-nine days' each for possession of morphine and possession of drug paraphernalia, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joy C. Lindsey ("Plaintiff") sued Walgreen Company ("Walgreen"), Robert Cortney ("Cortney"), and Kane David Stackhouse ("Stackhouse") after David Z. Lindsey, Sr. was shot and killed by Stackhouse in a Walgreen's parking lot. Approximately ten months after filing their answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Walgreen and Cortney filed a motion to amend to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse. The Trial Court denied Walgreen and Cortney permission to amend. We granted permission for an interlocutory appeal on the sole issue of whether Walgreen and Cortney should be granted leave to amend to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse. We reverse the Trial Court's order and grant Walgreen and Cortney permission to add a cross-claim against Stackhouse.

The Defendant, Steve Billman, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law, a Class C misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant for DUI, second offense, to 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation following the service of 60 days in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI and that (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a mistrial. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

Earl and Faye Faulkner ("Plaintiffs") hired Tom Emmett Construction Company ("Defendant") to construct a new driveway at their home in Knox County. Plaintiffs refused to pay $ 8,000 of the total $ 18,000 contract price because they were dissatisfied with the workmanship of the driveway. Plaintiffs sued Defendants seeking as damages what it would cost to remove and replace the allegedly defective driveway. Defendant asserted that the driveway was properly constructed and filed a counterclaim for the remaining $ 8,000 balance owed on the oral contract. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court [*2] concluded that any problems with the driveway were not sufficient to require that it be removed and replaced. Because there was a problem with how the concrete on one portion of the driveway had been poured, the Trial Court required Plaintiffs to pay Defendant only $ 5,000 of the remaining $ 8,000 owed on the contract. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm as modified.