APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in this medical malpractice action. On appeal, the plaintiff assigns error to various decisions made by the trial court concerning the admission of evidence and arguments and to the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of negligent retention. While the trial court erred in several respects, we consider the errors to be harmless and affirm the judgment based on the jury verdict.

Appellant, Patrick Pope, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in March of 2007 for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven years. After a hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The trial court denied the remainder of the motion for new trial, and Appellant has appealed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated; (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated by direct and circumstantial evidence, that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eleven years. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome while employed as a factory worker by Johnson Controls, Inc. (“JCI”). After employee gave notice of her injury and received some treatment, Manufacturers Industrial Group (“MIG”) bought the factory and became her employer. She had surgery on both arms and returned to work, but was then permanently laid off. Employee brought an action against both JCI and MIG for workers’ compensation benefits due to injuries sustained to her right and left hands and wrists. JCI and MIG each argued that the other should be liable for her workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court found that MIG was liable and awarded 48% permanent partial disability to both arms. MIG appealed. It contends that the trial court erred by assigning liability to it  and by adopting theimpairment rating of a physician chosen through the Medical Impairment Registry. MIG further argues that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable injury to his left arm. His employer denied the claim, contending that the injury was not caused by the employment, and also that the employee had failed to provide notice of his injury as required by the workers’ compensation statute. The trial court found that the injury was work-related, and awarded 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the left arm. On appeal, the employer argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on these issues, and that the trial court erred by failing to apply the missing witness rule as to the potential testimony of the treating physicians. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Shari Harp, filed this action to recover personal property and for an injunction related to her deceased mother's estate. Respondent, Darryelle E. Mills, is surviving spouse of the decedent. The trial court entered a partial default judgment in Ms. Harp's favor after Mr. Mills failed to answer the complaint or otherwise plead _ despite ample notice of the consequences of failing to answer. Upon appeal, this court entered a show cause order directing Mr. Mills, acting pro se, to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, among other things. Mr. Mills has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time allotted. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal because it is premature and because Mr. Mills has neglected to file a cost bond and has not paid the litigation tax associated with the appeal.

This is a dispute to quiet title to 5 acres between the owners of adjacent tracts. Both parties claim ownership of the disputed property along their common boundary by color of title. At issue is whether the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated _ 28-2- 105 for quieting title to lands under color of title by establishing the deed had been recorded for at least 30 years and the property at issue had been adversely possessed by the plaintiff or his predecessors in title for at least 7 years. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff finding that the plaintiff and his predecessors had adversely possessed the disputed property for more than 7 years and that the plaintiff's claim derived from a metes and bounds description in a 1961 deed, which was of record for more than 30 years. Finding the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's ruling, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal was initially referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). After oral argument was conducted before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court in order to consider a request under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to set aside a judgment approving a settlement. The trial court found no basis for setting aside the settlement under Rule 60.02. Neither do we. The judgment of the trial court upholding the parties’ settlement is affirmed.

The defendant, Kenneth Gregory Allen, was convicted of two counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine base and two counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine base, both Class C felonies; and sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine base, delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine base, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the delivery convictions with the convictions for the sale of cocaine. The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years at sixty percent for the conviction for sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine and for the possession with the intent to sell. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years at sixty percent for the two convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but to run consecutively to case 16510, also a drug conviction, and "any unexpired sentence." This resulted in an aggregate forty-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court imposed an improper sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The Defendant, James Arthur Johnson, was charged with two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count of aggravated robbery for events that occurred on the evening of June 18, 2006. Co-defendant Rodney Lenier Williams was also charged in all five counts, but his case was severed from the defendant's case before trial. A jury sitting in the Criminal Court for Davidson County found the defendant not guilty of the two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, guilty of the two counts of felony murder, and guilty of the count of aggravated robbery. The defendant was given concurrent life sentences for the felony murder convictions. For the aggravated robbery conviction, the defendant was given an eleven year sentence to run consecutively to the two life sentences. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in allowing a non-expert witness to give his opinion, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The parents of the two children at issue appeal the termination of their parental rights. The issues on appeal pertain to the trial court's findings that both parents were in substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and that termination was in the children's best interests. Also at issue is whether the requirements of the Permanency Plans were not reasonable, related and relevant to the stated goals. We find the requirements of the Permanency Plans were appropriate and that the efforts of the Department of Children's Services constituted reasonable attempts to reunify the family. We also find the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings that the parents failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans and that termination of their parental rights is in the best interests of the children. We, therefore, affirm the termination of the parental rights of both parents.

After seven years of marriage, Maryam Ghorashi-Bajestani ("Wife") sued Masoud Bajestani ("Husband") for divorce. After a trial, the trial court entered its order, inter alia, awarding wife a divorce, dividing the marital property, setting husband's child support obligation, awarding wife transitional alimony for nine years, awarding wife alimony in futuro to begin after the termination of the transitional alimony, and awarding wife attorney's fees. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of marital property and the awards of alimony, among others. Wife raises issues regarding child support, and also requests that this Court take notice of a post-judicial fact, and award her attorney's fees on appeal. We modify as to the award of transitional alimony, vacate the award of alimony in futuro, affirm as to the child support and division of property, decline to award attorney's fees on appeal, and decline to take notice of the post-judicial fact.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ricky Mayes (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his spine. His claim against Peebles, Inc. (“Employer”) was settled in accordance with the workers’ compensation statute. His authorized treating physician subsequently recommended a surgical procedure. Employer’s medical utilization review provider declined to approve the procedure. After an initial administrative appeal was denied, Employee filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to compel Employer to authorize the procedure. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded attorney’s fees to Employee. On appeal, Employer argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, because Employee did not exhaust his administrative appeals, and that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgment.

This action was brought to determine whether a roadway that serves the plaintiff and certain of the defendants is a public or private road. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, declared the road to be a private road. On appeal, we affirm.

Petitioner, Javonte Demontez Terrell, was indicted for first degree murder. He entered a best interest plea to second degree murder in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After an amended petition was filed, the post-conviction court held a hearing. The petition was dismissed by the post-conviction court. Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Petitioner challenges the dismissal of the petition. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove that his guilty plea was involuntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Jermaine Smith, appeals the trial court's order revoking Defendant's probation in various sentences and ordering Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. It appears from the record that as of the probation violation hearing on February 9, 2009, a "fourth amended" probation violation warrant was pending against Defendant. This warrant alleged that Defendant had violated various terms and conditions of his probation in Montgomery County cases numbered 40300037, 40600256, and 40601232. In this appeal, Defendant acknowledges that the evidence showed he violated the terms of his probation. However, he argues that the trial court should have reinstated probation rather than order service of the sentence by incarceration. After full review we affirm the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dallas R. Myers, Jr., appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his sentence is illegal because the trial court sentenced him above the presumptive minimum sentence absent a finding of enhancement factors. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Frank Deangelo Taylor, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery. He received a life sentence for the first degree felony murder and a concurrent term of eight years imprisonment for the attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Taylor claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) the insufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Raymond Douglas Myers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. See State v. Raymond Douglas Myers, Sr., No. M2003-01099-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 911280, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 20, 2004), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 8, 2004). The trial court merged the felony murder convictions and the conspiracy to commit murder conviction with the three convictions for first degree murder. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, and a consecutive twenty-four year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *7. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in a lengthy pro se petition. Counsel was appointed. After a hearing on the petition for relief, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner has appealed the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that the postconviction court should have determined that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Joel Adam Alexander, was indicted for possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to deliver, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On June 16, 2008, defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance containing a cocaine base with intent to sell, with an agreed sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the trial court's determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant filed petitions seeking increased library access as well as his release from incarceration. Because Appellant has been unconditionally released from prison, we find his appeal moot and affirm the trial court's dismissal of his claims.

The trial court in this matter granted a motion to dismiss and entered a default judgment for the plaintiff, American Legion Post 212 ("Post 212"). The defendant, Hollis F. Summers ("Mr. Summers"), who was not present at the hearing, had removed the action to federal court days earlier. Under 28 U.S.C. _ 1446(d), once a case is removed to federal court, a state court has no authority to take further action in the matter. Accordingly, because the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, we must summarily reverse the judgment of the trial court.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

A group of Sevier County residents identifying themselves as "Public Spirited Citizens" ("Plaintiffs") filed a set of quo warranto lawsuits against Sevier County, the Sevier County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), and Larry Waters, the County Mayor of Sevier County ("Mayor") (collectively "Defendants"). The trial court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Veric Dean Osgood, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He received a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff hospital filed a lawsuit against defendant patient for unpaid medical expenses. Defendant patient filed a third party complaint against defendant insurance company alleging that the insurance company was responsible for the unpaid medical expenses pursuant to a health insurance policy. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the insurance contract was ambiguous and construed it against the defendant insurance company. Defendant insurance company appeals. After reviewing the record and the health insurance policy, we conclude that the policy was not ambiguous and the insurance contract specifically excluded coverage of patient's pre-existing condition. Accordingly, we reverse.