APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiffs advanced monies for the creation and operation of a bonding company, in which plaintiffs were to be partners with the defendant. A dispute arose between them about the bonding operation, and plaintiff sued defendant for a percentage of the profits of the bonding company and defendant counter-sued for a monetary judgment as well. The trial court ruled that no partnership existed, but plaintiffs were entitled to recover $15,000.00 from defendant. Defendant's counter-action was dismissed. On appeal, we affirm.

A Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ron "Cotton" Seals, of one count of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine; one count of possession with intent to deliver dihydrocodeinone, a schedule II controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver alprazolam, a schedule IV controlled substance; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half ounce or more of marijuana; one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, kept, or sold; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 20 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation. Therefore, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Joseph Shaw, Jr., was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the sexual battery conviction into the rape conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim without issuing a limiting instruction and by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard P. Alexander, Regina Phillips, Gail Young and Judy Sprinkles ("Plaintiffs") filed this products liability suit against Antonio Zamperla, S.p.A. and Zamperla, Inc. ("Defendants"), as a result of June Alexander's death that occurred while riding an amusement park ride manufactured by defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants summary judgment, finding the act of a third party constituted both a superseding cause of the death and an alteration of the product which relieved defendants of liability. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Employee suffered a compensable back injury in the course of his employment for the State of Tennessee. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. On appeal, the State contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. We affirm the judgment.

E & J Construction Company ("Plaintiff") purchased a metal building from Liberty Building Systems, Inc. ("Defendant"). The metal building was purchased by plaintiff for one of its customers, Camel Manufacturing Company ("Camel"). Plaintiff constructed the metal building for Camel and connected it to an existing building. Almost from the outset, there was a problem with leaking. Plaintiff sued defendant raising various claims including, among others, breach of contract. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial on the few remaining claims. At the conclusion of plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the grant of a directed verdict on plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remand for further proceedings. The judgment of the trial court otherwise is affirmed.

The defendants in this matter have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the notice of appeal was not timely filed. The attachments to the motion support the allegation of the defendants that the only notice of appeal received by the trial court clerk was a facsimile filed notice of appeal. As such is insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this court, the appeal is dismissed.

The employee, who suffered two separate injuries during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the employer, settled his first claim for workers' compensation and filed suit on the second. Shortly after being laid off because of an unexpected work shortage, the employee elected to retire in order to maintain medical insurance coverage rather than face an indefinite furlough without pay or benefits coverage. When the trial court reconsidered the settlement and awarded benefits in excess of the lower statutory cap on the second claim, resolving the issues in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, and the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. Because we have concluded that the employment relationship terminated when the employee was laid off, rather than when he subsequently retired, the employee was not meaningfully returned to work, and, therefore, qualifies for reconsideration of his first injury and is not subject to the lower cap on the second. The judgment of the Panel is reversed, and that of the trial court is reinstated.

Plaintiff, individually and as the guardian of her minor child, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on her claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff claims that she and her child were harmed by the defendants' disclosure of their private health information. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

In this medical malpractice case, we are asked to determine whether various employees of a medical corporation were agents properly authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation and/or one of its physician employees. We hold that none of the individuals who accepted service in this case were agents authorized by appointment to receive service of process on behalf of either the corporation or the individual physician. With specific reference to the attempted service of the amended complaint, we hold that the authority to sign for and receive certified mail does not, on its own, confer the authority to accept service of process. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51 for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lori Turner (“Employee”) sought reconsideration of her prior workers’ compensation settlement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Her claim had been settled for 14% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole, based upon a 7% anatomical impairment. Upon reconsideration, the trial court awarded an additional 21% PPD, for a total of 35% PPD to the body as a whole. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc. (“Employer”) has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the amount of the award. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This matter was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for a frivolous appeal. Appellant challenges only the award itself and not the amount decided by the trial court. The party awarded the fees argued that the trial court erred in the amount awarded. Finding no error, the trial court is affirmed.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to three children, asserting that the findings of the juvenile court that he had abandoned his children by failure to support and that the conditions which led to the children's removal persisted were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father also asserts that the court erred in finding that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of his children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jose Holmes, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction. The petitioner contends that the judgment is void because the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment at least ten days before the trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Terry Lynn Craft, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-213(b)(2). In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court violated the hearsay rule in admitting a recording of a 911 call. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donnie Edward Braddam, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering him to serve the balance of his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its judgment.

This appeal involves a termination of rights proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113 (Supp. 2009) with regard to five children between the ages of twelve and seventeen. The Tennessee Department of Children's Services removed the children from the custody of their biological mother and the person thought to be their biological father and entered into a series of permanency plans with them for the next three and one-half years. Shortly after discovering that the putative father was not the biological father of two of the children, the Department filed a termination petition in the Shelby County Juvenile Court. The juvenile court entered an order on October 31, 2008, terminating both the biological mother's and the putative father's parental rights. The putative father appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate his parental rights based on both Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi). While the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's finding that grounds for termination of the putative father's rights existed, the court reversed the judgment terminating the putative father's rights based on the majority's conclusion that the Department had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to address the causes for termination under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(2)-(3). The majority also reversed the termination of the father's rights under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv), (vi) because the Department had failed to aid the putative father in establishing paternity. State, Dep't of Children's Servs. v. Tina T. (In re B.T.), No. W2008-02803-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3681884 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009). We granted the Department's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that the Department used reasonable efforts to assist the putative father to establish his parentage and to regain custody of his biological and legal children and that the juvenile court properly terminated the putative father's rights with regard to all five children.

On the evening of May 25, 2007, Appellant, Edward Lee Adkins, was arrested at the hospital for driving under the influence ("DUI"). This arrest occurred after Trooper Brandon Hunt was called to the scene of an accident where he found a truck registered to Appellant upside down in a ditch. When Trooper Hunt arrived at the hospital, he smelled alcohol and ordered a blood alcohol test. Appellant's blood alcohol level was found to be 0.19 percent by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") Crime Laboratory. The Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for two counts of DUI, one count of DUI, third offense, one count of reckless driving, and one count of violation of the registration law. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both counts of DUI, reckless driving, and violation of the registration law. The trial court held a bench trial and determined that Appellant was guilty of DUI, third offense. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with one hundred and twenty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the two convictions used to support his conviction for DUI, third offense because they were not self-authenticating. Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for DUI, third offense and reckless driving. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that both issues are without merit. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Charles Laten Howell, III, was convicted of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-433(e). In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting blister packs of pseudoephedrine caplets because the State failed to establish a chain of custody. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of the charge of driving under the influence ("DUI") against Appellee, Stephen James Thompson. The trial court dismissed the charge after finding that the statute of limitations had expired before the Maury County Grand Jury indicted Appellee. On appeal, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because Appellee waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the indictment against Appellee for DUI.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derek Alton Badger, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). In this appeal, he contends that the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203, because the employee had not filed a request for benefit review conference within one year of the date of injury. The employee, Joe Lynn Hughes, has appealed, contending that the statute was tolled by his timely filing of a request for assistance. We agree, reverse the grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the trial court

I concur with the result reached by the majority; however, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding the proferred opinion testimony of two lay witnesses, Lisa Poe, a registered nurse, and Jimmy Brock, a surgical technician.

The Petitioner, Gary Thomas Russell, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief; following a hearing, the Circuit Court of Madison County denied his petition. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in holding that petitioner's trial counsel rendered effective assistance. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.