APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, John Wayne Wright, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for his felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. Both sentences were to be suspended and Defendant placed on probation after serving forty-five days in confinement. As a condition of his guilty pleas, Defendant properly reserved two certified questions of law concerning the stop and search of his vehicle and the subsequent search of his home. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Three tenants of the Gallatin Housing Authority were indicted under the theft of services statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-104, for failing to report to the housing authority earnings that would have increased their rent. On the tenants' motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Applying the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, we hold that the definition of services in section 39-11-106(a)(35) does not include public housing. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

We accepted this case to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 503(a)(1), the proof required to convict the defendant of tampering with evidence is sufficient where the "thing" destroyed during the course of an investigation is not specifically identified. On the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nader Daqqaq, was found guilty of driving under the influence ("DUI"). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven months, twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve nine months in confinement before being eligible for work release or trusty status. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between a buyer and seller of lumber. The seller filed suit against the buyer alleging a right to recover in breach of contract, quantum meruit, and/or quantum valebant for an outstanding balance owed on several shipments of lumber. The trial court determined that the buyer accepted approximately half of the disputed shipments due to its failure to timely reject the initial deliveries but was not liable for additional shipments that it timely rejected. The trial court, however, did not address whether the buyer revoked its acceptance of the initial shipments or whether the buyer was entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in an attempt to salvage the rejected shipments. Because the parties tried these issues by consent, the order appealed is not a final judgment and the appeal must be dismissed.

The defendant, David Henry Hammon, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of domestic assault and child abuse, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion without considering and weighing all the appropriate factors. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion but remand for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the child abuse conviction and six months for the domestic assault conviction as stated in the trial court's sentencing order.

The defendant, Randy Clayton Norman, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court did not perform its duty as the thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the defendant's conviction but modify the defendant's sentence to fifteen years.

The petitioner, David Bankston, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the two-year sentence imposed for his 2007 conviction of ninth offense driving under the influence has expired. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his sentence has, in fact, expired, or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a foreign judgment entered by a Mississippi court against a Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee corporation moved to dismiss, contending that service of process was improper in the Mississippi action. The trial court found that the Tennessee corporation was not properly served, and it dismissed the petition. The judgment creditor appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Demetrie Darnell Owens, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, George Vincent Ware, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court in two separate cases on September 27, 2007. In Case Number 262379, the defendant pled guilty to introduction of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to seven years, suspended to "intensive probation." In Case Number 262471, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property, a Class D felony; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to three years, six months, and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively, for the convictions in Case Number 262471. The trial court ordered the sentences in Case Number 262471 to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case Number 262379. Thus, the defendant received a total effective sentence of ten years. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probationary sentence, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the dDefendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff served as the trustee of two trusts for several years. After he was informed that his services were no longer needed, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to compensation in the form of trustee's fees for his service. The trial court ruled, on a motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff had waived his right to trustee's fees and that he was equitably estopped from claiming such fees. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. The plaintiff husband is a successful physician and the defendant wife is a stay-at-home mother. They have one minor child. After twelve years of marriage, the husband left the marital home and filed for divorce. The wife counter-claimed for divorce, and protracted and contentious litigation ensued. The initial trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem. After several trial judges recused themselves, a senior judge was assigned. After nearly three years of dispute, the case proceeded to trial. The trial court granted a divorce to the wife; it found that she was economically disadvantaged but capable of partial rehabilitation, and that the husband had the ability to pay spousal support. The wife was awarded alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony, attorney fees as alimony in solido, and discretionary costs. The husband appeals the award of alimony, attorney fees, and costs. We affirm, finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion under the circumstances.

The defendant, Lisa Christina Simpson Tuttle, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of her suspended sentence. Because the defendant failed to file a proper notice of appeal and because the interests of justice do not require that this court excuse the failure to file the notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

The Shelby County Healthcare Corporation (“The Med”) has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider our opinion in Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 2539644 (Tenn. 2010). In that opinion, we found that the application of the Act of May 21, 2003, ch. 321, 2003 Tenn. Pub. Acts 650 (“2003 Act”) to the claims of the estate of Joyce Bell and her infant son, Jonathan Bell, violated Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. We have determined that the arguments advanced by The Med in its petition do not merit a reconsideration of our earlier opinion.

With the approval of the trial court, a divorced father of four children moved with the children from Tennessee to Arkansas. Four years later, the mother, who remained in Tennessee, fell behind in her child support payments and filed a petition for modification of child support. Father responded by filing a motion for contempt against the mother in the Arkansas court, and he entered a limited appearance in Tennessee for the purpose of transferring the entire cause to Arkansas. After a hearing, the Tennessee court declared Arkansas to be the children's home state, and it transferred all custody and visitation issues to that state, while retaining jurisdiction of child support matters. The court also denied Mother's petition for modification of child support. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in relinquishing its jurisdiction over custody because the children still have a"significant connection" to Tennessee. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gerome J. Smith, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In May 2008, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition based upon the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends the dismissal was an unconstitutional denial of his right to due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This appeal involves the application of the one-year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann._ 29-16-124 (2000) to a temporary regulatory taking claim. The developer of a residential subdivision in Wilson County filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County against the City of Lebanon and others alleging that the city's planning commission had denied it all economically beneficial use of its property by wrongfully refusing to approve the final plans for two phases of its subdivision. The City moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124 had expired before the developer filed suit. The developer responded that the limitations period was tolled while it sought judicial review of the planning commission's decision. The trial court held that the developer's lawsuit was timely because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the entry of the Court of Appeals' opinion invalidating the planning commission's action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals granted the City's application for an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the trial court and determined that the developer's lawsuit was not timely because the statute of limitations began to run when the planning commission declined to approve the final subdivision plans. B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No. M2008- 00572-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 130188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). We granted the developer's application for permission to appeal and now affirm the Court of Appeals.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mario A. Reed, of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the juvenile court erred when it transferred his case to the circuit court for him to be tried as an adult; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on aggravated rape; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal involves the application of a decision by the United States Supreme Court to legal issues in a matter pending before a state trial court after being remanded by a state appellate court. In 1998, a group of commercial waste haulers filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the validity of a flow control ordinance enacted by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The trial court granted the Metropolitan Government's motion for summary judgment. However, in 2002, the Court of Appeals, relying on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reversed the trial court with regard to part of the application of the ordinance and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., 122 S.W.3d 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). While the case was pending in the trial court, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision relied upon by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The trial court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision. The Court of Appeals, relying on the law of the case doctrine and equitable principles, affirmed. Gray's Disposal Co. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Davidson Cnty., No. M2007-00528-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 454183 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009). We granted the Metropolitan Government's Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal. We have determined that Tennessee's courts are not free to disregard applicable intervening changes in federal constitutional law announced by the United States Supreme Court while a case is pending on remand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The Defendant, Marty Ray Harris, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. He received a four-year sentence, to be served in split confinement of two months and the balance on probation. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by his crime. We reverse the portion of the judgment awarding restitution to Christopher Edwards, and we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the proper amount of restitution for the named victim, John Witherspoon.

The petitioner, Dennis B. Reece, pled guilty to second degree murder in October 2005. In September 2008, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the convicting court. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) ("Gomez II"), created a new constitutional rule entitled to retrospective application and that this court should deem the one-year statute of limitations period to extend from the publication of Gomez II. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Benny Taylor, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2008 Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiffs advanced monies for the creation and operation of a bonding company, in which plaintiffs were to be partners with the defendant. A dispute arose between them about the bonding operation, and plaintiff sued defendant for a percentage of the profits of the bonding company and defendant counter-sued for a monetary judgment as well. The trial court ruled that no partnership existed, but plaintiffs were entitled to recover $15,000.00 from defendant. Defendant's counter-action was dismissed. On appeal, we affirm.

The sole issue presented in this workers’ compensation claim is whether a corporate transaction involving the sale of the employer amounted to a loss of employment for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The trial court found that it did and awarded permanent disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.