APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Shannon Jones, was convicted by a jury in Lauderdale County of facilitation of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony, and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years for facilitation and to six years for delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to another unrelated case. On appeal, Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrence Woods, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to request an independent mental health evaluation to determine if mental health defenses were available. He also contends that he was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to enter his guilty plea because of trial counsels' failure to perform this independent mental evaluation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Originally charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault, the defendant, Leo Mays, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding sufficient evidence to support the verdicts of the jury, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony about items in the Defendant's possession when he was arrested; (2) the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for Community Corrections. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Charles O. Rogers, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to attempted robbery, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years. The trial court imposed a sentence of split confinement, ordering the defendant to serve sixty days, on consecutive weekends, in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Following the filing of a violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry Phillip Haley, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sixty year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from the victim; and (2) the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process in violation of State v. Anthony and State v. Dixon. Initial review of the record reveals that the defendant has waived both issues based upon his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Further review leads us to the conclusion that neither issue rises to the level of plain error. As such, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that it delivered materials and provided labor for the installation of a fire protection system on the property of defendant and defendant had failed to pay money still owed under the contract. Plaintiff sought a materialmen's lien to enforce any judgment obtained against defendant for the amount of monies owed under the contract. Defendants answered, filed a counter-complaint and raised multiple defenses. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled in plaintiff's favor, holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover monetary damages and the materialmen's lien would be enforced. Defendants have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Emanuel Oliver, appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt to unlawfully possess a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent in the Shelby County Correction Center. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for prosecution has run and that he should not be held responsible for his plea agreement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, George T. Haynie, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2007 guilty-pleaded convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and failure to appear. Discerning no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Larry D. Guthrie, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and he received a sentence of six years and one month in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court's denial of his request for two special jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother's parental rights to her three children were terminated. We affirm, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not meet the reasonable requirements of the parenting plans and that persistent conditions existed. We further find that DCS used reasonable efforts to reunite the family. Finally, we find that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

The Defendant, David Freeman Clay, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and three counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for each sexual battery conviction and six months for each assault conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of nine years and six months in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to fulfill its duties to approve the jury verdict under Rule 33 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Lynn Stanton, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the denial pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief in which petitioner alleged that his guilty plea was based on a coerced confession, he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and newly discovered evidence of perjury by a State witness requires a reversal of his guilty plea. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Bobby Reed Aldridge, pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of theft over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received in a collateral proceeding for violating his probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The petitioner now appeals, and, following careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Brandy Lea Birdwell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in January of 2008 for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery for her involvement in a shooting at a liquor store. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges. She was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed an untimely motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. Subsequently, Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant, Havin Hameed, was indicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court for two counts of aggravated child abuse and two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, that were associated with leg and wrist fractures sustained by Hameed's tenmonth- old daughter from September 1, 2004, to October 1, 2004. Prior to Hameed's indictment, the Davidson County Juvenile Court made a factual finding in a dependent and neglect hearing that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Hameed perpetrated the aforementioned injuries against her daughter. Hameed filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in criminal court, which was denied. The criminal court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal and this court subsequently granted Hameed's application to appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, Hameed argues that the criminal court erred in failing to dismiss her indictment based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy after identical allegations between the same parties were dismissed following a trial in juvenile court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying Hameed's motion to dismiss her indictment.

On March 6, 2009, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Aulton Cody Barnes, for indecent exposure. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner entered an open plea to the charge. On September 22, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Petitioner to six months with thirty days to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation or, in the alternative, grant him judicial diversion. We have reviewed the record presented on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Robert C. Taylor, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant sought an appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the Appellant was denied the right to a speedy trial; (3) whether Appellant's due process rights were violated by the State's six-year delay in producing laboratory results and loss of evidence. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was not denied a speedy trial and that Appellant's due process rights were not violated where there was no prejudice to Appellant. Further, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On January 17, 2007, Petitioner, Joshua Jacobs, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to one count of first degree murder, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated rape. On October 7, 2009, the post-conviction court received and filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief for Petitioner. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that the postconviction court erred because applying the statute of limitations to his case is a denial of due process. We have reviewed the record on appeal and find that there is no violation of Petitioner's due process rights in the dismissal of his time-barred petition. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Marico Finnie, appeals from the post-conviction court's order granting him partial post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal from his multiple aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and facilitation of aggravated rape convictions. He argues that because his successful post-conviction claim was based on appellate counsel's ineffective assistance in not raising meritorious issues in his direct appeal, and he never requested a delayed appeal, the court instead should have vacated his convictions and remanded for new trials. The State agrees that a delayed appeal is not the appropriate avenue of relief but contends that appellate counsel's deficiency resulted in prejudice only with respect to the consecutive sentencing imposed and in two of the aggravated rape convictions where the State failed to make a proper election of offenses. The State, therefore, argues that the petitioner should be afforded new trials for the two aggravated rape convictions as well as a new sentencing hearing for all the convictions. We agree with the State that a delayed appeal is not the appropriate relief but disagree with its contention that the petitioner suffered prejudice in only two of his rape cases as a result of counsel's deficient performance in failing to raise the election issue on appeal. We further disagree with both the petitioner's and the State's position that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentencing or that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court in part, vacate the petitioner's convictions in indictment numbers 00-10546, 00-10542, 00-10554, and 00-10545, and remand for new trials for those offenses.

David Mathews and Tommy Baker ("Plaintiffs") sued the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, and EPB Telecom ("Defendants") for inverse condemnation. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. After a 1 hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the claim for inverse condemnation was barred by the statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We hold that the claim for inverse condemnation fails because no taking occurred, and summary judgment was properly granted to Defendants. The judgment is affirmed.