APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anthony D. Jordan, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, of multiple drug offenses relating to three different drug sales, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the Drug-Free School Zone statute is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case; (3) the trial court improperly enhanced his punishment because the State did not give him adequate notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (5) three of the Judgment of Conviction forms contain errors. The State contends that this appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant’s amended motion for new trial was not timely filed, and he failed to file a timely notice of appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly permitted the Defendant to file an amended motion for new trial. Therefore, we review the issue properly preserved by his original motion for new trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain all of his convictions. We conclude, however, that two of those convictions violate his double jeopardy protections. Those convictions are, therefore, merged or dismissed in accordance with the reasoning below. Further, we have reviewed forplain error the issues the Defendant failed to properly preserve but hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of those issues. This case is remanded for the entry of corrected judgments in accordance with this opinion.

This medical malpractice case involves the reconsideration of an order granting a new trial. The patient, in her second trimester of pregnancy, presented at the hospital with abdominal pain and bleeding. Her treating physician consulted with a maternal-fetal specialist physician. The patient suffered a placental abruption, and the fetus died in utero. Later that day, the patient developed a blood-clotting disorder. She died that evening. The patient’s husband filed this lawsuit against the treating physician, the hospital and its employees, and the maternal-fetal specialist physician. A settlement was reached with all of the defendants except for the maternal-fetal specialist, and a jury trial was held as to only the specialist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant specialist. The trial court granted the plaintiff husband’s motion for a new trial. Three years later, the defendant specialist filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its order granting a new trial. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion and reinstated the jury verdict. The plaintiff husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order, and that the trial judge’s remarks, taken as a whole, indicate he was not satisfied with the jury verdict. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Don Siddall, was found guilty in a bench trial by the Hamilton County Criminal Court of two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-13-302 (2010). He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement, suspended after time served. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficientto support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victims to be exempt from the rule of sequestration. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Kevin E. Shepard, was convicted after a bench trial of reckless endangerment  involving a deadly weapon, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to two years, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daniel Lee Draper, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and afforded him an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm  the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Based upon events on November 7, 2006, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellants, Tornita Crenshaw, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Lance Sandifer, and Cortez Thorne for two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. In addition, Appellants Crenshaw, Cunningham, and Thorne were indicted for two counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape; Appellants  Crenshaw and Cunningham were indicted for two counts of coercion of a witness; and Appellant Sandifer was indicted for four counts of aggravated rape. Appellants were tried jointly in August 2008. Appellants were convicted of the following crimes: Appellant Crenshaw – one count of robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Cunningham – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of coercion of a witness; Appellant Thorne – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of facilitation of aggravated rape, and two counts of  especially aggravated kidnapping; Appellant Sandifer – two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellants to the following effective sentences: Appellant Crenshaw – twenty-three years; Appellant Cunningham – fifty-two years; Appellant Thorne – fifty-two years; Appellant Sandifer – onehundred and eight years. Appellants now argue several issues on appeal. These issues include: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions (all Appellants); (2) that the trial court erred in not apply mitigating factors, applying enhancement factors, the weight given to the factors and imposing consecutive sentences (all Appellants); (3) that the trial court failed to merge the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into either aggravated robbery or aggravated rape convictions (Appellants Sandifer, Thorne, and Cunningham); (4) that the trial court failed to grant Appellants’ motions for severance (Appellants Thorne and Cunningham); (5) that the trial court failed to merge Appellant Sandifer’s four convictions for aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape as one single act of rape; (6) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion in limine to exclude the victims from the courtroom; and (7) that the trial court erred in denying Appellant Thorne’s motion to require the State to elect the facts upon which it was relying for the two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Appellants’ issues do not require either the reversal of any of their convictions or an adjustment to their sentences. For this reason, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur with the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the majority view of the timeliness of the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. I do not believe the Petitioner’s mistaken filing of a second post-conviction petition, not provided by law, tolled the time within which a coram nobis petition was to be filed. The Petitioner’s ignorance of the proper action to take does not warrant a due process tolling of the statute of limitations in this case.

The Defendant, Mark Anthony McNack, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community correction sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in calculating his credit for time served. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence but conclude that the Defendant is entitled to credit for time served until the violation warrant was issued. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the correction of the judgment.

An elected council member of the City of LaFollette filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that three other members of the council had violated the terms of the Open Meetings Act in the process of adopting a resolution to increase the pay of various city employees. The trial court, after a hearing, granted a temporary restraining order, restricting implementation of the pay raises until the City complied with the procedural requirements of the City Charter. The order did not address the Open Meetings Act allegations. At a subsequent meeting, the Council, apparently in accordance with the requisite guidelines, approved the pay raises. After the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and then a motion seeking attorney’s fees and costs, the trial court dismissed the Open Meetings Act claim as moot, but awarded fees and costs to the council member who had initiated the suit. The order did not address a challenge by the City to the council member’s standing to sue. On direct appeal by the City, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the council member had standing as a taxpayer, rather than in his official capacity, but reversed the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Because the litigation involves issues of public interest, this Court granted an application for permission to appeal. We hold that the council member had no standing to sue as a council member or a taxpayer, but that he did have standing based upon his allegations of an Open Meetings Act violation. As the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of discretionary costs, but not attorney’s fees. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Fannon has standing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-106(a) (2002) to seek judicial relief from his colleagues’ violation of the Sunshine Law [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-44-101 to -111 (2002 & Supp. 2010)]. I also agree that Mr. Fannon was the prevailing party in the proceedings below and that he was entitled to recover discretionary fees under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) but not attorney’s fees. I am constrained to prepare this separate opinion because, unlike the Court, I have concluded that Mr. Fannon’s status as a public official provides an independently sufficient basis to confer standing on him to challenge the conduct of his fellow members of the LaFollette City Council.

In this appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission, taxpayer, a self-funded multiple employer welfare arrangement, seeks a refund of taxes paid under protest, asserting that the tax was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and that the tax is uncertain and ambiguous. We affirm.

The petitioner, James William Taylor, also known as Lutfi Shafq Talal, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of felony murder, robbery, and second degree burglary. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of life, fifteen years, and fifteen years for the respective convictions. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for nunc pro tunc to consolidate prior offenses. Because such an order is not subject to an appeal as of right under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

This is an appeal from the probate court’s award of $66,107.14 to Decedent’s Estate for the value of property Decedent’s husband did not return to the Estate following her death. The Administrators of the Estate appeal the court’s failure to award the Estate the value of certain jewelry the husband allegedly converted. The husband appeals the court’s valuation of the property he failed to return to the Estate. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s findings, we affirm.

This appeal involves post-divorce modification of alimony. When the husband and wife were originally divorced, the husband was ordered to pay alimony in futuro. At the time of the divorce, the wife was undergoing treatment for a life-threatening illness. After the divorce, the wife’s treatment resulted in a dramatic improvement in her health. Meanwhile, the husband lost his job and ultimately found employment at a reduced level of compensation. Citing his decreased income and the wife’s improved circumstances, the husband sought modification or termination of his alimony obligation. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, but nevertheless denied the husband’s petition to modify. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellee, Melvin Shorty was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. Several months prior to trial the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment listing two of Shorty’s prior Tennessee felony convictions. The day before sentencing, the State amended their notice to seek enhanced punishment by adding two prior Wisconsin felony convictions. The trial court determined that the amended notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202, and sentenced Shorty as a Range I, standard offender to four years in a workhouse. In this appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in sentencing Shorty as a Range I, standard offender, rather than a Range II, multiple offender because the original notice was sufficient to alert Shorty that they intended to seek enhanced punishment, and that Shorty has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the amended notice. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Disciplinary Counsel of the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against attorney F. Chris Cawood for alleged violations of Rules of Professional Conduct. After Disciplinary Counsel’s presentation of evidence, the Hearing Panel dismissed the petition. The Board of Professional Responsibility appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the Hearing Panel’s dismissal. The Board appealed the decision of the chancery court to this Court. We hold that the Board of Professional Responsibility’s petition for certiorari failed to meet the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 and that the chancery court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Defendant, Phillip Shermaine Lillard, was convicted of first degree felony murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in not charging the jury concerning his prior criminal convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In a landlord-tenant dispute, the tenant plaintiff claims that before the parties entered into a lease for commercial property, the landlord defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses that the plaintiff was expected to pay as part of its rent pursuant to the lease terms. The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its claims for fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We find that the defendants misrepresented estimated operating expenses after entering into the initial lease with the plaintiff but before entering into an agreement for expansion space. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court on the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and violation of the TCPA and remand for determination of an appropriate remedy for damage the plaintiff suffered after agreeing to lease the expansion space.

The pro se petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentences were imposed in violation of the Interstate Compact on Detainers. After careful review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Bell, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “motion” for post-conviction relief. The State has moved to have this court summarily affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record demonstrates that the “motion” was filed outside the statute of limitations applicable to petitions for post-conviction relief, we grant the motion and affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 20.

Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband did not file an answer. Wife sought and received a default judgment. Husband filed a motion to set aside the default judgment based on excusable neglect as a result of depression. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, David Clilon Bates, of aggravated rape and assault, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Lisa Renea Smith, was engaged in a custody dispute over her daughter but allowed to visit her pursuant to a Knox County Juvenile Court order. After one such visit, she refused to return her child and instead took her to Atlanta. The juvenile court held a hearing and found Appellant in contempt for violating the visitation order. Appellant was later indicted in the instant case for violating the custodial interference statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-306. After an unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy protections, she pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor but preserved the double jeopardy issue for appeal. Upon review, we affirm.

The matter before this Court arises from a petition to relocate filed by Elizabeth Leanne Hudson (“Mother”) following her divorce from Larson Douglas Hudson (“Father”) and the appeal from the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008, granting the petition and awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We granted Father permission to appeal and scheduled the appeal for argument. Mother requests that Father’s appeal be dismissed as moot. For the reasons stated below, we grant Mother’s request. In addition, we vacate the trial court’s order of May 22, 2008.