APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Douglass Marshall Mathis, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction for first degree murder and accompanying life sentence. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were not void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jason Michael Fint, of one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Finding that the defendant qualified as a career offender, the trial court imposed the maximum Class D felony sentence of 12 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Daniel Buck, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13- 502(b), -504(b). This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Daniel Buck, No. M2005-02818-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3831390 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec. 12, 2006), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2007). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the issue that his convictions were barred by the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The defendant, Michael Clark, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence to be presented concerning his prior conviction for aggravated assault. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Appellant, Wade Tyler, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for one count of rape, one count of incest, and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to eight years for the rape conviction, four years for the incest conviction, and four years for the statutory rape by an authority figure conviction. The sentences for rape and incest were ordered to be served concurrently. The sentence for statutory rape by an authority figure was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence for rape, for a total effective sentence of twelve years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim about specific instances of conduct; (3) whether the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing; and (4) whether the indictment was defective. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. Further, we determine that the trial court properly refused to allow cross-examination of the victim about specific instances of conduct and that the indictment was sufficient to inform Appellant of the charges against him. However, because we have identified several discrepancies in the record, we remand the matter for correction of the judgment form for statutory rape by an authority figure. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed and the matter is remanded.

Petitioner, Christopher Michael Flake, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions were reversed on the basis that the jury improperly rejected the proof at trial that established Petitioner was insane at the time of the offenses. State v. Christopher Flake, No. W2001-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1298733 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 12, 2002), rev’d on appeal by State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court on appeal. State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, among other things, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Innocent S. Nzamubereka, was convicted by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury in count one of domestic aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and in counts two and three of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to six years for each count and ordered counts one and two served concurrently with one another but consecutively to count three, for an effective sentence of twelve years. The court ordered Nzamubereka to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and allowed him to serve the remaining six years on probation. On appeal, Nzamubereka argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that one of the victims was unavailable; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in ruling on three evidentiary issues; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the State to make an improper comment during voir dire; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenneth Thompson Anderson, Jr., was convicted of eight counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and sentenced to an effective sentence of nine years. In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for review: 1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow testimony regarding the victim’s past sexual behavior and preference for older men; and 2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, we granted the request of Jason Patrick Shaw (“Father”) for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal on three issues: (1) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused to grant his request for access to his older daughter’s counseling records with a licensed clinical social worker; (2) whether the Trial Court properly prohibited Father from taking this daughter’s deposition, and (3) whether the Trial Court erred when it refused Father visitation with any of the parties’ three children. As to the first issue, we remand this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether furnishing the social worker’s records would be against the daughter’s best interest, as discussed more fully in this Opinion. We vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father to depose the daughter. Finally, we vacate the Trial Court’s refusal to allow Father any meaningful visitation and remand for the Trial Court to determine an appropriate supervised visitation schedule.

The Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Ann Marie Shannon, for four counts including one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), second offense. On June 19, 2009, Petitioner entered a negotiated plea agreement to DUI, first offense. Pursuant to the agreement, she was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in the Swaim Center 1 and serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court.  Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Pursuant to a lease agreement, Defendant was allowed to place a billboard on Plaintiff’s building. After the billboard allegedly caused damage to Plaintiff’s building, Plaintiff notified Defendant. Defendant then sent a letter to Plaintiff terminating the lease, but Plaintiff claims Defendant later agreed to remove the billboard and make repairs to his building. When such repair and complete removal were not made, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, and we affirm.

The Defendant, Rolly William Whitford, pled guilty to sexual battery and rape and agreed for the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years for the sexual battery conviction and ten years for the rape conviction, and it ordered that the sentences run consecutively for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it: (1) enhanced his sentences; (2) ordered consecutive sentencing; (3) denied him an alternative sentence; and (4) admitted into evidence his 1984 psychosexual evaluation over his objection. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In this post-divorce dispute, the trial court denied the petitions of both parents to modify the parenting time but granted the mother’s petition to modify child support. We affirm the trial court’s decision with respect to parenting time but reverse and remand for a proper determination regarding modification of child support.

The Petitioner, Eddie Lee Murphy, Sr., appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for felony murder and resulting life sentence. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2003) (amended 2005, 2007). He contends that the trial court erred in denying him relief because (1) he did not understand the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his guilty plea, (2) he was not adequately informed of his right against  self-incrimination, (3) trial counsel was ineffective, and (4) his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father filed a petition to relocate with the parties’ minor child, and the trial court denied his petition. On appeal, Father argues that the trial court made evidentiary and procedural errors necessitating vacating its decision, that the trial court’s decision denying his petition to relocate was erroneous, and that the trial court erred in declining to award him his attorney fees in defending against  Mother’s petition for dependency and neglect. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Plaintiff filed this medical battery suit on behalf of his deceased mother and named as defendants the nephrologist who ordered an allegedly unauthorized hemodialysis procedure, another treating physician, and the hospital where she was treated. The trial court granted summary judgment to the treating physician who did not order the procedure and to the hospital. Plaintiff appeals. We find that both of these defendants were entitled to summary judgment and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, James A. Burgess, of two counts of second degree murder, two counts of felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment for each of the felony murder convictions. The Petitioner appealed the convictions, and this Court remanded the case for  modification of the Petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary and affirmed in all other respects. State v. Burgess, M2009-00897-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3025524 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Aug 4, 2010). In May 2010, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to raise the existence of newly discovered evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court’s denial was in error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Marquise Harris, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his transfer to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute for a forensic evaluation was illegally accomplished in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial by jury. Additionally, Petitioner complained that neither the general sessions court nor the criminal court had jurisdiction because of the illegal transfer. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Plaintiff, a railroad employee, filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that his left ankle injury was caused by his working conditions. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but subsequently granted the railroad’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We granted the railroad’s application for an interlocutory appeal and now affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for summary judgment.

The Defendant, Dwayne Thomas Hooten, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The  Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the previously imposed sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an accident between a bicycle and a pick-up truck. Appellant was struck by Appellee’s truck when Appellant failed to obey a stop sign and rode his bicycle into traffic. The trial court found that Appellant was sixty percent at fault for the accident, and, pursuant to a comparative fault analysis, entered judgment for Appellee. On appeal, we find that the trial court erred in applying a pedestrian statute to a bicyclist, but that this error was harmless in light of our finding that Appellant was negligent per se in failing to obey the stop sign, and/or in failing to yield to oncoming traffic. We conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Appellant was at least sixty percent at fault so as to foreclose any recovery under a  comparative fault analysis. Affirmed for the reasons discussed herein.

The Petitioner, Calvin Fleming, appeals from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a mental evaluation and in failing to inform the trial court of the absence of the mental evaluation at trial. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s introduction of the victim’s medical records on the basis that they violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the confrontation issue on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Henry Springer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Springer claims the evidence was insufficient because it did not identify him as the perpetrator. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur. I write separately to express my concern that the courts could turn the phrase “contextual background evidence” into its own exception under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). I think “contextual background evidence” is a vague concept that can become too broad, much like “res gestae” was used before the courts attempted to consign that phrase to history because of its vagueness. See Gibbs v. State, 300 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tenn. 1957); State v. Carpenter, 773 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Kenneth Patterson (Pat) Bondurant and Hugh Peter (Pete) Bondurant, No. 01C01-9501-CC-00023, Giles County (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 1996) (Tipton, J., concurring), app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 12, 1996). In State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270-73 (Tenn. 2000), the supreme court’s analysis regarding background evidence focused on such evidence’s relevance to material issues in the case, the need to present the evidence to prevent confusion, and the weighing of its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Each of these three factors must be considered and found before the evidence is admissible.

The defendant, Shun Jelks, was convicted of introduction of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to four years in confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.