APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant, Todd Joseph Sweet, of theft greater than $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a sentence he received in a separate case, case number 08-081. In this appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Compact on Detainers; (2) the trial court improperly refused to remove for cause a juror who had previous knowledge of other crimes the Defendant allegedly committed; (3) the State failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 when it failed to provide the Defendant’s trial counsel with letters written by the Defendant and intercepted by the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department; (4) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; (5) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that the Defendant had committed other crimes; (6) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (7) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (8) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s Motion to Strike the State’s Notice of Impeachment; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (10) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant to the maximum sentence within his range and improperly ordered that his sentence run consecutively to a sentence he had previously received in a separate case. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the trial court’s judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment and sentence.

Plaintiff brought this action against this contractor alleging breach of contract to construct an asphalt parking lot for plaintiff. The Trial Court determined that defendant breached the contract and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant-Appellants, Ronnie Dobson and Milton Rance, were convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Both Dobson and Rance were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders and received effective sentences of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Benson, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. On July 5, 2000, the petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child in the Hamilton County. He now claims this conviction is void, and the State agrees, because the judgment of conviction does not contain the mandatory community supervision for life provision as required by law. The remedy he seeks is to require the State to honor its original plea agreement, which did not include the provision, even though it will result in an illegal sentence. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner is correct and has a valid claim, but he has cited to no authority authorizing the relief he seeks. Therefore, we must deem that this issue is waived. Contrarily, the State requests that this court reverse the actions of the habeas corpus court in denying relief and that we remand with instructions to the court to summarily amend the judgment of conviction to provide for the mandatory community supervision for life provision. However, after review, we deem it proper to reverse and remand to follow the instructions contained herein.

This is a breach of contract and conversion case. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and conducted a bench trial on the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract and conversion. The trial court held in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We find the plaintiffs’ appellate brief to be in substantial violation of Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; in light of this, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiffs sued the City of Memphis, claiming that they were fraudulently induced to sign a
sewer easement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City of
Memphis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner pled guilty in March 2000 to charges of first degree murder and aggravated rape. He accepted a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the aggravated rape conviction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief following the entry of an amended judgment order of conviction imposing community supervision for life for the aggravated rape conviction. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Cameron General Contractors, Inc., a Nebraska corporation (“Cameron”), sued Kingston Pike, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (“Kingston Pike”), for breach of a contract concerning the sale of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. Prior to trial, Cameron elected to exercise its contractual right to terminate the contract, and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the contract did not limit Cameron to the return of its earnest money, and granting Cameron a judgment against Kingston Pike for damages in the amount of $872,418.22, plus attorney’s fees of $137,656.56. Kingston Pike appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the contract at issue clearly and unambiguously provides that once Cameron chose to terminate the contract, Cameron’s sole remedy for Kingston Pike’s breach was a return of Cameron’s earnest money deposit. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s October 28, 2010 order.

The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Garrett, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Javis Montell Dean, pled guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and introduction of contraband into a penal facility, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eight years and ordered that the Defendant serve one year incarcerated and serve the remainder in the community corrections program. As part of the Defendant’s pleas, he reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Defendant, Richard Paul Brady, pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a multiple offender, to concurrent terms of four years for the burglary conviction and eight years for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served in community corrections after service of one year in the workhouse. A violation warrant was issued, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community correction sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari or in the Alternative Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by a former inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction.The petition alleges that several agencies or individuals who were not named defendants in the petition imposed two allegedly “illegal” sentences upon him, thus, violating his civil rights. The sentences expired in 1999 and 2000, respectively. The petition was filed in 2009. The pertinent statute of limitations is a one-year statute. Thus, the petition is time barred and the dismissal of the petition on that ground is affirmed. We have also determined the issues are moot.
 

The Petitioner, Xavier Tyrell Barham, pled guilty to three counts of possession of Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sixteen-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he understood the plea agreement to be that all of his sentences would run concurrently for a total effective sentence of eight years rather than sixteen years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Sisavanh Keomongkout, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murderand attempted first degree murder and his effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1)failing to provide the Petitioner with discovery materials before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas, (2) failing to discuss the definition of first degree murder and lesser included offenses with the Petitioner, and (3) failing to inform the Petitioner that he could hire an expert witness. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the removal of Plaintiff’s political signs from public property by employees of the Defendant City of Memphis pursuant to a sign ordinance. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the sign ordinance was  unconstitutional, and further alleged that he was entitled to damages for the removal and disposal of his signs under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of the sign ordinance. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to include additional claims challenging the constitutionality of the sign ordinance. In response, the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff’s remaining claims under the GTLA were time barred by the one-year statute of limitations. After conducting a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, and granted the City's motion for summary judgment, resulting in dismissal of the action. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper. Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William A. Howard, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court entered an agreed sentence of twenty-five years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his counsel did not inform him of the consequences of his plea and because he coerced him into pleading guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error. We, therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Brett Joseph Price, pled guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, 39-12-103 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for robbery and to three years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements and by admitting a statement at the sentencing hearing, and (2) imposing an excessive sentence and denying an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee alleged that she sustained a right- and left-side hernia while working. Her employer denied the claim for the left-side hernia. The trial court held that both the right- and left-side hernias were compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joe Clark Mitchell, was convicted in 1986 of multiple offenses following a violent crime spree against two women. On March 8, 2011, the Petitioner filed a pro se writ of error coram nobis alleging the existence of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, the Petitioner alleged that, in 2010, his trial judge was “found guilty of illegally expunging” the criminal records of convicted felons in exchange for a fee. The Petitioner also alleged that because he “did not have sufficient funds to pay for a legal sentence,” he received a sentence that was “illegal and void.” Lastly, the Petitioner alleged that his trial judge improperly sentenced him as a persistent offender. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court summarilydismissed the petition. On appeal,the Petitioner argues that the coram nobis court erred by dismissing his petition without a hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

An employee suffered a partial amputation of his left index finger. Compensability of the injury was not contested. At trial, the employee argued that his disability award should be apportioned to the hand. His employer contended that the award should be limited to the index finger. The trial court agreed with the employee and awarded 52% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee injured her back at work and the injury required surgical treatment. The employee returned to work but was later terminated for violation of her employer’s attendance and absenteeism policy. The trial court found the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The trial court, however, adopted the impairment rating that the employee’s evaluating physician expressed and awarded 90% permanent partial disability benefits, the maximum award permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician’s impairment rating, by its use of the six-times multiplier on the basis of facts not in evidence, and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning employee’s impairment and the six-times multiplier. Accordingly, we modify the award.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Bernard Garrett, of simple possession or casual exchange of cocaine, fourth offense, and resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal,the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Terry, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his prose petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Steven Shivers, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at thirty percent for the attempted murder and to a consecutive eighteen years at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of forty-three years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the victim’s identification testimony,erred by having an ex parte meeting with a juror during deliberations, and erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Danita Lanette Wilson was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect (counts one and two),conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three), possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (counts four and eight), attempted aggravated child neglect (count six), reckless endangerment (count seven), tampering with evidence (count nine), resisting arrest (count ten), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count eleven). The trial court merged the two convictions for aggravated child neglect into a single count, referred to as “count one.” The trial court sentenced DefendantWilson to seventeen years for aggravated child neglect(count one); five years for conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three); ten years for each conviction of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (counts four and eight); ten years for attempted aggravated child neglect (count six); eleven months, twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment (count seven); five years for tampering with evidence (count nine); six months for resisting arrest (count ten); and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia (count eleven). The trial court further ordered that Defendant Wilson’s seventeen-year sentence in count one, her ten-year sentence in count four, and her ten-year sentence in count six be served consecutively for an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. The jury convicted Defendant Tiffany Nicole Norman of two counts of child neglect (counts one and two), facilitation of conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three), facilitation to possess .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (count four), possession of drug paraphernalia (count five), and two counts of attempted aggravated child neglect (counts six and seven). The trial court also merged Defendant Norman’s convictions for child neglect into a single count, referred to as “count one.” The trial court sentenced Defendant Norman to four years for child neglect (count one); six years for facilitation of conspiracy to possessa Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell(count three); nine years for facilitation to possess .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (count four); eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia (count five); ten years for each conviction of attempted aggravated child neglect (counts six and seven). The trial court further ordered that Defendant Norman’s four-year sentence in count one,her nine-year sentence in count four, and her ten-year sentence in count six be served consecutively for an effective twenty-three-year sentence.