APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a child support case. The juvenile court found, inter alia, the father owed a child support arrearage of $21,356.63. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action contending his injury while cutting trees at his employer’s home was in the usual course of his employment at his employer’s floor covering business. The trial court held that employee’s work was casual employment not in the usual course of his employer’s business as defined by TCA § 50-6-106(2) and not covered by the workers’ compensation statute. We affirm the judgment.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant in this malicious prosecution action. We affirm.

In this products liability case, a widow sought compensation for the death of her husband from mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. She sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband’s employer. She based her claim on strict liability and alleged that the seller sold defective products and failed to warn her husband of the products’ health risks. The jury found that the seller was at fault, but that her husband’s employer was the sole cause of his injury and awarded her nothing. The widow appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions that more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury. On review, we hold that the seller was subject to suit in strict liability, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) (2000), because none of the products’ manufacturers were subject to service of process. Further, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of any danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings. This jury instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, it applied the learned intermediary doctrine, which the courts of this state have limited to medical products and pharmaceuticals. Second, the jury instruction misidentified the consumer as the employer, when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Appellant, Phillip Lynn Dorse, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated assault in connection with a neighborhood altercation during which Appellant hit two individuals with a baseball bat. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated assault and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl Bost, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell cocaine, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a cumulative sentence of six years, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. He filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. On appeal, he argues that he entered his plea unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the learned intermediary doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case. I disagree, however, that Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (“Pittsburgh Corning”) and Owens Corning Corporation (“Owens Corning”) were unavailable for service of process and that North Brothers, Inc. (“North Brothers”) therefore is subject to suit in strict liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106 (2000).

The defendant, Rodney McAlister, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of vandalism between $1000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of five years, as a multiple offender, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State failed to negate the defenses of duress and necessity. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the conviction.

The petitioner, Chad Rogers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase of his trial by not investigating and presenting evidence of his mental illness as a mitigating factor. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Tony Hoover, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered open Alford pleas to two counts of rape and two counts of incest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his pleas were not entered with an understanding of the nature and consequences of the pleas. He also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly inform him of the terms and consequences of his guilty pleas and by advising him to waive his ex post facto rights and be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Junior P. Samuel, guilty of five counts of rape and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgments of acquittal because of the State’s failure to establish venue; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a medical report containing statements the victim made to Phyllis Lynn Thompson in violation of the Confrontation Clause and the rule prohibiting hearsay statements; (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (4) whether the cumulative errors at trial denied the appellant due process. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Walter Williams, for one count of rape in connection with the rape of his thirteen-year-old daughter. A jury found Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant appeals his conviction. He argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony of an expert witness; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain questions during the jury voir dire; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to give the missing witness jury instruction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument must fail. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Scott W. Grammer, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, he argues that the State engaged in egregious, improper, and deceptive practices during the trial; that the post-conviction court should have amended his improperly enhanced sentences; and that the evidence is insufficient to support one of his convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Antonio F. Baker, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his request to modify his sentence via Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee sustained an injury to his shoulder at work. After a surgical repair, he briefly returned to work but was laid off prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. He filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. His treating physician assigned no impairment rating and placed no restrictions on his activities. An evaluating physician assigned 6% impairment to the body as a whole and recommended that Mr. Lewis avoid certain activities. The trial court awarded 36% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We modify the judgment to award 24% permanent partial disability to the employee. We also conclude that local Rule 17A of the Chancery Court of the 28th Judicial District of Tennessee conflicts with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

The Petitioner, Tyler King, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and received an agreed sentence of 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Michael Whitlock, was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003(d). In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor; (2) The trial court erred when it allowed the State to give a rebuttal closing argument when the Defendant waived opening statements and offered no proof; and (3) The trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding the factors contained in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). Following our review, we conclude that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor and, therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

The Sullivan County Grand Jury charged by presentment Appellant, Daniel H. Jones, with possession of .5 gram of cocaine with intent to sell. This charge was the result of the execution of a search warrant during which officers arrested five individuals and found containers holding  rocks of crack cocaine and other drug paraphernalia. After a jury trial held on August 26, 28, and 29, 2008, Appellant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony of a prior bad act of Appellant in contravention of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in question and that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Earnest Ulyessee McEwen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. In 2006, Defendant was indicted for burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to burglary and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender with one year to serve in confinement and eleven years on community corrections, and the theft charge was dismissed. A warrant was issued charging Defendant with a violation of his community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s sentence and imposed his original twelve-year sentence, to be served in confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this conservatorship estate, Geoffrey Sottong, son of Mary Louise Sottong, raises issues as to the ruling of the Trial Court regarding the conservator's administration of the conservatorship estate. Upon review, we conclude that the Trial Court's series of orders properly instructed the conservator on administering the estate, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on these issues.

The defendant, Chris L. Robinson, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eight-year sentence, leaving the trial court to determine whether he would serve the sentence concurrently with or consecutively to his six-year sentence in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 2009-I-508. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve the eight-year sentence consecutively to the six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes. Following our review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court and remand solely for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the defendant’s sentence in this case is to run consecutively to his sentence in case number 2009-I-508.

The Defendant, Leonard Eugene Myers, was convicted following a jury trial in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; vehicular assault, a Class D felony; and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102(2)(A) (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-13-106(a) (2010), 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). The trial court merged the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions with the vehicular assault conviction and sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting blood analysis evidence because the chain of custody was not properly established; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s civil judgment against the Defendant; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant based upon enhancement factors that were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for entry of one judgment reflecting that the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions are merged with the vehicular assault conviction.

The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius Nacoyea Dunn, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and burglary, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for aggravated robbery and one year for burglary. On appeal, Dunn claims: (1) his convictions were not supported 1 by sufficient evidence; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to issue a curative instruction following hearsay testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dusty Haynes, appeals the order of the post-conviction that denied him postconviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for burglary but nonetheless granted him a delayed appeal of his sentence. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court instead should have reversed his conviction and granted him a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and reverse the granting of a delayed appeal.

The defendant, Jerry W. Alley, Jr., entered pleas of guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to one count of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-435 (2006); one count of simple possession of methamphetamine, see id. § 39-17-418(a); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1); and one count of child neglect, see id. § 39-15-401(a). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.