APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Antonio J. Beasley, Sr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief from his 1989 conviction for grand larceny and his 1990 convictions for possession of cocaine and attempted arson. He claims his convictions should be vacated because trial counsel and the trial court did not inform him that his convictions could be used to enhance future sentences, thus rendering his guilty pleas involuntary and unintelligent. The State has moved this court to dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal as untimely, or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Guy Alvin Williamson, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun and possession of a firearm while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. He was sentenced to an effective term of three years, suspended to probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for convicted felon in possession of a handgun. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jarvis Harris, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the performance of his attorneys at trial and on appeal. Because the first two issues are either waived or previously determined, see T.C.A. § 40-30-106(g)-(h) (2006), and because the petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, James Johnson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and received a ten-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Montreal Lyons, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Montreal Lyons, No. W2006-02445-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2699657, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 9, 2008), , (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty-four years. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *7. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Among other issues, Petitioner argued that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine the victims during the trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred because he was prejudiced by the trial counsel’s failure to properly cross-examine the victims. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial counsel’s cross-examination of the victims. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award. The principle defense is that the appellant, the party against whom the arbitration award was issued, was never a party to the arbitration agreement at issue and did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and enrolled a judgment against the appellant in the amount of $78,956.80 plus costs. We reverse the confirmation of the award against the appellant upon the finding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award. This is because the statute which confers jurisdiction upon the court to confirm arbitration awards, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-302, requires a written arbitration agreement between the parties, and there is no written agreement between the appellant and appellee to arbitrate. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award against the appellant.
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Roderick Moore, of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery, reckless homicide, and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder, two years for the reckless homicide, and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of the investigating police officer and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. We remand for entry of a judgment reflecting that the reckless homicide conviction merged into the first-degree murder conviction.

The petitioner, Sentoryia Lawand Young, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury conviction of second degree murder and two convictions of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner firefighter appeals denial of on-the-job injury benefits by the City of Memphis.  We affirm.

The Defendant, Lamont Hogan, pled guilty as indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service for the sentences left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as Range III, persistent offender to ten years for the Class C felony conviction and a concurrent four years for the Class E felony conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his total effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternatively sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Brandon Mobley, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2005 convictions of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property for which he is now serving two consecutive life sentences plus 19 years in the custody of the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief based upon allegations that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Because we determine that the petitioner is entitled to relief on the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the use of expert testimony, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, David Enrique Leon, of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and ten years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the holding of the majority that the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel save for the failure to ask the expert witness whether Petitioner could premeditate do not have merit. However, I dissent from the holding that counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the defense’s expert the ultimate question of whether Petitioner could have “premeditated” the murders for which he was convicted.

In these two cases, consolidated for oral argument, defendants entered guilty pleas to one count in their respective indictments in exchange for dismissal of other counts. In both cases, the trial court denied their subsequent requests for expungement of the dismissed charges. Both defendants filed petitions for writ of certiorari. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both cases and remanded for entry of orders requiring the requested partial expungement. We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the  procedural requirements for petitions for writ of certiorari set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 (2000) do not apply in criminal cases. We further hold that a conviction for one count in an indictment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a dismissed charge in a separate count. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases.

The Defendant, Quincy Bryan Banks, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, class A felonies. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty years’ confinement for each conviction. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the rape convictions, for an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Willie Hampton, of theft of property in excess of $10,000, a Class C felony. The Defendant-Appellant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to a term of fifteen years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction of theft over $10,000. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael D. O’Guin, appeals as of right from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that his sentence is illegal because it is in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523(b) and (2) that his sentence has expired because he has served 85 percent of it. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Bankston, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to a twelve year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Isaac Eugene Jones, III, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to 25 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that he was given the opportunity to testify at trial and for failing to object to his statement in which he said that he had molested his cousin. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In these two cases, consolidated for oral argument, defendants entered guilty pleas to one count in their respective indictments in exchange for dismissal of other counts. In both cases, the trial court denied their subsequent requests for expungement of the dismissed charges. Both defendants filed petitions for writ of certiorari. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both cases and remanded for entry of orders requiring the requested partial expungement. We granted the State’s applications for permission to appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the procedural requirements for petitions for writ of certiorari set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106 (2000) do not apply in criminal cases. We further hold that a conviction for one count in an indictment does not preclude expungement of the records relating to a dismissed charge in a separate count. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in both cases.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, George Tucker, of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Darrel Watson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donald A. Jahr, Jr., appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering the previously imposed sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Matthew Garrett, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. He was subsequently convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The Defendant-Appellant was sentenced to three years imprisonment, which was suspended after service of six months. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Stephen Anthony Scott, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery CountyCircuit Court. The defendantwas convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and attempted robbery, a Class D felony. The defendant was originally sentenced to an effective term of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. After multiple appeals and new filings in both state and federal courts, the defendant’s case was eventually sent back to the trial court for re-sentencing in accordance with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). A resentencing hearing was held, and the trial court determined that one enhancement factor was applicable, that being that the defendant had juvenile adjudications which would have been felony convictions if they had occurred when the defendant was an adult. As such, the trial court, applying partial consecutive sentencing, resentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-four years and six months. On appeal, the defendant raises multiple sentencing issues for our review: (1) whether the imposed sentences are still in violation of Blakely, based upon the application of the single enhancement; (2) whether the imposed sentences are illegal as the State failed to file notice of intent to seek enhancement factors; (3) whether the court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; (4) whether the court erred in treating a juvenile adjudication as a felony conviction for enhancement purposes; and (5) whether the court erred in failing to offer the defendant the right to waive his ex post facto rights and be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in applying the enhancement factor to the defendant’s sentences. Accordingly, we conclude that the presumptive minimum sentences for each conviction must be imposed in this case, and we remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments to so reflect. Additionally, we conclude that the defendant’s others issues are not meritorious and that no relief is warranted.