APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff brought this action against this contractor alleging breach of contract to construct an asphalt parking lot for plaintiff. The Trial Court determined that defendant breached the contract and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant-Appellants, Ronnie Dobson and Milton Rance, were convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Both Dobson and Rance were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders and received effective sentences of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Benson, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. On July 5, 2000, the petitioner pled guilty to one count of rape of a child in the Hamilton County. He now claims this conviction is void, and the State agrees, because the judgment of conviction does not contain the mandatory community supervision for life provision as required by law. The remedy he seeks is to require the State to honor its original plea agreement, which did not include the provision, even though it will result in an illegal sentence. After careful review, we conclude that the petitioner is correct and has a valid claim, but he has cited to no authority authorizing the relief he seeks. Therefore, we must deem that this issue is waived. Contrarily, the State requests that this court reverse the actions of the habeas corpus court in denying relief and that we remand with instructions to the court to summarily amend the judgment of conviction to provide for the mandatory community supervision for life provision. However, after review, we deem it proper to reverse and remand to follow the instructions contained herein.

This is a breach of contract and conversion case. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and conducted a bench trial on the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract and conversion. The trial court held in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We find the plaintiffs’ appellate brief to be in substantial violation of Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; in light of this, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Daniel Decker, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and is currently serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because the proof presented established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner alleges that the postconviction court erred in   multiple aspects, specifically: (1) that the courtheld that an expert witness had the duty and burden to present her opinions more completely at trial; (2) that the court erred by admitting a letter written by the petitioner to trial counsel after the conviction; (3) that the court should haverecused itself in the matter; (4) denying  relief because the petitioner met his burden of proof under the Strickland standard to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) that the court erred by not reviewing trial counsel’s performance under the Cronic standard; and (6) that the court erred by failing to address all issues raised by the petitioner in its order denying relief. Following our review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal concerns post-divorce parenting time. In the first appeal in this case, this Court reviewed the trial court’s denial of any parenting time for the appellant father with his daughter. This Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether parenting time
with the father would result in substantial harm to the parties’ daughter. On remand, the trial court held a hearing in which the evidence consisted of the mother’s testimony on her observations of the daughter’s reaction when the topic of the father arose. Based on this, the trial court again denied both supervised and unsupervised visitation to the father, and enjoined the father from contacting his daughter in any fashion. The father appeals. We find the evidence insufficient to support complete denial of parenting time, vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the case for further proceedings before a different trial judge.

This appeal involves the exclusion of expert testimony. The plaintiff employee filed a lawsuit against the defendant railroad employer pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, seeking compensation arising out of alleged work-related injuries. The parties took the depositions of two experts for the plaintiff, an ergonomist and her treating orthopedic surgeon. The railroad subsequently filed motions in limine to exclude the testimony of the two experts, as well as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions in limine, excluding the testimony of both experts. It then granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad. The employee appeals the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of her experts. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury by failing to instruct the jury about voluntary intoxication and by misstating the definition of attempt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (3) the assistant district attorney committed misconduct by repeatedly using a racial slur to inflame the jury; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Gary Wayne Garrett, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Javis Montell Dean, pled guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and introduction of contraband into a penal facility, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eight years and ordered that the Defendant serve one year incarcerated and serve the remainder in the community corrections program. As part of the Defendant’s pleas, he reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

The Defendant, Richard Paul Brady, pled guilty to burglary, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a multiple offender, to concurrent terms of four years for the burglary conviction and eight years for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served in community corrections after service of one year in the workhouse. A violation warrant was issued, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community correction sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in prison. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari or in the Alternative Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by a former inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction.The petition alleges that several agencies or individuals who were not named defendants in the petition imposed two allegedly “illegal” sentences upon him, thus, violating his civil rights. The sentences expired in 1999 and 2000, respectively. The petition was filed in 2009. The pertinent statute of limitations is a one-year statute. Thus, the petition is time barred and the dismissal of the petition on that ground is affirmed. We have also determined the issues are moot.
 

The Petitioner, Xavier Tyrell Barham, pled guilty to three counts of possession of Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sixteen-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he understood the plea agreement to be that all of his sentences would run concurrently for a total effective sentence of eight years rather than sixteen years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Sisavanh Keomongkout, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murderand attempted first degree murder and his effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1)failing to provide the Petitioner with discovery materials before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas, (2) failing to discuss the definition of first degree murder and lesser included offenses with the Petitioner, and (3) failing to inform the Petitioner that he could hire an expert witness. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the removal of Plaintiff’s political signs from public property by employees of the Defendant City of Memphis pursuant to a sign ordinance. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the sign ordinance was  unconstitutional, and further alleged that he was entitled to damages for the removal and disposal of his signs under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City, upholding the constitutionality of the sign ordinance. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to include additional claims challenging the constitutionality of the sign ordinance. In response, the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff’s remaining claims under the GTLA were time barred by the one-year statute of limitations. After conducting a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, and granted the City's motion for summary judgment, resulting in dismissal of the action. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper. Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs sued the City of Memphis, claiming that they were fraudulently induced to sign a
sewer easement agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City of
Memphis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner pled guilty in March 2000 to charges of first degree murder and aggravated rape. He accepted a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the aggravated rape conviction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief following the entry of an amended judgment order of conviction imposing community supervision for life for the aggravated rape conviction. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Cameron General Contractors, Inc., a Nebraska corporation (“Cameron”), sued Kingston Pike, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company (“Kingston Pike”), for breach of a contract concerning the sale of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. Prior to trial, Cameron elected to exercise its contractual right to terminate the contract, and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the contract did not limit Cameron to the return of its earnest money, and granting Cameron a judgment against Kingston Pike for damages in the amount of $872,418.22, plus attorney’s fees of $137,656.56. Kingston Pike appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the contract at issue clearly and unambiguously provides that once Cameron chose to terminate the contract, Cameron’s sole remedy for Kingston Pike’s breach was a return of Cameron’s earnest money deposit. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s October 28, 2010 order.

An employee suffered a partial amputation of his left index finger. Compensability of the injury was not contested. At trial, the employee argued that his disability award should be apportioned to the hand. His employer contended that the award should be limited to the index finger. The trial court agreed with the employee and awarded 52% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee injured her back at work and the injury required surgical treatment. The employee returned to work but was later terminated for violation of her employer’s attendance and absenteeism policy. The trial court found the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The trial court, however, adopted the impairment rating that the employee’s evaluating physician expressed and awarded 90% permanent partial disability benefits, the maximum award permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician’s impairment rating, by its use of the six-times multiplier on the basis of facts not in evidence, and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning employee’s impairment and the six-times multiplier. Accordingly, we modify the award.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Bernard Garrett, of simple possession or casual exchange of cocaine, fourth offense, and resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal,the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for resisting arrest; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Terry, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his prose petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William A. Howard, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court entered an agreed sentence of twenty-five years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his counsel did not inform him of the consequences of his plea and because he coerced him into pleading guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error. We, therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Brett Joseph Price, pled guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, 39-12-103 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for robbery and to three years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements and by admitting a statement at the sentencing hearing, and (2) imposing an excessive sentence and denying an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee alleged that she sustained a right- and left-side hernia while working. Her employer denied the claim for the left-side hernia. The trial court held that both the right- and left-side hernias were compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.