APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anthony D. Byers, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, four counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The petitioner raises stand-alone claims that: (1) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are void because they are in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c); (2) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony are voidable on double jeopardy grounds; and (3) three of his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping are contrary to State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1998). The petitioner also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntarily. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief from the petitioner’s convictions for seven counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and four counts of aggravated robbery. However, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief from the petitioner’s conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and vacate and dismiss that conviction and sentence.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Wayne Cooper, entered guilty pleas to four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced him to forty-two months for each count, imposed concurrent sentences for three of the burglary counts, and ordered that these sentences be served consecutively to the remaining burglary count, for an effective sentence of eighty-four months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Cooper argues that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a partially consecutive sentence alignment, and (2) imposing a sentence of total confinement. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Albert Frank Kelly, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Anthony M. Patton, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of facilitation of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to an agreed upon effective sentence of fifty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

This appeal results from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee bank. Appellant defaulted on promissory notes executed in favor of Appellee, resulting in a foreclosure sale. After the sale, a foreclosure deficiency existed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, awarding deficiency damages including amounts for unpaid taxes on the property. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves an attorney fee award. The appellee attorney was hired to represent the executor of an estate. After handling the estate, the attorney submitted a fee request to the trial court. The beneficiary of the estate objected, but the trial court awarded the fee amount requested. The beneficiary appeals, arguing that the attorney fee request was so excessive that it should be disallowed entirely under White v.McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996). In the alternative, if the fee request is not disallowed in its entirety, the beneficiary contends that the trial court erroneously relied on a percentage formula in the local rule, and that the fee should be reduced because the attorney sought fees for work that was either delegated to others or which did not benefit the estate. We hold that the amount of the attorney’s fee request and fee award is excessive. While the case presents a close question as to whether any fee should be allowed, we conclude that the lawyer should not be precluded from receiving any fee, and so modify the fee award to a reasonable amount.
 

The defendant, Courtney Bishop, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions for felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s refusal to suppress his pretrial statement to police. Because the trial court erred by failing to suppress the defendant’s statement, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and first degree murder in the perpetration of attempted aggravated robbery, those convictions are reversed. The conviction for attempted aggravated robbery is dismissed. The conviction for first degree murder is modified to one for second degree murder. Accordingly, the case is remanded for a new trial on the modified charge of second degree murder.

I fully concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the applicability of White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996), to the instant case.
 

A Hardeman County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Qualls, of thirty-seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of incest, Class C felonies, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to make an election of offenses for the sexual battery convictions. The State acknowledges that the trial court committed reversible error. We agree with the appellant and the State that the appellant’s convictions for sexual battery by an authority figure must be reversed because the State failed to make an election of offenses. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial for those offenses. The appellant’s conviction for incest is affirmed.

STEVEN STAFFORD, J., concurring.
I concur in both the reasoning and the result reached by the majority in this case, but write separately to voice my concern over the lack of findings made by the trial court.
 

This is a post-divorce child support case in which Michael Estes filed a petition to modify his child support obligation. The State of Tennessee is providing child support enforcement services to Rebecca Estes pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-3-124(c). The court modified the child support obligation pursuant to a child support worksheet but held Michael Estes in civil contempt for failure to pay support prior to filing the petition for modification. Father appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

After the Tennessee Supreme Court declared the tax on unauthorized substances to be unconstitutional, Plaintiff taxpayer filed a claim with the Department of Revenue seeking a refund of taxes paid. The Commissioner of Revenue denied Plaintiff’s claim for refund on the grounds that it was filed beyond the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the denialinthe chancerycourt. The chancerycourtgranted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

Petitioner, Rene S. Guevara, pled guilty in March 1995 to the felony offense of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. A little more than fifteen years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking the 1995 conviction. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him regarding “immigration consequences of a guilty plea.” Petitioner claimed that this right was a new constitutional rule of law announced in Padilla v. Kentucky, _____ U.S. _____, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), and that this new constitutional rule of law should be retroactively applied to Petitioner’s case. The post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a), and because the rule of law was not required to be applied retroactively. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury found the appellant,William Alexander Gant,guilty of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, tampering with evidence, and evading arrest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to sentences from two prior convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, that the trial court erred “in allowing the State to present proof derived from evidence that it intentionally destroyed,” and that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Jose Garcia, of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of sixteen years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it made several evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Margaret L. Holt, was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class D felony, and statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Holt argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a note and a kiss between her and one of the victims, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael D. Williams, of  first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After trial, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Thomas Nathaniel Allen, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appeals the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct committed by the State. The Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to (1) investigate or call several witnesses at trial and (2) retain a jury consultant. He asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by instructing a witness not to talk to the defense. The Petitioner additionally argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying him coram nobis relief based on newly discovered evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Tina Gail Williamson, was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of second degree murder, felonymurder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction. Appellant was sentenced to life plus twenty years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a sequential jury instruction. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and have concluded that the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to support the conviction. With regard to the jury instructions, Appellant has failed to include them in the record. It is Appellant’s responsibility to do so. Therefore, we are unable to review this issue and it is waived. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Fred Allen Owens, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to investigate and present a mental health defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.

Appellant, Rabon D. Gibson, pled guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and sentenced appellant to an eight-year sentence in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Denny Merrill Phillips, was convicted of one count of solicitation to commit rape in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528(a)(3), a Class C felony, on the grounds that he followed the victim into a public men’s room and verbally requested that the victim perform fellatio on him. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, arguing that the State failed to present any facts or evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the sexual penetration solicited by the defendant would have occurred without the victim’s consent. We note that a jury, when determining whether the sexual act being solicited is to be accomplished with or without consent, may consider the totality of a defendant’s conduct - not just the particular words used by the defendant. However, in this case, even viewing the defendant’s conduct in its entirety, we cannot conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the sexual act being solicited by the defendant would have been accomplished absent the victim’s consent. A verbal request for sex or an offer to pay for sex, without more, is simply not a solicitation to commit rape as it lacks proof of the non-consent element which is required. We agree that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction for solicitation to commit statutory rape. However, because our supreme court has established that statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape, see State v. Stokes, 24 S.W.3d 303, 305-06 (Tenn. 2000), the defendant’s conviction cannot be amended to reflect that charge. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be reversed.

The plaintiffs, in their capacity as executors of their mother’s estate, filed this action against their brother alleging that he caused the estate to lose the sale of a valuable piece of lakefront property by maliciously asserting a meritless claim to a portion of the property. The defendant represented himself in a jury trial. The jury awarded the estate $6,000,000. The defendant appeals the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. We affirm.

Appellant,Frederick Darnell Alexander,was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the sale of less than. 5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. As a result, he was sentenced to twelve years in incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. Appellant appeals the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress Appellant’s statement to police. After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence, although mostly circumstantial, was sufficient to show that Appellant sold cocaine to an undercover officer within 1000 feet of a school. Further, Appellant not only failed to raise any issue with regard to the motion to suppress in a motion for new trial but also failed to a provide a transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief unless there is plain error. The record is not clear as to what happened in the trial court because of the lack of a transcript of the suppression hearing. Therefore, we will not review the issue for plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Randall Lee Brown, was sentenced, as a Range III, persistent offender, to an effective sentence of eleven years incarceration following his guilty pleas to multiple offenses in Hamilton County. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying him an alternative sentence. However, we are unable to review the defendant’s issues because the record before us does not contain a transcript from the guilty plea hearing, which is needed for complete review. As such, we must presume that the trial court’s determinations were correct and, accordingly, affirm the sentences as imposed.