APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jacob L. Peachy, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him that his sentence was to be served on probation. Following careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to a legal malpractice action. Appellee attorney drafted a contract for Appellant medical provider; the contract contained a fee-split clause in contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225. When the other party to the contract, a hospital, allegedly breached the contract and sued the medical provider, the medical provider counterclaimed for breach of contract. The hospital answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the contract was illegal and unenforceable.The trial court ruled that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6225 did not apply to the contract at issue. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the medical provider for more than one million dollars. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 63-6-225 invalidated the contract, and remanded the case for dismissal. Within one year of the Court of Appeals opinion, the medical provider filed this legal malpractice case against the drafting attorney. The trial court dismissed the case as beyond the one-year legal malpractice statute of limitations. We affirm.
 

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Brown, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The conviction for simple possession of cocaine was merged with the Class B felony, and Brown received an effective twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession with intent to deliver, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tray Turner, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Criminal Court for Knox County. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 14 years incarceration at 100 percent service. The Defendant contends (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve 100 percent of his sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2008, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Ray Turner, of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivering 300 grams or more of cocaine. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 22, 2010). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he alleged that his indictment was void because the State improperly amended the indictment to include that he committed the offenses in a school zone and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. On appeal, he contends the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.
 

Nero Oswald Jones (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for first degree premeditated murder and voluntary manslaughter, claiming that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing statements made by the Defendant to law enforcement officials; (2) excluding the Defendant’s line of questioning on cross-examination of a witness regarding potential bias based upon alleged romantic interest; (3) excluding testimony of one witness purporting to impeach the testimony of another witness; and (4) allowing the testimony of a lay witness based on her experience with firearms. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Joel Scott Stephens, guilty of driving on a revoked license and violating the financial responsibility law. He was found not guilty of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total sentence of six months in the Hamblen County Jail, with ninety days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of ninety days of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Trial Court held Man Keng Ho liable for unpaid rents on commercial property that Ho had leased from his landlord. Ho claimed against Soon Lee Pang, appellant, on the grounds that Pang was the guarantor on the lease. At the subsequent trial between Ho and Pang, Ho acting as an interpreter for Pang, the Trial Court entered Judgment against Pang for the full amount of the Judgment against Ho as guarantor under the terms of the lease. Pang then filed a Rule 60 Motion seeking relief from the Judgment, principally on the grounds that he was entitled to an interpreter and the Trial Court erred in utilizing his co-defendant, who had an interest in the case, as Pang's interpreter. The Trial Court overruled the Rule 60 Motion and Pang appealed to this Court. We hold that the Trial Court abused its discretion in not complying with Rules 41 and 42 of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and remand for a retrial on the merits.

The defendant, Princeton Moody, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years at 100 percent for the second degree murder conviction, eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction, with the murder and aggravated assault sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his second degree murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a hearsay statement as an excited utterance, in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior convictions for reckless endangerment, in admitting the victim’s medical records, and in allowing the medical examiner to testify with respect to an autopsy report that she did not create. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric Sims, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to eight years on each conviction to be served concurrently. The Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, raising three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions for aggravated robbery; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to question the Defendant about his arrest involving an explosive device at school when he was fourteen years old; and (3) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to all three subsections of the criminal responsibility statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402 (2006). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to all three subdivisions of the criminal responsibility statute. We, however, conclude that the Defendant failed to prove that this error probably changed the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Trial Court dismissed this case based upon its finding that although plaintiff’s Summons was issued the day she filed her Complaint, proof of service was not made to the clerk until 412 days later, and, because plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Timothy L. Morton, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original effective sentence of three years. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Defendant, Joseph L. Lands, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, and he intended, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), to reserve the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether proof of actual attempts by law enforcement officers to obtain a lawful warrant must be placed on the record before the court may find that exigent circumstances exist, such that the warrant requirement can be excused?” After review of the entire record, we conclude this appeal must be dismissed.

The defendant, Vernon Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on premeditation; (2) the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a Brady violation; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony of the victim’s dying declaration to include information concerning the motive for the killing; and (4) the State’s argument during closing was improper and amounted to plain error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A residential property owner challenged the procedures used by a planning commission and city commission in granting a rezoning application submitted by two industrial companies. The companies asked that the zoning for 95.2 acres of land be changed from agricultural to special impact industrial for the purpose of developing a landfill to dispose of salt cake produced as a byproduct of their smelting businesses. The property owner also asserted that two of the commissioners had a conflict of interest and that their participation granting the application invalidated the procedure. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions after concluding the planning commission and city commission complied with the procedural requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§13-7-203(a) and 6-20-215 and that the two commissioners had no conflict of interest since they had no ownership interest in the rezoning applicants. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the property owner’s complaint.
 

The petitioner, Johnny J. Peterson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder and attempted first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the reasoning used. I believe the evidence fairly raised the issue of self-defense, thereby justifying an instruction to the jury. I also believe that under the facts in this case, selfdefense was not inconsistent with a claim of reckless homicide. I, however, am not persuaded that counsel performed deficiently nor that prejudice has been shown.

Jawad Salman (“the Petitioner”) filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea for conspiracy to manufacture less than one hundred plants of marijuana, a D felony. The trial court denied the motion, and final judgment was entered. The Petitioner timely appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was void because of the failure to reduce the Petitioner’s guilty plea to a signed writing and that the trial court erred by not allowing the Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bo W. Prendergast, of one count of theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000, see T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(4) (2006), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and urges this court to conclude that the trial court committed plain error by excluding a State’s witness’s felony convictions for use as impeachment. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor that substantial justice requires consideration of the alleged error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellee was granted a default judgment against Appellant in the general sessions court. More than five months after the entry of the default judgment, Appellant filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion for relief from the general sessions court’s judgment. The general sessions court dismissed the motion on grounds that it was not timely filed and that the general sessions court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to set aside its judgment. Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was dismissed sua sponte by the circuit court. Appellant appeals. Because the writ of error coram nobis has long been abolished in the civil law, this filing had no legal effect; consequently, the trial court did not err in dismissing the writ. Affirmed and remanded.
 

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Rodney K. Glover, of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued at less than $500. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 50 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of sentences as to both the length and alignment of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

In this divorce appeal, husband challenges the trial court’s valuation of his business, the division of marital assets, and the allocation of the debt on the marital residence. Husband also argues that the trial court erred in the amount and length of the alimony award and in awarding attorneyfees to wife. We find that the trial court erred in changing its net valuation of the business, after a second hearing, from $200,000 to $280,000 based upon the updated status of Husband’s payments on the tax lien. As this change did not affect the trial court’s division of the marital estate or the alimony award, however, the error is harmless. In all other respects, we find no error in the trial court’s decision.

Jeffrey Klocko (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and assault by offensive or provocative contact, which resulted in an effective sentence of thirteen years. As his basis for relief, he alleged numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to interview the Petitioner’s therapist or mother and failed to call either of them at trial, resulting in ineffective assistance. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

The Petitioner, Christopher Johnson, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because it relied upon “unconstitutional” case law in determining that the petition failed to present a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce action, the father appeals the entry of a default judgment modifying the parties’ parenting plan for their minor child and the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment. The father was personally served with the petition to modify the parenting plan at work but did not file an answer. He had changed residences after the divorce but did not provide the mother or the court with his new address after the petition was served. Over two months later, the mother filed a motion for default judgment, serving the father by mail at his last known address. The trial court granted the motion and entered a default judgment. Father filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief, which was denied. This appeal followed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.