APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this negligence case, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of the plaintiff’s medical
evaluation and treatment immediately following the accident as well as pain and suffering.
We find material evidence to support the verdict and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

Defendant in suit to recover property taxes appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to Plaintiff. Finding no error, we affirm.

Karen Stoner (“the Executrix”), in her capacity as the Executrix of the Estate of Irma M. Collins, brought suit against Brittany C. Amburn seeking to divest ownership of certain real property out of Amburn and into her name in her representative capacity. The suit was grounded in the Executrix’s claim that the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to Amburn by the latter’s stepfather, Larry C. Collins (“the Judgment Debtor”), a judgment debtor of the Estate. The Executrix alleged that the transfer was made for the purpose of shielding the property from execution on her judgment. At the conclusion of the proof in a jury trial, the court held that no reasonable minds could reach a conclusion other than that the conveyance was fraudulent in nature. The court directed a verdict in favor of the Executrix. The court vested all right, title and interest to the property in the Executrix. Amburn appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, William Fisher, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence has expired. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Court issues a show cause order on July 19, 2012, directing the pro se incarcerated appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant is seeking a review of the decision on a claim pending on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. "No appeal may be taken from a commissioner's decision regarding claims appearing on the small claims docket." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2).

The Petitioner, Francisco Miquel Jose,appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his 2004 guilty plea to misdemeanor theft of property was not knowingly made because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time of his plea, and that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations due to the circumstances surrounding his guiltyplea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A management employee working for Ford Motor Company was to become an employee of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiary when the subsidiary was made an independent company. The manager wanted to remain employed by Ford and sought to transfer back to an hourly position before the spinoff took effect. The manager’s supervisor promised the manager his benefits and pay would not change as an employee of the subsidiary and that he could return to an hourly position with Ford after the spinoff until such time that the subsidiary was purchased by a third party. The subsidiary was purchased by a third party five years later, but Ford did not permit the employee to transfer back to Ford at that point. After the employee asked to transfer back to Ford, Ford offered its hourly employees a special retirement plan whereby they were offered lifetime health and pension benefits. The employee would have been eligible to participate in this plan if he had been allowed to transfer back to Ford. The employee filed suit against Ford, claiming promissory estoppel and seeking damages based on the amount he would have received under the special retirement plan. A jury found Ford liable for promissory estoppel and awarded the employee damages. Ford appealed, arguing (1) the employee’s claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) the employee failed to prove all the elements of promissory estoppel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal in the Circuit Court, entered on April 11, 2012. The appellant did not filed a notice of appeal until August 9, 2012. This Court issued a show cause order directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order by motion which does not show good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed.

The Petitioner, Calvin D. Norris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or less of cocaine and his ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Clois Dean Asbury, of driving under the influence (DUI), seventh offense; leaving the scene of an accident involving injury; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. In addition, the trial court found that he violated the implied consent law. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement for the convictions. As a result of his violating the implied consent law, his driver’s license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting officer to testify as the State’s fourth witness, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment or give a special jury instruction when the State lost evidence, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leslie Jacquinte Fetters, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery and agreed to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. The plea agreement was based upon the Defendant being sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years, at 30%, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences run concurrently as contemplated by the plea agreement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Aldrick D. Lillard, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court committed reversible errors by (1) refusing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition for postconviction relief during the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding that the post-conviction hearing testimony from the assistant district attorney regarding his discussions during trial with the Petitioner’s trial counsel was irrelevant; and (3) concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his trial attorneys were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court merged the Petitioner’s two conspiracy convictions but found that the Petitioner failed to prove any additional allegations in his petition for relief. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling prohibiting the Petitioner from amending his petition during the evidentiary hearing.We also conclude that the post-conviction court’s finding that the prosecutor’s testimony was irrelevant was in error, albeit harmless. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issue in this case is whether a warranty deed made by a 98-year-old uncle to his 85-year old niece should be set aside for lack of competence or undue influence. Following a bench trial, the court found that the uncle was competent and that the niece did not exert undue influence on him. The uncle’s children appeal. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant, Ian Michael Boone Parks, was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault in Claiborne County. Appellant pled guilty, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a five-year sentence of confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not supported by the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that Appellant failed to include both the transcript of the guilty plea and the presentence report. These documents are necessary for an adequate review of the issues presented. Because we do not have these documents, we must conclude that the trial court’s sentences are supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Willie Lewis, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) excluding relevant testimony regarding the victim’s tattoo, (2) not permitting the Defendant to refer to the victim’s tattoo during closing argument, and (3) issuing a flight instruction that was not supported by the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Edward Watts, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for attempted theft of property. We determine that sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and affirm that judgment. We conclude, however, that the trial court’s order concerning the vandalism count is inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling at the motion for new trial hearing. Therefore, we remand as to that count for entry of a corrected order properly effectuating the intent of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the following charges against the Defendant, Jimmy Joyner: driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense; violation of the open container law; and failure to maintain a traffic lane. The trial court dismissed the charges finding that the State had not commenced prosecution before the expiration of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the indictments against the Defendant.

The Petitioner,Antwain TapaigeSales,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the threshold burden to warrant an additional hearing regarding whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his mental incompetence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Gerald Farrar (“the Claimant”) submitted a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house was badly damaged by fire. His insurer, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“the Company”) denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action. The Company alleged that the Claimant had made a misrepresentation on his application – one that increased the Company’s risk of loss. The Claimant filed a counterclaim in which he alleged that the Company’s agent, Michael E. Dyer (“the Agent”), misled him about the meaning of question 13 on the application, the answer to which contains the alleged misrepresentation. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the Company and dismissed the Claimant’s counterclaim predicated on the Claimant’s failure to carry the burden of proof. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farrar, 337 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Farrar I”). The Claimant then filed this action against the Agent alleging that the Agent made a misrepresentation about the meaning of question 13 that caused him to give an incorrect answer on the application. The complaint also named the Company as a defendant “principal” responsible for the Agent’s actions. The trial court dismissed the case on summary judgment, holding that Farrar is a bar to this second action. The Claimant appeals. We affirm.

This direct appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Chattanooga lawyer arising out of his representation of two clients. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for forty-five days. Following the lawyer’s appeal to the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, the trial court upheld the lawyer’s forty-five-day suspension after finding that the record supported the hearing panel’s findings that the lawyer had attempted to bill one client twice, had breached his ethical obligations to another client, and had failed to cooperate with the Board of Professional Responsibility during its extended investigation into his conduct. On this appeal, the lawyer insists (1) that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings, (2) that the hearing panel erred by receiving into evidence a videotaped deposition given by one of his clients, (3) that the hearing panel failed to properly apply the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and (4) that the hearing panel failed to consider the discipline imposed on other lawyers for similar infractions. Based on our review of the record, we, like the trial court, affirm the hearing panel’s decision to suspend the lawyer’s license to practice law for forty-five days.

The Defendant, Dennis Marshall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed plain error (2) by denying him an open and public trial; (3) by admitting hearsay statements into evidence; (4) by admitting evidence of other investigations; (5) by admitting evidence of the utility account holder at the home in which the drugs were found; (6) by admitting evidence about his having money but no job; (7) by admitting nonexpert testimony about the value of the cocaine found at the crime scene; (8) by admitting evidence about the recovery of a razor blade at the scene; and (9) by admitting evidence of his personal relationship with a minor female. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement.