APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In March of 2011, John Charles Sosebee, Jr. (“Husband”) was found guilty of 69 counts of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection in favor of Brandi Nicole Sosebee (“Wife”). Husband was sentenced to 10 days in jail for each violation, for a total of 690 days. Husband appeals raising several issues including whether he received proper notice that Wife was seeking criminal contempt. We find and hold that Husband did not receive proper notice that criminal contempt was being pursued and should not have been convicted and sentenced accordingly. We, however, hold that the record on appeal supports a finding that Husband violated the order of protection on 69 occasions. We, therefore, modify the judgment to reflect that Husband committed civil contempt, and remand to the Trial Court with direction to set a purge amount and proceed accordingly.

Petitioner appeals the Circuit Court for Lincoln County’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted of forty-three counts, thirteen counts by a jury trial and thirty counts by guilty pleas. On the date of his scheduled sentencing hearing, petitioner agreed to sentences on the thirteen counts for which the jury convicted him and pled guilty to the remaining thirty counts. He accepted an effective sentence of twenty-five years at 100% for all forty-three counts. On appeal, petitioner alleges that trial counsel made numerous mistakes in preparing for and conducting the trial and did not adequately explain the consequences of his guilty pleas. He further alleges that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his motion to remove post-conviction counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Carlos Cannon, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

A jury convicted Randall Kelvin Madison (“the Defendant”) of twenty-two counts of rape, three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and one count of forgery. The trial court subsequently merged several of the offenses so as to leave in place twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) that evidence of his uncharged bad acts was admissible; (2) the State’s election of offenses; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) his sentence. We hold that (1) the Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling; (2) the Defendant has not demonstrated that the State’s election of offenses was fatally deficient; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. We also affirm the trial court’s sentencing decisions. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

This appeal involves a contract dispute over the purchase of more than 100 acres of rustic property adjacent to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Wilson Reynolds offered to purchase the property from Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. for 3 million dollars. The parties formed a contract evidencing their agreement. Following the closing date, Wilson Reynolds filed suit, alleging breach of contract. The trial court ruled that Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. breached the contract and awarded Wilson Reynolds $600,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees, and other costs. Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. appeals. We affirm.

James William Swafford, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his multiple convictions for drug and other offenses which resulted in an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2002, the Defendant, Dale M. Rogers, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, to be served at 100%, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The trial court later amended the judgements to reflect that the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life after the expiration of his sentence. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not have notice that his sentences were amended until 2011 and asking the court to toll the applicable statute of limitations. He further alleged that the trial court’s amending of his judgments, adding the community supervision for life provision, rendered his guilty pleas unknowingly and involuntarily entered. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition based upon its finding that the petition was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post- conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. The State agrees with the Petitioner that the post-conviction court erred and asks this Court to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine when the Petitioner knew that his judgments had been amended. We agree with the parties, and we reverse the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

Following the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, the Defendant, David Ingram Ownby, alias, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to forty-eight hours incarceration, placed him on unsupervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days, and ordered the Defendant to pay a $350 fine. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant reserved a two-part certified question of law challenging the legality of his seizure and subsequent arrest. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in that the facts of the case would engender a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving while impaired. I would emphasize that the presence of the defendant’s vehicle headed in the wrong direction in the restaurant’s drive-through lane, in addition to the condition of the driver, is the fact that justifies the seizure.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee sustained a compensable back injury for which he was prescribed medication. Approximately five weeks after his injury, the employee died from gastrointestinal bleeding. His widow sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that his death was compensable because it was caused by the medication he was prescribed for his work injury. The employer denied her claim, contending that the employee’s death was not caused by the medication, but was instead the result of esophageal varices caused by alcoholism and cirrhosis of the liver. The trial court held that the widow did not sustain her burden of proof, and she appeals. We affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Earl Watts, of four counts of aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count of child neglect. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the offenses; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the appellant’s co-defendant was an accomplice; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the appellant’s aggravated child neglect convictions; and (5) his effective sentence is excessive. The State concedes that the trial court erred by failing to merge the appellant’s aggravated child neglect convictions. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellant’s motion to sever but that the error was harmless. We also conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support one of the appellant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse, one of his convictions for aggravated child neglect, and his conviction for child neglect. The appellant’s remaining convictions and effective seventy-five-year sentence are affirmed.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendants, Brian Montrel Brawner, Randy Leon Miller, and Sam Edward Stevenson, with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated arson for having assaulted, kidnapped, and set fire to the victim, Freddy Jones. At the conclusion of their joint trial, a Madison County jury convicted Defendants Brawner and Stevenson of aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of attempted first degree murder. The jury convicted Defendant Miller of aggravated assault, aggravated arson, especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged Defendant Brawner’s and Defendant Stevenson’s aggravated assault convictions into their convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and sentenced them to effective terms of thirty and fifty-three years, respectively. The trial court merged Defendant Miller’s aggravated assault conviction into his conviction for attempted first degree murder and sentenced him to an effective term of forty years in the Department of Correction. Defendant Miller raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated arson and especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether his dual convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson violate principles of double jeopardy; (3) whether the State should have been required to make an election of offenses for the aggravated assault charges; and (4) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Stevenson raises essentially two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (2) whether the State should have been required to elect the offenses for his aggravated assault charges. Defendant Brawner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A show cause order was entered in this case on April 13, 2012, directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, John Howard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A show cause order was entered in this case on March 23, 2012, directing the appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellants have responded to the show cause order, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Alan Bryant Minchew, pleaded guilty to first offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”) with a blood alcohol level of .08% or more and reserved as a certified question the propriety of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings in its order denying the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Chesney Cheyenne Bowling, was sentenced by agreement to consecutive sentences of three and one-half years and eleven months and twenty-nine days following her plea of guilty to various drug-related offenses. It is from the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing that the Defendant appeals. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court attributed excessive weight to her criminal history while not attributing sufficient weight to proof she offered in mitigation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Patricia Adkisson, appeals her Hickman County Circuit Court jury convictions of 14 counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, see T.C.A. § 39-14-212, 16 counts of cruelty to animals, see id. § 39-14-202(a)(2), one count of the unlawful sale or transportation of dogs or cats, see id. § 44-17-103(a), and one count of unlawful administration of rabies vaccination, see id. § 68-8-103(d), for which she received an effective sentence of five years’ probation to be supervised in a community corrections program, see id. § 40-36-106(f), followed by five years of traditional probation, see id. § 4035-303. On appeal, she contends that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel, that the State failed to provide exculpatory material, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jeremiah Dawson, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; carjacking, a Class B felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of fourteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) his dual convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violate double jeopardy and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that dual convictions for carjacking by use of force or intimidation and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony do not violate double jeopardy and that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Nevertheless, we conclude that the appellant’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm must be reversed because the trial court improperly instructed the jury. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to those offenses. The appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Small, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, in case number 01-00913 and two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, in case number 01-00914. In each case, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentences in 01-00913 and 01-00914 concurrently with each other and consecutively to the defendant’s sentence in 01-00926. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated; (2) not striking the jury venire after a prospective juror’s outburst; and (3) not declaring a mistrial after the jury indicated it could not reach a unanimous verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dennis Burnett, appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction. He argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to admit at trial a statement of an alleged witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment upon being subpoenaed to testify; advising the jury during voir dire that he, trial counsel, had been previously indicted; failing to respond to a judgment of conviction belonging to Burnett's co-defendant found in the jurors' bathroom furing trial; failing to adequately prepare Burnett to testify; failing to investigate and call Michael Gibson as a trial witness; and failing to preserve issues in a motion for new trial thereby securing review on direct appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the collection of credit card debt. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the debt, filed this collection action against the appellant debtor. On appeal, the appellant debtor argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various documents from a previous owner of the debt, pursuant to the hearsay exception for business records under Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). We hold that two of the exhibits were not appropriately admitted into evidence under the business records exception. Without those exhibits, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the creditor, and reverse.
 

A dispute over the extent of lawn being mowed and the manner in which it was being mowed boundary line between the neighboring lots be established and demanded compensatory and punitive damages. The Defendants filed a third-party complaint against their predecessor in title, Sandra Stallings, based upon her alleged misrepresentation in her disclosure to them. After a bench trial, the court awarded the Plaintiff a judgment establishing the boundary according to one of her two surveys, and awarded her the cost of her surveys as damages. The court also ordered the Defendants to remove all encroachments. The court found that Ms. Stallings failed to disclose known encroachments and held her liable to the Defendants for one-half of the cost of the surveys. The Defendants appeal. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding as damages the cost of the surveys. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Roy Allen Scott, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because the trial court for the underlying convictions was without jurisdiction to enter his conviction for aggravated assault. In addition, he contends that his convictions for driving under the influence and vehicular assault violate double jeopardy principles. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Gary V. Bullard, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. In this appeal, Bullard argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to (1) sufficiently cross-examine the investigating police officer,(2) cross-examine the victim,and (3) offer any proof in defense.Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.