APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Kevin Jamelle Baldwin, was charged with possession with intent to sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana after the narcotics were discovered in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop and search of his vehicle were unconstitutional. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the indictment. The State appeals the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress, and after review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous.
 

The Petitioner, Joseph S. Lucas, Jr., appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape of a child and resulting twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered, (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve a suppression issue for appeal, failing to address waiver of the Petitioner’s ex post facto rights during sentencing, and failing to prepare witnesses for the sentencing hearing, and (3) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to include transcripts of the suppression hearing and the guilty plea hearing in the record on direct appeal, failing to request a rehearing, and failing to argue that the Petitioner’s sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Two years after the divorce, Father sought to be named primary residential parent due to Mother’s alleged deteriorating mental health. Father sought discovery of Mother’s mental health records. Mother objected. The trial court ordered production of the records for in camera inspection. Mother filed an appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10, which this court granted. We reverse the trial court’s order.
 

The Defendant, Keesha P. Washington, was found guilty by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by not holding a hearing to ensure that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right not to testify and that her sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Kenneth Dubose, appeals the decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years. The sentence was to be suspended to supervised probation following the service of one year. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered the balance of the sentence be served in the Department of Correction. Following review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of confinement. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jeffrey Wade Osborne, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court bench trial conviction of felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, arguing that his trial should not have occurred while competency proceedings were still pending and that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Randell Murphy, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; vandalism of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000; possession of burglary tools; and criminal impersonation. The defendant received an effective sentence of 21 and one-half years. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his plea agreement with the State, by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and by imposing an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gail Lynn Padgett, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration for felony DUI with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months probation for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. The trial court also revoked the Defendant’s license for five years, ordering the Defendant to attend DUI school. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for DUI, fourth offense; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the State’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence of her actions and statements to police due to the lack of probable cause to effectuate the arrest. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Thorne Peters, of one count of simple possession of marijuana, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration in the local workhouse; with respect to the manner of service, the judgment said,“[T]ime served.” On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to quash a subpoena of the former sheriff, and the trial court’s limitation of crossexamination of a witness. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor reversible error committed by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for clarification of pretrial jail credit.

The appellant, Charles Edward Durham, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of possession of not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana in a school zone with the intent to sell and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he alleges was discovered after he was illegally detained and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeremiah L. Woods, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. He contends that the evidence is insufficient only with regard to the element of premeditation. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence of premeditation in the record is overwhelming and, accordingly, affirm the conviction.

The defendant, James Drew Freeman, Jr., appeals from his White County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the admission of the autopsy report via a witness who did not perform the autopsy violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, that the State engaged in improper and inflammatory closing argument, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Coffee County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant,Raleigh Kristopher Frye,of one count of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the trial court found the defendant guilty of violating the implied consent law. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of his vehicle and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to exercise four peremptory challenges and by permitting the indictment for the implied consent violation to be taken to the jury room, and contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The trial court awarded workers’ compensation benefits to an injured lineman who had violated a rule requiring the use of protective gloves while in a bucket lift. The employer appealed, contending that the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and, more particularly, the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or device precluded recovery. The appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). After oral argument before the Panel, but before the Panel filed its opinion, the case was transferred to the full Court. Because the evidence establishes that the employee admitted his knowledge of a regularly enforced safety rule, understood the rationale for the rule, and willfully (rather than negligently or recklessly) failed to comply, the injuries he suffered because of the rule violation are not compensable. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the case is dismissed.
 

Today the majority adopts Larson’s four-element test for applying the defenses of willful misconduct or willful failure to use a safety device. This test allows an employer to assert the defenses of willful misconduct or willful failure to use a safety device when four elements are satisfied: the employee has actual notice of the employer’s rule, the employee understands that the rule is in place for safety reasons, the employer consistently enforces the rule, and the employee has no valid excuse for violating the rule. I disagree with the majority that the application of Larson’s test compels the conclusion that Mr. Mitchell’s removal of his gloves was a willful failure to comply with his employer’s safety rule. The majority concludes that “[t]he lack of a valid excuse for the failure to use a safety appliance or device, when the first three elements [of Larson’s test] have been satisfied, amounts to willfulness.” Our case law compels a different conclusion.
 

In this divorce action the parties engaged in mediation and resolved several issues in the case. The Trial Court entered a Divorce Decree without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues remaining. The father appealed to this Court. We affirm that part of the

In this case for parental termination, the Trial Court found statutory grounds for terminating the parents' parental rights to their three minor children. Only the father has appealed, and we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Trial Court's finding for grounds of abandonment, as well as termination of parental rights being in the best interest of the children.

Defendant-Appellant, Keith Richard Gibson, was convicted after a jury trial for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received eight years’ incarceration for the felony and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for the misdemeanor. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, although we reject a part of the trial court’s reasoning in its denial of the motions to suppress, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Adjoining property owners dispute the validity of an Agreement which placed restrictions upon a roadway across one property which provided access to the other property. The trial court, after making specific factual findings, found the Agreement invalid and non-binding upon the parties. We affirm the trial court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate determination of invalidity.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Short, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Short to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish his convictions given Short’s theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This divorce case deals primarily with child support. The parties entered into a consent order n the amount of child support to be paid. Father  subsequently lost his job and sought modification of his obligation. The divorce referee modified the support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity rather than on his actual income. Father appealed the ruling of the referee, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the trial court. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce, finding all property to be marital, affirming the ruling of the referee, setting permanent child support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity, and awarding attorney fees to Mother. We reverse the judgment setting child support based on Father’s earning capacity and remand for a determination of Father’s child support based on his actual income. Additionally, we vacate the judgment of the trial court awarding Mother $35,000.00 in attorney fees, award Mother $7,675.00 in attorney fees and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the remaining portion of the attorney fees in light of this opinion. This case is affirmed in all other respects. Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Christina K. Deweese Richmond (“Wife”) and Gregory Alan Richmond (“Husband”) were divorced in June of 1999. In March of 2011, Wife filed a motion to clarify the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order holding, inter alia, that Wife was awarded 42.5% of Husband’s disposable military retired pay. The Trial Court also ordered that Husband shall pay to Wife her share of his military retirement accruing from August 2010 through June 2011 in the amount of $4,915.90 less federal taxes. Husband appeals raising issues regarding whether Husband should be entitled to the protection of the unclean hands doctrine and whether Wife waived her rights to past payments of Husband’s military retirement. We find neither unclean hands nor waiver, and we affirm.

This appeal involves a contract dispute over the purchase of more than 100 acres of rustic property adjacent to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Wilson Reynolds offered to purchase the property from Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. for 3 million dollars. The parties formed a contract evidencing their agreement. Following the closing date, Wilson Reynolds filed suit, alleging breach of contract. The trial court ruled that Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. breached the contract and awarded Wilson Reynolds $600,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees, and other costs. Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. appeals. We affirm.

James William Swafford, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his multiple convictions for drug and other offenses which resulted in an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.