APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jesse Wade Glover, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of facilitation of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class E felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jesse Wade Glover, No. W2008-00185- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2015230 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed July 13, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 23, 2009). A summary of the facts underlying Defendant’s conviction can be found in this Court’s opinion cited above. Defendant timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, asserting as grounds that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, James Britt, charging him with premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting two autopsy photographs. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jason M. Justice, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jason M. Justice, No. W2008-01009-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1741398 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 15, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 23, 2009). An appellate summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction can be found at this Court’s opinion cited herein. In this appeal as of right, Petitioner asserts: 1) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; 2) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at the post-conviction proceedings; and 3) the post-conviction court erred by denying Petitioner’s requests to have his post-conviction counsel relieved and the post-conviction hearing continued. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Weldon Christopher Frazier, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his initial statements to the police, (2) not granting a mistrial after a witness for the State mentioned polygraphs, plea negotiations, and used the word “confession” to characterize the Defendant’s statements to the police, and (3) refusing to give a jury instruction regarding his not fleeing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dwight Randy Rowe, pled guilty to sale of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone and to possession of a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly advised him of parole eligibility and failed to throughly investigate the case or prepare a defense. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves various claims by a beneficiary of several trusts against his sister and her husband, who serve as the trustee and co-trustee of some of the trusts. The defendants/trustees filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that they had followed the terms of the trusts and paid the beneficiary all distributions to which he was entitled pursuant to the trust documents. In response, the beneficiary asserted that the trust documents were void either because they were fabricated, or because he executed them due to undue influence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, and the beneficiary voluntarily dismissed all of his remaining claims. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff was severely injured when a padlock, which was allegedly thrown from a City of Memphis mower, broke through her vehicle window. Plaintiff and her husband successfully sued the City. On appeal, the City argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of the Public Duty Doctrine. Because the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to amend fails to explain the basis for its denial, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a reasoned explanation of its actions regarding the City’s motion to amend its answer.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to continue and awarded summary judgment to Defendant Bank. We affirm.

Wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and its division of marital property following the parties’ divorce. She also argues that Husband failed to demonstrate his need for spousal support and that the award exceeds Husband’s actual need. We affirm the decision of the chancery court. We find it appropriate to award Husband his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand to the trial court for a determination of such fees reasonably incurred.

In this divorce action, Father appeals certain provisions of the parenting plan, the award of rehabilitative alimony and award of counsel fees to Wife, and the finding that he was in criminal contempt. Mother appeals the valuation and division of marital assets, the failure of the court to require that payments to Mother be secured, rulings with reference to certain pre-trial matters, and the classification of alimony. We remand the case for further consideration of the amount of Father’s annual contributions into the children’s educational accounts; we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the requirements for rehabilitative alimony. All types of alimony are statutory, and the legislature’s definitions must be applied. The legislature has stated that it intends that an economically disadvantaged spouse be rehabilitated, through an award of rehabilitative alimony, whenever rehabilitation possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2).
 

The Defendant, Jacob Aaron Faulkner, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. Under the terms of the agreement, he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he violated the “move over law.” After our review of the record, we dismiss the appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and there is no reason justifying waiver of the filing requirement.
 

An employee filed a motion requesting that a former employer be ordered to provide postjudgment medical treatment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the employee’s motion. The former employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting the employee’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, David Edward Niles, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. On appeal, Niles argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his ex parte motion for funds for a psychiatrist. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

After a subpoena duces tecum was served on Chattanooga attorney Scott D. Bergthold (“the Attorney”) requiring him to appear for a deposition in Hamilton County and to produce documents regarding ordinances enacted by Sarasota County, Florida (“the County”)pertaining to “adult businesses,” he filed this action as a motion for a protective order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-201, et seq. (Supp. 2011). The Attorney asserted, on behalf of himself and the County, that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and that the discovery was overly broad and unduly burdensome. The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoena. The subpoena had been issued and served at the request of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba “The Cheetah Lounge” and Sarasota Eateries, LLC (“the Adult Clubs”) as a part of their discovery in a Florida case wherein they challenged the constitutionality of the subject ordinances. The Adult Clubs appeal. While this matter was pending oral argument before us, the County filed motions asking that this Court consider dual facts, i.e., (1) that, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Florida court dismissed the underlying case and (2) that court later denied the Adult Clubs’ motion to rehear. We directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this ancillary matter is rendered moot by the dismissal of the underlying action. We now hold that this case is moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiff appeals from the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice claim against his former attorney who represented him during an arbitration of a securities dispute. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, causation, we affirm the summary dismissal of the action.
 

After an investigatory stop and frisk, the defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of a handgun after a felony conviction and the unlawful possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol and was convicted on both counts. The trial court imposed probationary sentences of three years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The defendant appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Because the investigatory stop and frisk of the defendant was not supported by specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion that a criminal act was being or about to be committed, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the handgun found by the police and presented as evidence at trial. The judgments of conviction are, therefore, reversed and the cause dismissed.
 

The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm.

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction.
 

The petitioner, Melvin J. Reed, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations in his case. Because we agree that the petitioner alleged grounds for due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, we reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand the case for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.
 

The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.

Donna J.S. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Ethin E.S. and Mary J.C. (collectively “the Children”). The younger child, Ethin, was born drug-exposed and required intensive care for treatment of his withdrawal symptoms. As a result, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) became involved. In the weeks after Ethin’s birth, a protective order was entered and DCS took temporary custody of the Children. Following a two-day bench trial, the court found that there are multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s rights and that termination is in the best interest of the Children, both findings by the court said to be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Mother challenges both of these determinations and, in addition, contends that DCS failed to provide reasonable efforts to assist her toward reunification with the Children. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects
 

Following his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, assault, and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, the Montgomery County Circuit Court sentenced the defendant, Vincent D. Steele, as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years, 11 month and 29 days, and 11 years’ imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive both in length and manner of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Edward Jerome Harbison, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis seeking relief from his 1983 convictions for first degree murder, second degree burglary, and grand larceny. Petitioner claims that an order of a previous coram nobis court establishes a new predicate for review. Petitioner also claims that a statement of a prosecutor during a previous hearing constitutes “new evidence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the error coram nobis court.