APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Matthew Edwin Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103,-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years’ confinement for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricardo Davidson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess over 300 grams of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, and conspiracy to possess and deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in a Drug Free School Zone. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that he says was obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a house Wife owned prior to the marriage and a house purchased during the marriage. Following the grant of Wife’s request for divorce, the trial court classified the pre-marital house as Wife’s separate property and the house purchased during the marriage as marital property. The court ruled that Husband had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of the pre-marital house and ordered Husband to reimburse Wife. The court awarded Wife two-thirds of the equity in the marital house, leaving one-third of the equity to Husband. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leroy Dowdy, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years and six months for the vehicular homicide conviction, two years for the leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The only issue before the trial court was the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The employee had two compensable injuries prior to the injury that rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The trial court found that those injuries had caused 85% permanent partial disability. Based on that finding, it held the employer liable for 15% of the award and the Second Injury Fund liable for 85% of the award. We find that the trial court incorrectly applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6208(a)(1)(2008), and modify the award accordingly.
 

The Defendant, Joseph Nathaniel Nance, was convicted of six counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an 18-year sentence for each rape of a child conviction and a 10- ear sentence for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. The court ordered consecutive service of several of the convictions, resulting in a total effective sentence of 64 years. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by excluding sexual entries from the victim’s MySpace page as irrelevant and inadmissible; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history to be used only for impeachment purposes; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions; and (4) whether the Defendant’s effective 64-year sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dispute between two attorneys. Attorney 1 hired attorney 2 to represent him. Attorney 2 sued attorney 1 for attorney fees, and attorney 1 counterclaimed for legal malpractice. The trial court granted attorney 2 summary judgment on the attorney fee claim, and a jury found in favor of attorney 2 on the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, attorney 1 challenges both decisions on multiple grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee suffered a fractured wrist as a result of  workplace accident. He contended that he also sustained a neck injury and post-traumatic tress disorder from the accident. The trial court awarded benefits for the wrist injury only, and the employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro.
 

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Monte Hull, and Co-Defendant, Johnny Williams, charging them with aggravated robbery. Following a consolidated jury trial, Defendant and Co-Defendant Williams were convicted of the offense. However, Co-Defendant Williams is not part of this appeal. Defendant received a sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the biological father sought to revise the permanent parenting plan to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The child had been conceived during illegal sexual contact meeting this State’s definition of statutory rape; the mother, however, allowed the father to have a relationship with the child. Upon remand after an earlier appeal by the father, the trial court determined that the mother, now married and living in Florida with the child, was in contempt for failing to cooperate with the father regarding certain co-parenting issues. Despite this finding, the court refrained from imposing any punishment on the mother. The court additionally denied the father’s request to modify custody, made a modest award of attorney’s fees to the father, and held that further proceedings relating to the child be conducted in Florida. The father appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Charles Thompson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his three separate petitions for post-conviction relief in case numbers P-24665, -22149, and -27258. Petitioner was convicted, following guilty pleas, of the first degree murder of Eddie Johnson and attempted first degree murder of Brenda Hampton. Following jury trials, he was convicted for the aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping of Paloy Finnie, see State v. Derrick M. Vernon, et al., No. W1998-00612-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 490718 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Apr. 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2001); and the first degree murder of Dedrick Taylor, see State v. Charles Thompson, No. W1998-00351-CCA-R10-CD, 2001 WL 912715 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Aug. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 31, 2001). In his brief, Petitioner asserts that the indictments in the three cases above were defective. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Department of Human Services determined that Plaintiff’s available resources exceeded he resource limit for purposes of Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary category. The trial court affirmed the Department’s determination. We affirm.

Nicholas Clower (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to two counts of sale and delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to six years’ probation on each count, to be served concurrently. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant and subsequent amended warrants, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s ruling, asserting that the trial court erred in determining that the Defendant possessed a weapon in violation of his probation and in requiring the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Polk County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Clayton Pike, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence because the search of his home was unlawful, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the murder conviction, and (3) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider the appellant’s prior bad acts as substantive evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress but that the error was harmless. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are affirmed.

In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, alimony award, permanent parenting plan, award of discretionary costs, and award of attorney fees to Wife. We have determined that the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay more rehabilitative alimony than he can afford, in awarding him only 28 days a year in parenting time, and in awarding discretionary costs for expert fees for case preparation. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

The pro se petitioner, Robert B. Ledford, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions of second degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft. On initial review, this court affirmed the coram nobis court’s summary denial because we concluded that coram nobis relief was not available to provide relief from a guilty-pleaded conviction. Robert B. Ledford v. State, No. E2010-01773-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 4, 2011). The petitioner applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On March 8, 2012, the supreme court granted the application for permission to appeal for the purpose of remanding the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in Wlodarz v. State, ___S.W.3d ___, No. E2008-02179-SC-R11-CO (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2012). Following our reconsideration, we conclude that the petitioner failed to present a justiciable claim warranting coram nobis relief and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted petitioner, Michael Deshay Peoples, Jr., for first- degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The State dismissed one of the aggravated robbery counts. Following a trial on the remaining counts, a jury found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to life in prison for felony murder. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on the remaining counts and ordered concurrent sentences of eighteen years at one hundred percent for especially aggravated robbery; ten years at thirty percent for aggravated robbery; and ten years at one hundred percent for aggravated kidnapping. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief by checking several boxes on the standard form, but he added no supporting facts. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.
 

This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Mary Claudine Holland and Robert Shields Holland were married in 1967. Robert Shields Holland was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems in 2009. Mary Claudine Holland filed a complaint for separate maintenance in which she sought division of the marital assets and income. The trial court granted her request and filed an order reflecting its decision. The Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order. The trial court denied the motions. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the court to reconsider the complaint for separate maintenance with the Tennessee Department of Human Services present as an intervening party.

This appeal arises from the termination of Beth Proffitt (“Plaintiff”) from employment at Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc. (“the Corporation”). Plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the Corporation, sued the Corporation, as well as the other shareholders Mac Proffitt and Ray Proffitt (collectively, “the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to her. After a trial on the matter of liability, the Trial Court found the Defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. After the hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded damages to Plaintiff, including lost salary and bonus. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The Defendants appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Defendants did breach their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. We, however, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The trial court terminated parents’ parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse. We affirm.

The Defendant, Garry Lee Nance, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve part of his remaining sentences in confinement. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of  Criminal Appeals. Following our review, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The parties, John Leslie Byrnes (“Husband”) and Joyce Marie Byrnes (“Wife”), were divorced in 1998. Under the divorce judgment, they were to have equal parenting time with their two minor children. Some six years later, in 2004, Husband filed a petition to change the custody arrangement. The petition was granted ex parte on an “emergency” basis. The ex parte order temporarily placed sole custody of the children with Husband and required Mother to pay monthly child support of $652. For reasons that Wife blames on Husband and the trial court, and Husband blames on Wife, a hearing was not held on the custody and support issues until 2009, more than five years after Husband was named the sole custodian. Eventually, the court entered an order, to which Wife agreed, decreeing that Wife was liable to Husband for a child support arrearage of $20,874.24, a figure that includes interest and Wife’s share of medical expenses. In the same order, the court decreed that Husband was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined at a future hearing. That hearing was later scheduled for a date certain. Wife’s counsel did not appear at the hearing on attorney’s fees and the court proceeded, in counsel’s absence, to hold Wife liable for fees of $30,315. Wife filed a motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees which the court denied. She appeals, challenging the child support arrearage and the denial of her motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This Court issued a Show Cause Order on April 19, 2012 directing appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.