APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Rain and Hail, Inc. (“the plaintiff”) obtained a judgment in the state of Iowa against Craig A. Stewart (“the defendant”). The plaintiff filed this present action to register and enforce the foreign judgment in Tennessee, where the defendant resides. The defendant denied being served with a copy of the complaint in Iowa. The court set a hearing date at which neither the plaintiff nor its counsel appeared. The plaintiff’s counsel advised the court that it would submit the matter on the papers it had filed in support of its position. The court dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Delawrence Williams, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that: (1) prior to trial, his counsel did not inform him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing and (2) his counsel failed to research and sufficiently argue against the imposition of consecutive sentences at his sentencing hearing. Because the petitioner has not shown deficiency by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

This is a termination of parental rights case with respect to Johnny J.E.M. (“the Child”), the minor son of Amanda M. (“Mother”) and Joshua D. (“Father”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from Mother’s home as a result of “serious environmental neglect.” The Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care; he had no relationship with Father, who was serving a lengthy prison sentence throughout these proceedings. After taking the Child into custody, DCS soon placed him with Janice M. (“Foster Aunt”) and her husband, Sonny M. (collectively “Foster Parents”), the prospective adoptive parents, where he remained for a year and a half before DCS sought to permanently sever the rights of the biological parents to the Child. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition to terminate based on its dual findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination were established as to both parents, and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother and Father, represented by separate counsel, appeal. We affirm.

This appeal involves a lawsuit by a taxpayer. The taxpayer filed this action on behalf of the citizens of the municipality to prevent a disputed disbursement of funds, naming as defendants the municipality, the municipality’s utility district, and three private citizens. By the time the initial hearing in this matter took place, the only defendants who remained in the suit were the three private citizens. Finding that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue this action, the trial court dismissed the case. The taxpayer then filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking to continue to pursue the lawsuit, pursuant to Bennett v. Stutts, 521 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm, finding the exception in Bennett v. Stutts inapplicable.

Deceased, a resident of Iowa, an employee of plaintiff, delivered materials to the State of Tennessee, and while the materials were being unloaded sustained injuries which resulted in his death, which arose out of the course and scope of his employment. His widow could claim benefits either under the Iowa worker's compensation laws or the State of Tennessee worker's compensation laws, which contain essentially similar provisions. The widow claimed benefits under the Iowa worker's compensation law, and the employer under both laws was entitled to seek subrogation recovery for benefits paid from the alleged third party tort feasors. The State of Iowa would not have jurisdiction over some of the alleged tort feasors, and the employer brought his subrogation action in the State of Tennessee under the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes. Defendants moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court concluded that since the claimant elected to sue under the Iowa worker's compensation statutory scheme, that the employer could not rely on the Tennessee worker's compensation statutes to maintain its action in Tennessee, and dismissed plaintiffs' action. On appeal, we hold that the employer was entitled to employ the Tennessee worker's compensation statute in an effort to recover subrogation benefits against the third party tort feasors.

Claimant filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission to recover for the wrongful death of his father, a resident of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute; the Commission awarded damages for loss of consortium, pain and suffering, and medical and funeral expenses. Claimant appeals the amount of damages awarded for loss of consortium and pain and suffering. We affirm the damages awarded for loss of consortium and modify the award of damages for pain and suffering.

The Defendant, Brenda Whitesides, pled guilty to violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law, driving on a revoked license, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for driving on a revoked license and violating the habitual motor vehicle offender law and then sentenced her to five years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant that alleged that she had violated the terms of her probation by failing to report and by moving out of the State. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly based its revocation finding on considerations that were not presented by the warrant or supported by the facts adduced at the hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Bruce Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010). He was sentenced to twentyfive years’ confinement and community supervision for life. On appeal, he contends (1) that he did not receive a unanimous jury verdict and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about a sexual assault that occurred in Louisiana; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify that she saw a handgun in the Defendant’s bedroom; and (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to refer to herself as a hostage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted this appeal to clarify the procedures an inmate must follow to dispute the determination of parole eligibility when the inmate is serving consecutive determinate sentences imposed pursuant to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2010 & Supp. 2011). We clarify that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) governs an inmate’s challenge to the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (“TDOC”) calculation of a release eligibility date. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -325 (2011). Under the UAPA, an inmate must request a declaratory order from TDOC before filing a declaratory action in court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b). Petitioner failed to seek a declaratory order from TDOC; thus, the trial court properly dismissed his petition for common law writ of certiorari naming TDOC and TDOC officials. The UAPA does not govern an inmate’s challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) concerning parole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106(c). Rather, the petition for common law writ of certiorari is the procedural vehicle for bringing such challenges. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (2000). While Petitioner also named the Board and Board officials in his petition for common law writ of certiorari, the trial court properly granted their motions to dismiss because the allegations of the petition fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The method for calculating release eligibility and custodial parole discussed in Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978) is not applicable to inmates sentenced pursuant to the 1989 Act and serving consecutive determinate sentences for parole-eligible offenses. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the chancery court dismissing the petition is reinstated.
 

Former inmate challenged the calculation of his prison sentence, contending the Tennessee Department of Correction erred in failing to award him pretrial jail credit. The orders of judgment TDOC relied upon to calculate the prison sentence apparently did not indicate the inmate had earned pretrial jail credit. The former inmate filed a complaint against individuals employed by the prison and TDOC, contending they violated his constitutional rights and were liable to him for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The trial court dismissed the former inmate’s complaint because the defendants calculated the former inmate’s sentence based on the judgments as they were required to do by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Upon petition by the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services and following a trial, the Putnam County Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights to his three minor children. We affirm because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision and because there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest.
 

In this appeal,the Mother and Father of three children appeal the termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. We reverse the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
 

A Montgomery County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Antonio Dwayne Johnson, for six counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and six counts of delivering .5 grams or more of cocaine. Following a jury trial on counts nine and ten of the indictment (alternate theories of selling and delivering .5 grams of cocaine on August 22, 2008) Defendant was found guilty of selling more than .5 grams of cocaine. The remaining counts of the indictment were apparently tried separately. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Multiple Offender to twelve years at 35% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bryan Keith Bradford, appeals from his conviction upon his guilty plea for robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying him a community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2005, Plaintiff purchased a subdivision lot believing it could later be traded toward the purchase of a condominium. Because no condominiums had been built by 2010, Plaintiff filed suit, seeking to rescind the sale and to recover damages. The trial court rescinded the warranty deed and awarded Plaintiff a return of the purchase price, plus city and county taxes paid and prejudgment interest from the filing of his complaint. Finding no failure of consideration, we reverse the trial court’s rescission of the warranty deed and its damage awards. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. All remaining issues are deemed either waived or pretermitted.

Defendant, Rachel Leigh Jessie, was indicted by the Carroll County Grand Jury in a seven count indictment for two counts of selling  Methylendioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or “Ecstasy”), a Schedule 1 controlled substance; one count of selling 13.5 grams of marijuana; and four counts of selling counterfeit MDMA. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of selling MDMA, both Class B felonies, and one count of selling marijuana, a Class E felony, with the manner and length of her sentence to be determined by the trial court. The remaining charges were dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a standard offender to eight years in community corrections after serving one year incarcerated for each of the two counts of selling MDMA, and two years in community corrections after serving 180 days incarcerated for selling marijuana. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Defendant appeals her sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying a sentence of full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A police sergeant stopped a vehicle driven by appellant, Eric A. Martin, for violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b), the statute requiring a vehicle license plate to be maintained free from foreign materials and in a clearly legible condition. He then determined that appellant was driving with a revoked driver’s license. A grand jury indicted appellant for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, seventh offense. Appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fifth offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months twenty-nine days and revoked his driver’s license for one year. The trial court suspended all of the sentence except for twenty days and placed appellant on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b). Following our review, we conclude that appellant failed to certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Kevin L. Buford, Sr., was found guilty after a jury trial of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. On appeal, he raises numerous challenges to his convictions and sentencing, including claims that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress his pretrial statements to police; (3) his two convictions should have been merged; and (4) the trial court erred at sentencing by finding him to be a Range II offender, by imposing consecutive sentences, and by giving him excessive sentences on both counts. After a careful review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the testimony given by one of the defendant’s accomplices is sufficient to support his convictions and that this testimony is sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because any police misconduct that may have occurred was unintentional and because the statements the defendant made to police were given after the defendant received repeated Miranda warnings and occurred several hours after he was taken into custody. We conclude that double jeopardy principles do not require the merger of the defendant’s two convictions because the statutes under which the defendant was convicted include different elements and therefore punish distinct offenses. Finally, after engaging in de novo review of the defendant’s sentencing, we conclude that the defendant was properly sentenced as a Range II offender,the sentences imposed by the trial court were not excessive, and that the trial court did not err by ordering them to be served consecutively. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendants, Rebecca and J. C. Draper, were each indicted for one count of manufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §1 § 39-17-417(a)(1), - 425(a)(1). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of a search of their manufactured home and backyard. The trial court denied the Defendants’ motion. The Defendants then entered into a plea agreement with the State and reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant Rebecca Draper pled nolo contendere to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Defendant J. C. Draper pled guilty to one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. In this appeal, the Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress the evidence against them. Following our review, we reverse, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and dismiss the charges.

This is a termination of parental rights case.  Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had committed severe child abuse, had been sentenced to prison for the child abuse, and had been sentenced to confinement for more than ten years. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Affirmed

Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.

I concur with the majority opinion in this case, and submit this separate concurrence only to make an additional point.

Appellant, Edward L. Baird, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to three felony offenses involving distribution of controlled substances. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered appellant to serve an effective sentence of ten years in confinement. Appellant contests the manner of service of his sentence, arguing that the trial court should have ordered split confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Justin Parliment, appeals from his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, see T.C.A. § 39-16201(b)(2) (2006), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the marijuana introduced into evidence, that the fine imposed bythe jury is excessive, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In February 2011, the Petitioner, Fred Ratliff, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his 1976 conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner claimed that he had “compelling” new evidence of his innocence because the State failed to disclose a key prosecution witness’s juvenile record in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court first dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that due process did not require tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Then, addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s Brady claim, the coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the new evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court.