APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process considerations could toll the statute of limitations in this case. While there are instances when due process could toll the statute of limitations, this is not one of them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Christopher Kennedy, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery in exchange for a sentence of nine years to be served at 100%, followed by community supervision for life. After his release for that conviction, the Defendant was indicted for violating a condition of his community supervision. The Defendant filed a motion to declare Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional “and/or” seek habeas corpus relief. After hearing the motion, the trial court granted relief, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 violate double jeopardy protections. The State filed a timely notice of appealed. The Defendant cross appeals, asserting: (1) the community supervision for life statute is unconstitutional; and (2) the conditions for lifetime supervision established by the Board of Probation and Parole are void as the conditions are not enacted pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court improperly declared Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional and that the trial court properly dismissed the remaining issues. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court in part and affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a breach of contract case. Appellant, a former employee of Appellee Shelby County, filed suit against Shelby County for alleged breach of a settlement agreement. specifically, Appellant alleges that Shelby County breached the contract by failing to change Appellant’s employment record to reflect that he resigned, rather than that he was fired, and/or by informing Appellant’s potential employer that Appellant was fired. Shelby County filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions had expired. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We conclude that: (1) the contract is severable; (2) Appellant’s cause of action for Shelby County’s breach of its obligation to change his employment records was correctly dismissed on the statute of limitations ground; (3) Appellee’s contractual obligation to answer employment inquiries pursuant to the terms of the contract was not implicated until the condition precedent occurred (i.e., until inquiry was made by a third-party); and (4) the breach of this obligation accrued when Shelby County disseminated information counter to that contemplated in the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Appellant’s claim that Shelby County violated the express terms of the settlement agreement in 2010 by informing the Appellant’s potential employer that he was fired is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Defendant, Harriet Robertson Forrest, was indicted on nine counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. The Defendant pleaded guilty to all nine counts. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence for each conviction as a Range II multiple offender with the sentences to run concurrently. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Channon Lee Williams, appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. He was originally convicted for the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years, which was to be served on community corrections after one year’s imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition filed by the niece of a decedent’s surviving spouse to have the decedent’s estate administered and to have a personal representative appointed. The probate court dismissed the niece’s petition for lack of standing holding that she could not proceed as next friend of her aunt because her aunt had previously appointed the decedent’s brother as her attorney-in-fact. The niece contends on appeal that she has standing to pursue the administration of the decedent’s estate in accordance Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. 17.03 because the attorney-in-fact for her aunt failed to initiate administration of the decedent’s estate. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.
 

The employee was injured in 2007 and returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee’s claim was settled in November 2007 and was subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). In July 2009, the employee was diagnosed with cancer, and he took a medical leave of absence. The employee remained on leave for over one year. The employer’s policy permitted one year of medical leave. When the employee was unable to return to work in July 2010, he was terminated pursuant to that policy. The employee then sought reconsideration of the November 2007 settlement. The trial court found that the employee was not eligible for reconsideration. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant corporation, which failed to appear for trial, appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against it. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying its Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 motion for relief from judgment and in awarding the plaintiff damages that exceeded the ad damnum clause of the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee injured his lower back on August 22, 2005. The trial court approved a settlement of his workers’ compensation claim in 2008. The order approving the workers’ compensation settlement provided for future authorized medical treatment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204. In January 2011, the employee’s treating physician recommended a surgical procedure. The employer’s medical utilization review provider determined that the medical necessity of the procedure was not documented, and the employer denied approval for the procedure. The employee appealed the decision to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”), and the Department’s medical director did not overturn the utilization review decision. The employee then filed a petition in the trial court, seeking an order requiring the employer to authorize the surgery. The trial court granted the petition but denied the employee’s application for attorney’s fees. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by granting the petition, that the employee failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, and that the petition is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The employee has appealed from the denial of an award of attorney’s fees. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal.

After a bench trial, the Hickman County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Troy Lee McDonald, of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to two years to be served as thirty days in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his request for full probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Cornelius O. Williams, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant pled guilty to one count of rape of a child, two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. He received an effective thirty-three year sentence to be served in confinement. The State raises an issue regarding appellant’s untimely notice of appeal. After considering the merits, we hold that the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robbie E. Pickett, pleaded nolo contendere to one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, see T.C.A. § 55-10-101. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ confinement to be served at 75 percent before reaching release eligibility. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered as enhancement its opinion that the facts of the case supported a greater charge and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee viewed the bodies of co-workers who had died as a result of work accidents on two separate occasions in February and April 2008. On June 23, 2008, the employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the two incidents. On June 23,2009, the employee requested a benefit review conference. The employer filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers’ compensation benefits due. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the second accident and that the claim was therefore barred. The employee contended that the statute did not begin to run until the date of his diagnosis and that his claim was timely. The trial court granted the employer’s motion. The employee appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the trial court’s alternative findings.
 

Much aggrieved by his convictions of aggravated rape and robbery and resulting 23-year sentence of imprisonment, the petitioner, Ricky Lee Morgan, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

Following his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of facilitation of the sale of 26 grams or more of cocaine, and possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine for resale, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his convictions were caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

This is a certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary board proceeding that found him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding was conducted violated Tennessee Department of Correction policies. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Homeowner challenges the trial court’s dismissal at the summary judgment stage of all of her claims against lenders. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the homeowner’s claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of the Truth-In-Lending Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of her claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
 

Plaintiffs, who voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit, appeal the trial court’s award of discretionary costs to the defendants. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Demance Beasley, of first degree felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder because the State’s witnesses provided inconsistent testimony and were not credible. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Wilson County appeals from the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed order of compromise and settlement based upon its contention that the agreement would violate a policy of the Wilson County Road Commission and that it “forgot” the policy when entering into the agreed order. The county also appeals from the trial court’s finding that it was in contempt of the agreed order and must comply with the order within six months, the trial court’s denial of its request to stay the judgment, and the trial court’s award of $750 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court in all respects.
 

The Petitioner, Cleven Johnson, pled guilty to several charges that spanned six different cases: one count of attempting to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free zone; three counts of possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony; one count of evading arrest; two counts of driving on a suspended license; two counts of driving without insurance; one count of driving under the influence, first offense; one count of simple possession of marijuana; one count of possession of a weapon; two counts of aggravated burglary; six counts of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of aggravated robbery; two counts of aggravated assault; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery; one count of especially aggravated burglary; and one count of attempted first degree murder. The plea agreement included a total effective sentence of forty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

After being indicted for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), reckless driving, and violation of the implied consent law, Defendant, Evan Deyo, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question reserved for appeal specifically states the issue as: “whether the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that his pre-trial detention was not for a valid remedial purpose but rather was punitive.” After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jesse Wade Glover, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial of facilitation of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class E felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender, to four years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jesse Wade Glover, No. W2008-00185- CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2015230 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed July 13, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Nov. 23, 2009). A summary of the facts underlying Defendant’s conviction can be found in this Court’s opinion cited above. Defendant timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, asserting as grounds that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, James Britt, charging him with premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting two autopsy photographs. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.