APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Darry Lee Mitchell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-fiveyears in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in 1996 and again in 2004; both petitions were denied. Acting pro se, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in July 2011, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal to answer the question of whether the Tennessee Revenue Bond Law, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-101, et seq., permits a private right of action on behalf of Appellees, utility rate payers, against Appellants, the City of Bolivar and its utility. The trial court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that Appellees could maintain a private cause of action because Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-34-115(f) did not provide the sole remedy for violation of the statutory scheme. We hold that the Revenue Bond Law does not expressly create an individual private right of action, and that Appellees have not carried their burden to establish that the legislature intended to imply such a right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. Reversed and remanded.

Property owner hired a general contractor to perform construction work on a commercial building. The parties subsequently discovered that when the building was originally constructed, there were no fire dampers installed in the ductwork. The contractor performed the additional work necessary to install the missing fire dampers, but when the work was completed, the property owner refused to pay the amount invoiced by the contractor for the additional work. Both parties asserted that the other had breached the contract. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the contractor and awarded her a judgment for the unpaid balance and other damages. The property owner appeals. We affirm as modified.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ramone Gholston, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, William Henry Wiggins, was convicted in the Davidson CountyCircuit Court of felony possession of a controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and a violation of the sex offender registry. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., was found guilty by the Sevier County Circuit Court of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2010), 39-14-404 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-12-101 (2010). The trial court merged one count of aggravated assault into an attempted first degree murder conviction. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, twelve years for especially aggravated burglary, and six years each for the aggravated assault and attempted aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered the attempted first degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions, (2) his conviction for especially aggravated burglary is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d), and (3) the trial court erred by applying improper sentencing enhancement factors and ordering partially consecutive sentences. We  ffirm the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Christopher Lyons, aggravated assault, and attempted aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin and especially aggravated burglary and remand the case for sentencing and entry of judgments of conviction for attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary.

After careful review of the record and relevant law, I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ determination that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. I concur with the majority’s conclusions otherwise.

The Petitioner, John Todd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years’ confinement for second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding him competent to stand trial; (2) denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial trial on the ground that an outburst during the trial prejudiced the jury against him and prevented a fair trial; (4) admitting gruesome photographs of the victims at the trial; (5) allowing a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsies to testify at the trial; and (6) denying his request for a mistrial on the ground that the State failed to provide his oral statement reduced to writing before the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case addresses the issue of whether an announced, and otherwise qualified, candidate for the District 89 (Knox County) seat in the State House of Representatives satisfies the residency requirement to run in the Democratic primary on August 2, 2012. The trial court held that she was not eligible to run because the court found that she was a resident of Anderson County. She appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Courtney Rashad Farrell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. As part of the Defendant’s guilty plea, he agreed to a sentence of between ten and twelve years as a Range I standard offender. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the length of sentence within the agreed upon range as well as whether the sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with the Defendant’s prior twelve-year sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven years consecutively to his prior sentence. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Derrick Le’mon Goode, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court committed error in finding that neither his general sessions court counsel nor his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law. He cites six factual grounds supporting his claim and alleges that the cumulative effect of counsels’ errors deprived him of his right to counsel and a fair trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that either counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove venue; (2) law enforcement officers’ seizure of him violated his constitutional protections; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Homeowner retained Contractor to remodel her residence and paid Contractor two out of three installments as provided in the contract. Homeowner was not satisfied with Contractor’s work and refused to pay the final installment. Contractor sued for breach of contract and Homeowner filed a counterclaim asserting Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the job in a workmanlike and reasonable manner. Homeowner also claimed Contractor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act by engaging in unfair and deceptive practices. The trial court dismissed Contractor’s complaint and held Contractor breached the contract by failing to perform the work in a reasonable and workmanlike manner. The court found Contractor was not liable for double or treble damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act because Homeowner did not prove its deficiencies were intentional or willful. Homeowner appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend her counterclaim to assert a claim for rescission and erred in holding Contractor did not violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm the trial court’s judgment

Pro se petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of his five 1988 convictions for drug offenses and the resulting concurrent five-year sentences he received as a result of a negotiated plea agreement. As grounds, petitioner argues that the sentences are void because he committed the offenses while on bail and should have received consecutive sentences. The Criminal Court for Shelby County found that declaratory judgment relief is not available to petitioner because his five concurrent sentences had expired. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Plaintiff-homeowners filed this action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the builder and seller of their home alleging that the home was not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant breached the contract and the express and implied warranties, and violated the TCPA. The court awarded damages of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home. The court also held Plaintiffs were entitled to recover their attorney’s fees pursuant to the TCPA. Defendant appealed arguing that Plaintiffs failed to prove causation, that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $90,000 for the diminution in value of the home, and erred in finding it violated the TCPA for which the trial courtawarded attorney’s fees.We affirm the trial court’s findings as to Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty and affirm the trial court’s determinations as to damages; however, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding of a violation of the TCPA and therefore the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiffs their attorney’s fees.
 

The Defendant, Denise Dianne Brannigan, was convicted by a Carter County jury of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 and three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than $500. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed terms of 5 years for the theft conviction and 11 months and 29 days for each fraudulent use of a credit card conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the 5-year sentence and two of the 11-month and 29-day sentences. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior uncharged conduct under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) that her sentence was excessive. After our review, we affirm.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for attorney fees and court costs and executed an order to that effect. The plaintiff filed a motion for relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 arguing that the trial court violated his due process rights by awarding the defendant attorney fees without providing proper notice and the opportunity to be heard. We reverse the trial court.
 

Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of 20 years for each conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 2) the trial court erred by limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness and by denying Defendant the opportunity to make an offer of proof of his excluded cross-examination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stoney R.Anderson,II,pled guilty in the Hickman County Circuit Court to possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Anderson reserved the following certified question of law: “[w]hether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s bag is supported by exigent circumstances.” Upon review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

Raymond Thomas (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years of incarceration. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the consecutive service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A non-party deponent appeals the imposition of $6,635 in monetary sanctions under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4). The non-party deponent, a Tennessee resident, was subpoenaed to give a deposition concerning a civil action pending in a California state court pursuant to a foreign court subpoena, which was issued and served in accordance with the Uniform Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 24-9-201 through -207. During the deposition, the deponent’s attorney objected to almost every question in an argumentative and suggestive manner, often without providing a proper basis for the objection, consulted with the deponent at length several times during questioning, and unilaterally terminated the deposition without seeking a protective order. The California defendants who attempted to take the deposition filed a motion to compel discovery and to recover their expenses pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01. The trial court granted the motion and held the non-party deponent liable for the defendants’ expenses. The deponent appeals contending that he did not obstruct the deposition, that the sanctions are the result of his attorney’s misconduct, and that his attorney should be solely responsible for the sanctions. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01(4) affords the trial court the discretion to require a deponent whose conduct necessitated a motion to compel, or the attorney advising such conduct, or both of them to pay to the moving party’s reasonable expenses. The manner in which the deponent’s attorney conducted the deposition amounted to clear violations of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 30.03 and 30.04. Except for certain circumstances not at issue here, a lawyer’s misconduct is attributable to and binding on the client; therefore, the deponent should not be excused from liability for his attorney’s misconduct, especially considering the deponent is experienced in giving depositions and knew or should have known his attorney’s conduct was outrageous and in violation of the rules of discovery. Moreover,because trialcourts have broad discretion in determining when to impose sanctions and against whom, such decisions are reviewed on appeal pursuant to the very deferential abuse of discretion standard. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Richard Carlton Pickard, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pled nolo contendere to one count of DUI, second offense, and one count of simple possession of Schedule IV contraband. He reserved five certified questions regarding the legality of his stop. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Town of Pegram appeals from the trial court’s decision awarding it no damages in its claims against Cornerstone Development, LLC, the company which constructed theTown’scity hall and surrounding parking lot. Pegram also appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, which provided the performance bond assuring Cornerstone’s performance. We affirm the trial court’s findings in all respects.
 

The pro se petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because due process considerations may toll the statute of limitations in this case and the post-conviction court did not make such determination, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property in this divorce action. We affirm.