APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Humphreys County jury convicted the Defendant, Tina M. Dixon, of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone and of possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the attachment order upon which she was arrested was unlawfully issued; (2) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside her verdict because she was not properly charged with the crimes for which she was convicted; (3) she was denied due process of law because the presiding trial judge had previouslyprosecuted her for burglary and felony theft charges; (4) she was denied due process of law because the Assistant District Attorney General who prosecuted her case had previouslybeen her public defender when she was convicted of burglaryand felonytheft charges; and (5) the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Ross McClellan, of rape of a child and incest. On remand for resentencing for the rape of a child following his first direct appeal, State v. Daniel Ross McClellan, No. E2009-00698-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2695657 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 8, 2010), the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. McClellan appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by relying on enhancement factors that were improperly submitted to the jury. The State concedes error but maintains that McClellan’s sentence is appropriate. Although we discern no reversible error, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment formsto reflect the date of the offense as shown in the indictment. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pro se petitioner, Efrain Huerata Orduna, appeals the Circuit Court for Franklin County’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2007, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On April 4, 2011, almost four years after the judgments were entered, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings and that other constitutional rights were violated. He failed to state any factual basis in the petition to explain its untimely filing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This appeal arises from a judgment for arrears in child support. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner (“the State”) filed a civil contempt petition against Jamie Reed (“Reed”) in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered Reed to pay $75 per month towards satisfying his $17,330 in arrears. The minor child at issue had attained majority age by the time of these proceedings. The Juvenile Court found Reed to be in substantial compliance with his payments, and he was given an opportunity to comply with the Court’s order. The Juvenile Court rejected Reed’s demands for a jury trial and for discharge of the arrearage. Reed appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The plaintiffs in this matter, the city and a redevelopment group, filed this action against the defendant entities involved in the design and construction of a large municipal project on the city’s waterfront. Also named as a defendant was the development manager for the project. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-105. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

The petitioner, Nathan Cordell Burkeen,appeals the denialofhis petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion affirming the Trial Court's granting of summary judgments to all defendants. In my view, the record in this case does not demonstrate that this case is ripe for summary judgment.

The defendant, JeffreyB. Johnson, Jr., was tried on two counts of first degree (premeditated) murder,and after a jury trial was found guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter,Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years on each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years. The defendant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court, claiming error in the trial court’s application of certain enhancement factors, its failure to apply certain proffered mitigating factors, and its decision to order the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively. Considering the State’s concession that the trial court’s application of two of the enhancement factors was error, the trial court’s failure to consider all of the evidence that was presented at trial during sentencing, and the state of the record before us, we conclude that this case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother argues that the evidence presented to the trial court did not clearly and convincingly establish that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Doyle Everette Haney, was convicted of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony, and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the consistency of the verdicts, the jury instructions, and sentencing. All of his issues could be treated as waived for failure to comply with the requirements for appellate briefs. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). However, after a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Rivera Peoples (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for first degree felony murder. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Tavaris Cantrell Brooks (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, and reserved a certified question regarding the legality of the search that led to his arrest. The State concedes that the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress and that his convictions must be reversed. We agree. Based on the illegality of the search leading to his arrest, and the necessary exclusion of the resulting evidence, we are constrained to reverse the Defendant’s convictions.

Jonathan W. Stephenson (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, challenging his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition on the merits, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is facially void because his 1994 guilty plea rendered his 1990 jury conviction a nullity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner’s first degree murder conviction stems not from the 1994 guilty plea but from the 1990 jury verdict that was affirmed on direct appeal. Accordingly, the 2002 judgment sentencing the Petitioner to death on his underlying jury conviction for first degree murder was not facially void. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Lonnie Payne (“the Defendant”) was convicted of violating a protective order, aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. He received an effective sentence of five years plus eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The Defendant filed a petition seeking to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a suspended sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Wife filed a complaint against Husband seeking a legal separation or, in the alternative, an absolute divorce. Husband counter-claimed for a divorce. Both Wife and Husband alleged the other had engaged in marital misconduct. The trial court awarded Wife a legal separation for two years, ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,500 per month as alimony during that period, and divided the marital estate between the parties. The trial court refused Wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Wife appealed, claiming the trial court erred by failing to award her alimony in futuro, a larger portion of the marital estate, and her attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. First, the statute addressing legal separation directs the trial court to make a final and complete adjudication of the parties’ support rights following the parties’ legal separation when the court awards the parties an absolute divorce. Thus, Wife’s request for alimony in futuro is premature. Second, Wife failed to show the court’s division of marital property was inconsistent with the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4121(c) or was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Third, Wife failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorney’s fees.
 

Eddie Wayne Shelton (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, one count of possession with the intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years to be served in community corrections. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The employee alleged that he injured his right shoulder while working for the employer. The trial court found that the employee’s thoracic outlet syndrome stemmed from a congenital abnormality and not a work-related injury. The employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife was granted divorce on the grounds of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court distributed the marital property and awarded Wife transitory alimony for four years. Wife appealed, arguing she should have been awarded a larger portion of the marital estate and was entitled to alimony in futuro. She also argued she should have been awarded her attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. The trial court equitably distributed the marital assets and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife transitional alimony to help her adjust to living as a single person again.
 

The petitioner, Robert Scribner,II, appeals the denialof his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an independent expert to challenge DNA evidence that linked him to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Homeowners in a subdivision used water from a sulfur well to water their lawn. Neighbors complained about the noxious odor, and when the Homeowners continued to use the sulfurous water, the neighbors sought and obtained an order permanently enjoining them from using their well for irrigation purposes. Three years later the Homeowners began using the sulfur well to water their lawn again, and the neighbors filed a petition seeking to hold the Homeowners in contempt for violating the court’s order. The Homeowners filed a retaliatory complaint against the neighbors, and the neighbors sought Rule 11 sanctions for having to defend that action. The trial court consolidated the hearing of the two motions, and following a hearing where testimony and documentary evidence were introduced, the court found the Homeowners had willfully violated the court’s order on at least nine occasions. The court also found the Homeowners’ action was filed in violation of Rule 11 and fined the Homeowners $1,000. The Homeowners appealed,claiming the two motions should not have been heard together and that the evidence did not support the court’s finding of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in hearing the two motions in the same proceeding, and that the evidence was not insufficient for the court to have found the Homeowners guilty of willfully violating its earlier order beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

This appeal arises from a dispute over the constitutionality of City of Maryville (“Maryville”) ordinance 16-110 (“the Ordinance”). The ordinance requires the issuance of a permit for certain public meetings and parades in Maryville. Wallace Scott Langford (“Langford”) and two associates engaged in street preaching at a Maryville intersection. Langford declined to apply for a permit and was cited for violating the ordinance. After a default judgment was rendered against him in municipal court, Langford appealed to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). Langford challenged the constitutionality of the Ordinance on grounds that it is overly broad and vague. Following a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Langford appeals. We hold that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face as it is vague, overly broad, and affords too much discretion to the officials charged with issuing permits. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

Landowner owns property that was once part of a single parcel of land. The only way she can access her property is over a gravel roadway approximately nine feet wide that crosses through her neighbors’ property. One of Landowner’s neighbors erected fence posts near the roadway that Landowner alleges interfere with her ability to pull her horse trailers back and forth to her property. Landowner filed a complaint alleging she has the right to a forty foot easement across her neighbors’ property. After Landowner presented her proof at trial, Defendant neighbors moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. The trial court dismissed Landowner’s complaint. We reverse the dismissal as to the Landowner’s claim for interference with her use and enjoyment of the easement because she presented evidence to establish the elements of that claim. We also reverse the dismissal of the claim for damages resulting from the interference. Dismissal of the other claims by Landowner is affirmed. We remand this case for further proceedings.
 

A Crockett County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Jerry L. Crawford, Jr., for one count of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury found him guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of four years for statutory rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim “knowing” that she was under the legal age of consent; and (2) whether appellant possessed knowledge of the victim’s age simultaneously with the intent to engage in intercourse with her. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Jeremy Antwan Bryant, pled guilty to possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years but suspended the sentence and placed appellant on supervised probation. After appellant had been on probation for almost three years, the trial court revoked his probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation because the State did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellant committed new criminal offenses while on probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff was severely injured while working on the premises of his employer. Because the employer was immune from liability in tort under the Workers’ Compensation statutes, the employee’s negligence suit named as defendants two other companies whose equipment was implicated in his injury. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the employer was solely at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, resulting in no award. The plaintiff then filed a motion for new trial. The trial court granted the motion ten months after it was filed, declaring that in his capacity as the thirteenth juror he had found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence. The case was tried before a second jury, which reached a different verdict, finding that one of the defendant companies was 90% at fault for the plaintiff’s injury while the plaintiff himself was 10% at fault. The net verdict for the plaintiff amounted to $2,925,000. The defendant company argues on appeal that the trial court erred in vacating the first jury verdict, that the second jury verdict was “contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,” and that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment based on it.