APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, James Stephen Carder, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for 36 counts of theft of property in amounts ranging from less than $1,000 to $60,000 and two counts of aggregate theft in an amount greater than $60,000 but less than $250,000. Five of the theft counts were dismissed after the close of the State’s proof, and a petit jury convicted Defendant of 24 theft counts and both aggregate theft counts. The trial court merged those individual theft convictions involving the same victim and also merged the two counts of aggregate theft, and the court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to an effective 20 years’ incarceration and ordered him to pay $134,990 in restitution. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that law enforcement improperly investigated the case and interfered with his contracts. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of amended judgment forms to reflect the merger of the 24 individual theft convictions into count 37, the one aggregate theft conviction.

The pro se Defendant, Marquette Benson, aka Marquette Mukes, appeals the summary
denial of his September 6, 2022 Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Because it is clear that the Defendant’s September 6, 2022
filing is merely a request for the trial court to reconsider its denial of the Defendant’s first
Rule 36.1 motion, which was summarily denied on October 4, 2021 for failure to state a
colorable claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree that was initially entered in 2017, but the divorce action was not finalized until 2022. In this appeal, Wife argues that the trial court should not have divorced the parties because there were no valid grounds for divorce. Because the parties executed a valid marital dissolution agreement agreeing to be divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, we affirm the trial court’s decision to declare the parties divorced. We modify the divorce decree, however, to provide that Wife is awarded the divorce on that ground, consistent with the parties’ agreement. We further award Husband his attorney’s fees as required under the marital dissolution agreement.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Casey DeWayne
Hodge, appeals one certified question of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss in which he alleged a speedy trial violation and two certified questions of law
related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress in which he challenged the
constitutionality of a traffic stop. Discerning no error, we affirm. We remand for entry of
judgments on Counts 2 and 3 reflecting that the charges were dismissed in accordance with
the plea agreement.

The plaintiffs, a prospective adoptive couple and six other Tennessee taxpayers, brought this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-147, which allows private child-placing agencies that receive state funding to deny services to prospective foster or adoptive parents based upon the agencies’ religious beliefs. A three-judge panel concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute. We have determined that the plaintiffs have standing and reverse the decision of the three-judge panel.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant, Rodney Paul Beech, pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop of his vehicle. Upon our review, we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify the question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Devon Allen Wall, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping related to the same incident. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated kidnapping convictions and challenges the trial court’s refusal to deliver a special jury instruction. Relative to his sufficiency challenge, the Defendant contends that there was no significant confinement or removal of the victims and that the aggravated kidnappings were incidental to the underlying crime of aggravated robbery. Regarding his second challenge, the Defendant contends that the requested jury instruction concerning “relatively trivial restraints” provided crucial guidance for the jury on Tennessee’s aggravated kidnapping statute. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Hilton Lee Chatman, was charged in an eleven-count indictment on drugrelated offenses. A jury convicted him of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in Count 1; possession with intent to sell heroin in Count 3; possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony drug offense in Count 10; and possession of drug paraphernalia in Count 11. Defendant was found not guilty of the remaining seven counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years and six months. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, his sentence is excessive, his motion for new trial was erroneously denied, and the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when it rejected his guilty plea. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A husband and wife each had multiple children from prior relationships. After their marriage, the husband and wife agreed to a contract that would control the distribution of their estates, with funds passing first to the surviving spouse and then to be distributed after the second spouse’s death among their children. Both husband and wife have since died. Husband’s children brought suit, arguing that the distribution of assets in husband’s final will is contrary to the contract. Awarding summary judgment to husband’s children in this declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined that the distribution of the husband’s estate is controlled by the terms of the contract. The wife’s estate appealed. We vacate and remand.

A husband and wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement in 2019. Part of the agreement provided that once the husband retired from the United States Army, he would pay the wife alimony in futuro in an amount equal to the amount of military retirement to which the wife was entitled under the agreement. In 2021, the wife filed a motion for contempt alleging, inter alia, that the husband was not complying with the alimony requirements. The husband argued that the parties’ agreement was unenforceable because it is pre-empted by federal law. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the husband had failed to comply with the agreement but that the contempt was not willful. The husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. We also grant the wife’s request for her appellate attorney’s fees.

Defendant, James Howard Smith, entered nolo contendere pleas to two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty years for each of the two rape of a child convictions and ten years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, resulting in an effective sentence of ninety years. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Joe Nelson, appeals as of right from the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, robbery, and aggravated rape. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon counsel’s failure to (1) move to suppress the evidence obtained by Petitioner’s arrest, the search of his girlfriend’s mother’s home, and the search of a cell phone he shared with his girlfriend; (2) move to suppress the victim’s identification of Petitioner on a surveillance recording as impermissibly suggestive; (3) investigate DNA evidence or contest the chain of custody of the victim’s rape kit and the DNA standards for the victim and Petitioner; (4) introduce a voice exemplar of Petitioner to prove that the perpetrator’s voice in the background of the victim’s 911 call was not his; and (5) use telephone records to cast doubt on the State’s timeline of events and establish that a witness had reason to lie about Petitioner’s involvement in the offenses. Petitioner also alleges that the State withheld exculpatory evidence relative to the victim’s rape kit and DNA standards for the victim and Petitioner. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Robert Joseph Atkins, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court
of second degree murder, tampering with evidence, and unlawful possession of a handgun
by a convicted felon and received an effective thirty-one-year sentence. On appeal, he
claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction, (2) the trial
court erred by admitting testimony about his prior assault of the victim, (3) the trial court
erred by admitting an unauthenticated video into evidence, (4) the trial court should have
granted a new trial because a police officer, who testified at trial, was the subject of an
internal affairs investigation, (5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing the
medical examiner to testify outside her area of expertise, and (6) he was denied his right to
a fair trial under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record,
and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Brian Allen Armstrong, of two counts of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and one count of possession of a prohibited
weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective term of fifteen years in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his requested
jury instruction on the defense of necessity. After reviewing the record, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Angela Montgomery, was convicted in the Rutherford County Circuit Court of six counts of rape of a child, for which she received an effective sentence of forty years’ imprisonment to be served at one hundred percent. This court affirmed her convictions, and she filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State then appealed, claiming for the first time that the petition was untimely. This court remanded the case to the post-conviction court to determine whether the Petitioner was entitled to due process tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. The post-conviction court held that she was not and denied the petition as untimely. The Petitioner now appeals contending that she is entitled to due process tolling because, despite her repeated requests, trial counsel failed to provide her with a copy of the trial transcript. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns divorce-related issues. In October 2019, Michael Grande
(“Husband”) filed for divorce against Dr. Kimberly Grande (“Wife”) in the Circuit Court
for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). In March 2021, the Trial Court entered its Final
Judgment for Divorce, which incorporated the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement
(“the MDA”). In September 2021, Husband filed a petition for civil contempt against Wife.
In its June 2022 final order, the Trial Court found among other things that Wife was in civil
contempt of court. Wife appeals. Husband raises his own issues as well. We find, inter
alia, that Wife is not in civil contempt for pre-MDA conduct when the MDA purported to
resolve the very issues subject to the contempt petition and Husband has not asserted a
claim of fraud. We reverse the Trial Court’s findings of civil contempt against Wife, as
well as the judgments against Wife in the amounts of $27,000 and $11,171.80, respectively.
We also reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Husband, and decline to award
either party attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal. Otherwise, we affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

The defendant, Matthew Peter McDonnell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s
order revoking his probation and requiring him to serve the balance of his four-year
sentence for aggravated assault and vandalism of property valued at more than $1,000 but
less than $2,500. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an action for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and damages under the Tennessee Educator’s Protection Act. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants falsely accused him of being a “sexual predator” and “pedophile” who sexually harassed his female high school students. The defendants responded to the complaint by filing petitions to dismiss the action under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for each of his claims and dismissed the action. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph Langlinais, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking postconviction
relief from his convictions of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and
attempted rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-eight years
in prison. State v. Joseph Langlinais, No. W2016-01686-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1151951
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 19, 2018). In this appeal,
the Petitioner argues (1) that the post-conviction court deprived this court of meaningful
appellate review because it failed to consider certain issues as raised in his petition and
failed to provide sufficient findings of fact in its order denying relief; (2) that the Petitioner
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel under
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), or alternatively,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); (3) that trial counsel
was ineffective based on eighteen separate grounds; and (4) that the cumulative effect of
trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After a thorough review of the record, we
conclude that the aggregate effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies requires a new trial.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the post-conviction court, vacate the Petitioner’s
convictions, and remand for a new trial.

The appeal is dismissed due to the fact that Appellant’s brief wholly fails to comply with
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a). In addition, there is no transcript or
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) statement of the evidence, thus negating this
Court’s ability to review the trial court’s substantive findings.

Clifford Leon Houston (“Appellant”) filed a motion to stay foreclosure proceedings in
2010 in the Chancery Court for Roane County (the “trial court”). In September of 2022,
Appellant filed a motion to recuse the new Roane County Chancellor. The trial court
denied the motion to recuse and dismissed Appellant’s action for failure to prosecute.
Appellant appealed to this Court. Because his brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule
of Appellate Procedure 27, Appellant’s issues are waived, and the trial court’s ruling is
affirmed.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by the plaintiff, Karen Elizabeth Phillips Lowe (“Former Wife”),
seeking to recuse the judge in this post-divorce case. Having reviewed the petition for
recusal appeal filed by Former Wife, and finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a claim filed by a decedent’s wife against his estate. Of note, the decedent’s will contained a provision bequeathing his wife all of his clothing, personal effects, automobiles, and all of his other tangible personal property. During an inspection of the decedent’s home following his death, the decedent’s relatives located a checkbook with a sizeable amount of money contained in it, while also locating a large sum of money left in his clothing and in a wallet taped to a pipe in the decedent’s bathroom. The decedent’s wife argues that this money constitutes tangible personal property left to her in the decedent’s will. The trial court rejected this argument, determining that the money constituted intangible personal property. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kelli M. Cates, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence(“DUI”) after the trial court denied her motion to suppress. As a part of her plea agreement, she sought to reserve five certified questions of law for appeal challenging the legality of the traffic stop leading to her arrest. However, following our review, we conclude that the certified questions are not dispositive of the case and do not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issues reserved as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the case is dismissed.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her eldest child on a number of grounds. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother engaged in only token visitation with the child during the relevant time period. We vacate the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to parent because the trial court failed to make findings as to whether the return of the child would pose a risk of substantial harm. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to the remaining grounds, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.