APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights, persistence of conditions, mental incompetence, substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, and abandonment by failure to maintain a suitable home. The trial court also found that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.
 

In 1994, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stephen L. Beasley, of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on appeal. State v. Stephen Lujan Beasley, No. 03C01-9509-CR-00268, 1996 WL 591203, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 10, 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 27, 1998). After a somewhat lengthy procedural history, the Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to “instruct trial jury and argue murder in perpetration of felony reckless.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he has been subjected to multiple punishments for the same crime, arguing that the jury violated his constitutional rights when it applied the felonymurder aggravating circumstance to his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. He does not contest his sentence for life in prison but contests the jury’s decision that he not have the possibility of parole. The Petitioner states that because he was convicted of premeditated murder, the jury improperly applied the felony murder aggravator as a basis for imposing his “without parole” sentence. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The plaintiff from a case that was dismissed in 2002 by agreed order filed a motion nine years after the dismissal to “extend the judgment” from that case and for injunctive relief. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the motion.

The defendant, Derek Coleman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter, employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault, all Class C felonies. He was subsequently sentenced to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, six years for the firearm conviction, and five years for the aggravated assault. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient and affirm the convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Charlton Garner, of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he petitioned the Shelby County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present a witness suggested by petitioner and failure to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Zona Mayo (“Plaintiff”) sued Donna L. Shine, M.D., Fort Sanders Obstetrical and Gynecological Group, P.C., and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) alleging medical malpractice in connection with Plaintiff’s birth. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding that neither Dr. Shine nor the Hospital were legally responsible for any harm suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals raising issues regarding alleged jury misconduct and alleged errors with regard to admission of evidence, among other things. We find and hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial due to errors in the admission of specific evidence and the improper limitation of Plaintiff’s cross-examination of Dr. Shine, among other things. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court for a new trial in compliance with this Opinion.

Joseph Wells (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve thirty days of periodic confinement followed by two years of probation. The Defendant has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, erred in denying full probation, and erred in relying on hearsay statements in imposing sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of second-offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving with an expired license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after seven months’ incarceration, on the second-offense DUI, and to a concurrent six months on the charge of driving on an expired license, for a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant claims that: the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to enter evidence pertaining to his tumultuous relationship with a woman; the trial court erred by denying his motion to recuse; the trial court erred by denying his motion to investigate juror dissatisfaction with the verdict; and the sentences imposed were excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Wife appeals the final decree of divorce, asserting that the trial court erred in failing to make findings as to what property constituted separate property and what constituted marital property; Wife also appeals the amount of alimony awarded to her. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to classify the property and, accordingly, vacate the division of marital property and remand the case for the court to classify the parties’ property and debt and to modify the division of marital property if necessary. We affirm the trial court’s holding that an award of alimony to Wife is appropriate, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony.
 

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joshua Beadle, and Co-Defendant, Lezuntra Knox, charging them with burglary of a building. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a sentence of four years in the county workhouse. Defendant Knox was tried separately. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury found appellant, JimmyEsters, guilty of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range I, standard offender, to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to appellant; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is a reconsideration case. The employee settled his claim for one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in 2007. In 2008, his employer merged with a second company to form a new corporate entity. The employee continued to be employed by the new entity in the same location, working under the same collective bargaining agreement that he had been under prior to his injury. The trial court found that he had lost his employment for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(B) and awarded additional permanent disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that a loss of employment occurred. In the alternative, Employer argues that the evidence preponderates against an award of additional benefits. We affirm the judgment.
 

Plaintiff, was general contractor for the renovation of a private club, and employed defendant to install flooring at the club. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages incurred when plaintiff was sued by the club which obtained judgment for damages against plaintiff for the defective floor, as well as for attorney's fees for defending the action and other expenses. Defendant moved to dismiss the action, relying on the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-202. The Trial Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the action, and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This action originated in Sessions Court, when the plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant had confiscated an automobile of plaintiff's over a disputed debt for repairs on another vehicle. The Circuit Judge refused to award either party damages, but ordered plaintiff's vehicle to be returned to him. Plaintiff appealed to Circuit Court, which inter alia held that plaintiff was entitled to damages of $663.88. Defendant was awarded $663.88 under its counter-complaint. The Court said the two awards offset each other and dismissed all claims and taxed costs equally. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted Defendant, Ricky Dean Harvey, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on a related charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. A fourth count of the indictment was resolved in a bench trial wherein the trial court found Defendant violated the implied consent law. The DUI charge was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eleven years for the cocaine conviction, concurrent with the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver; (2) the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle and the resulting arrest of Defendant violated Defendant’s constitutional rights and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; and (4) Defendant “[l]acked the [m]ental [c]apacity for the [a]rrest and [t]rial [h]eld in this [m]atter.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jake L. Monroe, alias, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance within a drug-free school zone, a class B felony. The Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment.

This appeal involves a suit to restrain a surviving wife from inheriting from her deceased husband. Husband’s daughter filed a complaint against wife, alleging that wife intentionally killed husband, thereby forfeiting any right to inherit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-1-106. When wife was convicted of first degree murder, Daughter filed a motion for summary judgment and attached the judgment of conviction. The court granted the motion, finding that no genuine issues of fact remained because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded litigation of whether wife killed husband. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a survivor and wrongful death suit arising out of the alleged neglect and abuse of Earl McLemore while he was a resident in a nursing home, Life Care Center of Elizabethton, which is located in Elizabethton, and is owned and operated by defendants. The suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Carter County, and following a ten day trial in May of 2010, the jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff and against all defendants. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $500,000.00 and punitive damages of $4,250,000.00. The Trial Court suggested a remittitur of compensatory damages to $225,000.00, but sustained the punitive damages award. Defendants/appellants appealed the verdict on numerous grounds. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

I concur in the Opinion and Judgment of this Court to reverse the Judgment of the Circuit Court. I agree with the Opinion that Ms. Leath’s “judgment of conviction cannot be used for collateral estoppel purposes because the judgment of conviction is not a final judgment.” Likewise, I agree with the Opinion that under current Tennessee law, Ms. Wilkerson “cannot assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel because she was not in privity with the State” and, therefore, the mutuality of parties as required in Tennessee for offensive collateral estoppel is missing. Sullivan v. Wilson County, No. M2011–00217–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 1868292, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2012), no appl. perm. appeal filed.

The Defendant, James Young, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 0-401. The trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for one year and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration with all but thirty days to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a contract for the purchase and sale of property. The buyer refused to close pursuant to the terms of the contract and stopped payment on its earnest money check. The sellers brought an action for specific performance and breach of contract. The buyer alleged that the sellers breached the contract first. The trial court found in favor of the buyer, holding that because the sellers did not cause title to be examined ten days from the effective date of the contract, the buyer had a right to withdraw the earnest money payment. The sellers appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the disqualification of an attorney and the denial of permission to appear pro hac vice. The plaintiff taxpayer corporations filed two lawsuits against Tennessee’s Commissioner of Revenue for a refund of franchise and excise taxes. The Commissioner filed a motion to permit an out-of-state attorney to appear pro hac vice to assist in representing Tennessee’s Attorney General in the taxpayers’ lawsuits. The attorney to be admitted pro hac vice is a full-time in-house attorney with a quasi-governmental multistate tax policy entity. The plaintiff taxpayers objected, arguing that admission pro hac vice of the multistate tax entity’s in-house attorney was tantamount to allowing the multistate tax entity to intervene in the lawsuits. The plaintiff taxpayers also argued that the attorney should be disqualified from representing the Commissioner because such representation would present an inherent conflict of interest and would give the attorney access to confidential taxpayer information. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff taxpayers. It denied the Commissioner’s motion to admit the attorney pro hac vice and disqualified the attorney from representing the Commissioner in these proceedings. This Court granted the Commissioner’s application for an extraordinary appeal. We reverse and remand the case for entry of an order granting permission for the attorney to appear on behalf of the Commissioner pro hac vice.
 

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Ross McClellan, of rape of a child and incest. On remand for resentencing for the rape of a child following his first direct appeal, State v. Daniel Ross McClellan, No. E2009-00698-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2695657 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 8, 2010), the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. McClellan appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by relying on enhancement factors that were improperly submitted to the jury. The State concedes error but maintains that McClellan’s sentence is appropriate. Although we discern no reversible error, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment formsto reflect the date of the offense as shown in the indictment. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pro se petitioner, Efrain Huerata Orduna, appeals the Circuit Court for Franklin County’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2007, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On April 4, 2011, almost four years after the judgments were entered, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings and that other constitutional rights were violated. He failed to state any factual basis in the petition to explain its untimely filing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This appeal arises from a judgment for arrears in child support. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Robin Turner (“the State”) filed a civil contempt petition against Jamie Reed (“Reed”) in the Juvenile Court for Cocke County (“the Juvenile Court”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court ordered Reed to pay $75 per month towards satisfying his $17,330 in arrears. The minor child at issue had attained majority age by the time of these proceedings. The Juvenile Court found Reed to be in substantial compliance with his payments, and he was given an opportunity to comply with the Court’s order. The Juvenile Court rejected Reed’s demands for a jury trial and for discharge of the arrearage. Reed appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.