APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Seeking relief from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction of attempted aggravated robbery, Timothy L. Rose appeals and claims that his plea of guilty to the conviction offense is invalid because it was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and was unknowingly and involuntarily made. The record, however, supports the post-conviction court’s findings and its denial of post-conviction relief. For that reason, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Glover P. Smith, of fabricating evidence in counts 1 and 2 and filing a false report in counts 3 through 8. During a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the appellant’s convictions of filing a false report in counts 3, 4, and 5 and ordered that he serve an effective sentence of one year in jail followed by six years of probation. Subsequently, the trial court granted the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the fabricating evidence convictions based upon insufficient evidence. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. In a counter-appeal, the appellant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on “knowingly”; that newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial; that the State committed a Brady violation; that his multiple convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5 and in counts 6, 7, and 8 violate double jeopardy; that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and improperly denied his request for full probation; and that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and reinstate his convictions of fabricating evidence in counts 1 and 2, the merger of the convictions, and the sentence. We also conclude that the trial court should have dismissed the charges of filing a false report in counts 4 and 5 because they were mutliplicitous with the charge in count 3. The appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences for filing a false report in counts 6, 7, and 8 are affirmed.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Terrance Antonio Cecil, of assault and false imprisonment, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six months incarceration, with all but sixty days on each suspended, followed by ten months on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it considered his prior arrest record in sentencing; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted false imprisonment and attempted assault. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner, Bruce Alexander Tuck, in three separate cases. In each case, the petitioner was indicted for aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and various other related offenses. The petitioner pled guilty in each case, agreeing to serve three, consecutive twenty-year sentences at 100 percent, resulting in an effective sentence of sixty years. No direct appeal was filed. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. He claims that when he entered his pleas, he was mentally ill and subject to mistreatment and threats in an attempt to induce him to plead guilty. He also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to discuss the facts and circumstances underlying each of the indictments charging the petitioner; (2) failing to review the audio and visual recordings of the petitioner’s first statement to police; (3) failing to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s confession; and (4) failing to discuss with the petitioner the possibility of withdrawing his pleas. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner did not prove his assertions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief.

We accepted this appeal of a personal injury action to determine whether the dismissal of a defendant pursuant to a written order not made final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 renders that defendant “not a party to the suit” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. We answer this question in the affirmative. Because the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appellees from the Manns’ second amended complaint as time-barred, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Petitioner,Ralph Paul Marcrum,appeals as of right from the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary. The Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Wife appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony among other issues. The trial court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct. Wife was awarded 51% of the marital assets and Husband received 49%. Wife was awarded $5,000 month in alimony in futuro until she reached the age of 65, at which time the amount would be reduced to $2,000 until Wife’s death or remarriage. Wife contends that the trial court erred in its determination as to the division of marital property, its award of alimony, its denial of her request for an additional $170,000 as alimony in solido due to Husband’s alleged dissipation of assets, its denial of Wife’s request that Husband pay her medical insurance following the end of an eight-year employment agreement with Husband’s company, and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expert witness fees in the amount of $115,528.88. For his part, Husband contends the trial court made a mathematical error regarding the parties’ 2010 tax liability. We affirm the trial court in all respects except for the tax liability and remand the issue of the parties’ 2010 tax liability. Although Wife does not challenge this issue, we are unable to determine the correct amount; thus, we remand this issue for the court to determine whether a mathematical error exists and, if so, to modify the decree accordingly.

While working for a law firm in which he was a shareholder, an attorney performed legal services for clients and failed to remit fees owed to the law firm. Members of the law firm confronted the attorney about the misappropriated legal fees shortly after the attorney resigned his position at the law firm to assume elected public office. As a result of his conduct, the attorney pleaded guilty to theft and to willful failure to file income tax returns. During a subsequent investigation, the Board of Professional Responsibility discovered that the attorney had accepted loans from the law firm’s clients while he was employed at the law firm. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that the attorney should be suspended for four years. The attorney appealed, and the chancery court applied additional mitigating factors to reduce the suspension to two years. We hold that the chancery court erred in modifying the judgment without finding that any of the circumstances in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3 applied. We also hold that the hearing panel erred in imputing a conflict of interest to the attorney with respect to the loan from the law firm’s client and in misapplying aggravating and mitigating factors. Despite these errors, we conclude that the length of suspension imposed by the hearing panel is consistent with the sanctions imposed on attorneys for similar conduct. We therefore reverse the chancery court’s reduction of the suspension to two years and affirm the hearing panel’s imposition of a four-year suspension.

Peggy Giffin d/b/a Re/Max Realty Center and Racia Futrell (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Anthony Sawyer and Hope Sawyer alleging, among other things, that the Sawyers had breached a real estate sales agency contract. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Sawyers did not breach the sales agency contract and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to collect a commission under the sales agency contract. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s fifth petition for habeas corpus relief. After a thorough review of the briefs and the appellate record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, was charged with first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit first degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to 60 years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Shundell L.Dickerson, No.M2006-02021-CCA-R3-CD,2008 WL 2780591 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 18, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to represent him. Petitioner alleged several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying relief. Petitioner now appeals. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Larry C. Pitman, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief which the trial court summarily dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The petition seeks to set aside Petitioner’s 2006 convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. As pertinent to this appeal, Petitioner alleged that the indictment for each offense which led to his jury convictions is defective because each count of the indictment failed to allege at least one essential element of the criminal charge. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is an estate case in which Bobbie Bryant appeals the trial court’s affirmation of the fifth and final accounting of the deceased’s estate. Having concluded that the issues raised on appeal do not pertain to the fifth and final accounting of the estate, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Curtis Beechem, pled guilty to first degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He received sentences of life for first degree murder and four years for attempted aggravated robbery to be served concurrently. In this appeal from the denial of the postconviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court and trial counsel misinformed him as to the length of his sentence. He also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel misinformed him as to the length of his sentence, and trial counsel failed to object to a statement made by the post-conviction court concerning the sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Vincent D. Hadley, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the habeas corpus petition filed by Petitioner. Petitioner asserts on appeal that the indictment, which resulted in his guilty plea to felony murder in 1994, is defective and that the judgment is void. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the entire record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

This appeal involves the release of ballots for a condominium association election. The plaintiff condominium owner was a candidate for a position on the board of directors for the defendant condominium association. After losing the election, the plaintiff condominium owner requested to audit the vote and see the other members’ written ballots. The condominium association provided a tally sheet reflecting the number of ballots cast for each candidate but declined to release the actual ballots. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit, contending that the condominium association had a statutory obligation to release the ballots to him. The plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff condominium owner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff condominium owner does not have a statutory right to see the association members’ written ballots.

Father and Mother filed a joint motion to modify a parenting plan entered by the trial court in 2010. In their motion, Father and Mother asked the court to reduce Father’s child support obligation, to modify the parenting time schedule, and to amend the plan to permit a known registered sexual offender to be in the presence of their children. The trial court denied the motion with respect to allowing a sexual offender to be in the presence of the children, and otherwise granted the motion. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Patrick Wayne Carter, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The married parents of two minor children are involved in custody/visitation litigation in the trial court. The most recent decision by the trial court was prompted by a petition filed by he children’s father. The trial court denied the father’s attempt to obtain custody and suspended his visitation rights pending his completion of anger management and parenting classes. The father appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment is not a final judgment, we dismiss the father’s appeal.

The defendant, Christopher S. Robinson, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the court erred: (1) in finding that his due process and speedy trial rights were not violated by the long delay between the filing of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing; (2) in finding that he violated the terms of his probation; and (3) in ordering him to serve six months in confinement. Following our review, we conclude that the twelve-year delay between the filing of the warrant and the revocation hearing, under the facts of this case, violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the revocation warrant.

This case concerns the application of the medical malpractice notice requirement to a lawsuit that was previously nonsuited and then re-filed pursuant to the saving statute. The children of a woman who died due to alleged medical negligence filed suit against the defendant medical providers. The children subsequently nonsuited the lawsuit. Within one-year of the nonsuit, the children sent notice of a potential claim to the medical providers. Within one year and 120 days from the nonsuit, the children re-filed their claim. The medical providers moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one-year period provided by the saving statute and, as such, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action and the children appealed. Concluding that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105(a) is not an “applicable statute[] of limitations or repose,” we hold that the saving statute is not extended by compliance with the medical malpractice notice requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c). Affirmed and remanded.

The executor of the estate of Dana Ruth Johnson Gregory waited approximately 14 months after her death before seeking to open her estate. The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim approximately four months later, shortly after receiving the executor’s notice of the death and the opening of the estate. The executor objected to the claim as untimely under the statute of limitations applicable to claims by the state. The trial court rejected the objection and held that the claim was valid. The executor appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Corry Tyrone Owens, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, to ten years of incarceration, to be served at 45%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

Covered Bridge Resort on Waldens Creek, LLC (“Seller”) sold its interest in an ongoing resort development to Tennessee Covered Bridge, LLC (“Purchaser”). Seller agreed to finance the sale and Purchaser agreed to secure the debt with a mortgage on the property. Mountain National Bank (“the Bank”) agreed to loan Purchaser money to continue development of the property but required that its mortgage be in a first position. Seller agreed to subordinate its mortgage with the understanding that the members of Purchaser would personally guarantee the debt to Seller. Attorneys Charlie R. Johnson and Sherri E. Case of the firm of Johnson, Murrell & Associates, P.C. (collectively “the Lawyers”) prepared the documents and handled the closing. Purchaser soon defaulted and Seller learned that Purchaser’s members had refused to execute the guaranties. Seller filed this action against the Bank, the Lawyers and Purchaser . When Seller took the deposition of the Bank’s loan officer, the Bank, through counsel, instructed him not to answer several categories of questions on the ground of privilege. Seller filed a motion to compel which the trial court granted upon finding that the information at issue was not privileged. The trial court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed to hear the appeal. We now affirm the order of the trial court (1) granting the motion to compel and (2) holding the Bank’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance pending completion of discovery.