APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Joshua A. Randolph, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for aggravated assault and domestic assault after an altercation took place at the home occupied by his estranged wife and children. Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of assault. He was acquitted of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal he insists that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. After a review of the record, we conclude, as the State concedes, that the trial court did err in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense where the evidence fairly raised a contested issue of fact, i.e., whether Appellant was in the home with consent of the lawful resident when the altercation took place, and therefore entitled to raise self-defense because he claimed he was attacked. As a result, the jury instructions failed to inform the jury of the applicable law. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

A prisoner filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court dismissed sua sponte for failure to prosecute due to the prisoner’s failure to file the necessary summonses. The prisoner appeals. We affirm.
 

This appeal involves the foreclosure of real property owned by the Appellants. The Appellants filed a request for a temporary and permanent injunction, alleging that the Appellee bank that held the mortgage on the property had violated the Appellants’ rights. After the Appellants testified at the temporary injunction hearing, the Bank moved for involuntary dismissal and the trial court dismissed the case. Both parties filed post-trial motions regarding possession of the subject property. The appellate record contains no record that either of these motions was adjudicated by the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is not final, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Dismissed and remanded.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. By clear and convincing evidence, the trial court found two grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and (2) prison sentence of more than ten years, imposed when the child was under the age of eight. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the requirements for a petition for certiorari. This case is on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Board of Professional Responsibility v. Cawood, 330 S.W.3d 608 (Tenn. 2010). After reviewing the petition for certiorari in light of the requirements set forth in Cawood, we find that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s decision and dismiss the case.

The Defendant, Shirea Barber, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marty Joe Kelley, appeals after a lengthy jury trial during which a Rutherford County Jury convicted him of six counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, nine counts of rape without consent, twenty-five counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Appellant was sentenced to an effective thirty-nine year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the State to refer to the victim as “the victim” throughout the trial; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the victim as “the victim” throughout the trial; (3) the trial court improperly restricted defense counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court improperly allowed a State’s witness to remain unsequestered during trial; (5) the trial court erred by denying a mistrial; (6) the trial court improperly allowed the State’s witness to display and explain a speculum during testimony about the physical examination of the victim; (7) the trial court erred by “repeatedly” allowing the State to introduce hearsay; (8) the trial court improperly charged the jury regarding the offenses of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions;(10)the trial court improperly enhanced Appellant’s sentences; and (11) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough and complete review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude:
(1) Appellant waived any issue with regard to references to “the victim” during trial by failure to object; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from reading a letter written by the victim to Appellant during opening statements where there was some confusion as to whether the State received the letter during discovery; (3) Appellant failed to show that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct alleged affected the verdict to the prejudice of Appellant; (4) Appellant waived any issue with respect to Detective Duke’s remaining in the courtroom for failure to object, and, any error is harmless; (5) Appellant waived any review of whether the trial court should have granted a mistrial because he failed to seek a mistrial; (6) Appellant waived any complaint with respect to Hollye Gallion’s testimony at trial for failure to object to the use of the speculum as demonstrative evidence, and, in the alternative, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; (7) Appellant waived most of the hearsay issues for failure to object at trial; (8) the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of Mr. Perry that the victim never told him about the abuse; (9) Appellant’s sentences for rape of a child were improperly enhanced to twenty-three years because the trial court applied enhancement factors that were neither found by the jury nor admitted by Appellant; (10) the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing where Appellant was convicted of two of more offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor; (11) Appellant is not entitled to plain error review of the jury instructions; and (12) the State improperly elected facts for Count Five. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction in Count Five for rape of a child is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Appellant’s remaining sentences for rape of a child in Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six, are hereby modified to twenty years. Additionally, the trial court should enter a corrected judgment in Count Fifty and Fifty-eight to reflect Appellant’s conviction as soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded.
 

A Wayne County jury convicted Appellant, Wesley Trent Reaves, of theft of property worth more than $1,000 but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State’s witnesses were mistaken or lied during their testimonyat trial and that the trial court erred in imposing an eight-year sentence because it failed to apply a mitigating factor. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trier of fact is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses. We also determine that although the trial court erred in failing to apply the mitigating factor in question, Appellant’s criminal history more than supports the imposition of an eight-year sentence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Monroe James Dodson, Jr. and his co-defendants were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony. Appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a weapon during a felony with prior convictions. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eighty-two years. Appellant appeals both the length of his sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a review of the record on appeal, we have determined that the enhancement factors used by the trial court were supported by the record and that, therefore, the length of the sentences is affirmed. We also conclude that the record on appeal supports the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant is a dangerous offender and that consecutive sentences are warranted in his case. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mario Bateman, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Robert D.Conner, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissalof his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner attacks his convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault following a jury trial in which he was charged with first degree murder and aggravated assault. The sole ground for relief argued on appeal is that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a written motion pre-trial for the severance of offenses, since the charges involved two different victims and occurred on different days. After a thorough review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

I concur in the result reached by the majority and, with one caveat, its rationale in reaching that result. While I agree with the majority that “[t]he record before this [C]ourt does not reflect that Father ever raised an issue regarding Mother’s ability to recover attorney fees because she was never his spouse,” I disagree with the majority’s holding, in dicta, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c)(2010) supports such an award.

This appeal focuses on State Farm’s ability to claim an offset of uninsured motorist coverage for workers’ compensation benefits paid to its insured. The trial court construed the case of State Farm Insurance Company v. Schubert, et al., No. E2000-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 584206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May, 31, 2001) so as to preclude offset. We reverse and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a Shelby County jury trial, the Defendant, DeWayne Collier, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape. At the time of the crime, the Defendant was forty-two years old and the victim was fourteen years old. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the fourteen-year-old victim was an accomplice and there was not sufficient corroborating evidence. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the victim is legally an accomplice regardless of the fact that she cannot be indicted for her own statutory rape. However, we also determine that there is additional evidence to adequately corroborate her testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a contempt finding against a closely-held corporation. The defendant closely-held corporation owned real property located on a highway. The trial court held that the corporation had violated zoning ordinances by maintaining and operating a trucking terminal and salvage yard in an unauthorized area. The trial court enjoined the corporation from maintaining a trucking terminal at this location and directed the corporation to remove junk from the property. The corporation then leased the property to a business associate who continued to operate a trucking terminal on the property and failed to remove the junk. A contemptpetition wasfiled againstthe defendantcorporation. The trialcourtdetermined that the defendant corporation had violated the injunction and was in contempt of court. The defendant corporation now appeals, arguing that the corporation cannot be held in contempt for the actions of the tenant on the property. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Willie Perry, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, each a Class D felony, and was sentenced to serve, in prison, two twelve-year sentences to run concurrently with each other. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition, seeking relief on the basis that his trial counsel failed to investigate and advise him regarding the possibility that the property was valued at less than $1,000. The post-conviction trial court denied the claim, and the petitioner appeals the denial of relief and the trial court’s refusal to admit certain evidence regarding the property’s value. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. Indeed, I join in the majority opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of the appropriate standard of review by this Court on hearsay evidentiary issues. The majority applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the hearsay issue in this case.

This appeal arises out of a custody dispute over Amber D. Brewster and Nicholas Galloway’s minor child. When presented with a petition to establish paternity and set child support, Nicholas Galloway acknowledged paternity but filed a petition to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court denied Nicholas Galloway’s petition, designated Amber D. Brewster as the primary residential parent, and granted Nicholas Galloway co-parenting time. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that Defendants were entitled to GTLA immunity. Because we find a question of fact exists as to whether Defendants acted within the scope of their employment in communicating with Plaintiff’s teaching supervisor, in communicating with the named individuals, and in ordering destruction of the surveillance video tapes, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium claims with regard to such conduct. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se petitioner, Terry Lewis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions for first degree murder and attempted robbery. Petitioner claims that a report indicating that authorities performed a fingerprint analysis on a shell casing found near petitioner’s apartment is new evidence. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
 

The Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions and sentences were illegal because the United States Constitution did not authorize the Tennessee Legislature to create criminal statutes. Upon motion by the State, the habeas court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his judgments were facially void and noting that nothing on the face of the judgments indicated that the underlying sentences were invalid. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the summary dismissal by the habeas court.

A neighborhood association president, fearing that members conspired to improperly oust him at an upcoming meeting, filed suit, requesting declaratory relief regarding the proper procedure for removal of a president. Prior to a hearing, the members voted to remove him from office and filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court dismissed the complaint and denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment. The president appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Devonte Black, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration followed by three years on probation after release from confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of split confinement, specifically when it: (1) denied full probation; and (2) denied judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Demp Douglas, of one count of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based upon the victim’s testimony that he met the Defendant shortly after the Defendant was released from prison. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Dulworth, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.