APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this matter. In the first appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the employee permanently and totally disabled. The Panel held, however, that the trial court’s judgment should be reduced by the 272 weeks of benefits the employer had previously paid the employee. Therefore, the Panel remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with its opinion. On remand, the trial court applied the 272-week credit as the Panel had directed. The trial court also reapportioned liability and modified the date on which the employee’s permanent total disability benefits began to accrue. The trial court’s modification effectively increased the employee’s award from the 496.86 weeks it had awarded the employee in the original appeal to 697.14 weeks. Employer has appealed, contending that the reapportionment of liability and the modification of the date upon which benefits accrued conflict with the mandate of the previous appeal. We conclude that employer’s contentions are correct and reverse the trial court’s judgment.
 

I do not believe the trial court went outside the parameters of its sound discretion when it increased father’s co-parenting time from 85 days to 143 days. Unlike many of the divorce cases we see, this one involves parents who, after the divorce, in the words of the majority opinion, “maintain[ ] a positive, cooperative relationship with one another regarding their co-parenting responsibilities.” Even more unique, this case presents a situation where father’s wife and his former spouse have a “positive relationship.”

The employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back in August 1999. He returned to work in August 2000. He had back spasms related to the injury in May 2001 that caused him to be off work until August 2001. Thereafter, he worked until December 2008, when he was permanently laid off due to economic conditions. The settlement of his workers’ compensation claim, which was approved by the trial court in July 2001, was based on the two-and-one-half times impairment cap, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a), and preserved his right to seek reconsideration on loss of employment. Following the December 2008 layoff, he filed this petition for reconsideration. His employer contended that reconsideration was time-barred by section 50-6-241(a)(2) because his loss of employment occurred more than 400 weeks after he returned to work in August 2000. The employee argued that his correct return to work date was in August 2001, and his petition was therefore timely. The trial court agreed with the employer, for whom judgment was entered, and the employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Plaintiff filed this action in Circuit Court challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Retention Election Statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-4-1010 et seq. The Trial Judge held the statutes were constitutional, but concluded that intermediate appellate judges are subject to retention election only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resides. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's decision that the statutes are constitutional, but reverse the Trial Court's holding that intermediate appellate judges are subject to retention only by the qualified voters of the grand division in which the judge resides.
 

Plaintiffs charged defendant with medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. An out-of-state medical doctor testified on behalf of the defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, insisting that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to allow that expert to testify in violation of the "Locality Rule". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant, Sherri A. Bogle, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s probation and requiring her to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence had expired before the State initiated revocation proceedings. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, of the second degree murder of the victim, Joshua Perry. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction, that the trial court erred in denying her request to charge assisted suicide as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding assisted suicide as a defense to second degree murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Womack, of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft of property over $500, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments, with the exception of the theft of property conviction, which we modify from a Class E felony theft to a Class A misdemeanor theft.

Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the General Sessions Court. Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff then attempted to raise his claim in Circuit Court, but the Circuit Court dismissed his claim on the basis of res judicata, finding no evidence that he had appealed the adverse General Sessions judgment to Circuit Court. Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Because Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to this Court is untimely, the appeal is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a products liability settlement and a pension plan. Following the grant of the parties’ request for divorce, the trial court classified the proceeds of the settlement and the portion of the pension earned during the marriage as marital property. The court held that husband had dissipated the settlement proceeds without wife’s knowledge or consent. The court awarded husband the pension but awarded wife a judgment of $27,520.97 to equalize the division. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The employee alleged that he suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder in July 2008. His employer contended that the employee’s complaints were a continuation of a February 2006 injury to the same shoulder which was the subject of an earlier settlement. In the alternative, the employer contended that any award of benefits should be limited to one-and-one-half times the anatomical impairment in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A), because the employee resigned in April 2010 pursuant to a voluntary buyout program. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a new injury in July 2008 and that his resignation was reasonably related to the work injury, and therefore, the lower cap did not apply. A judgment awarding benefits was entered, and the employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, L. B. Rittenberry, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his statements; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to refer to the deceased as “the victim”; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Shelly Minor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for several offenses after the death of his estranged girlfriend. At the conclusion of a lengthy jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death, driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence (“DUI”), reckless driving, vehicular homicide by intoxication, and vehicular homicide by reckless conduct. At sentencing, the trial court merged the vehicular homicide convictions with the second degree murder conviction and merged the reckless driving conviction with the conviction for driving under the influence. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was ordered to serve an effective sentence of twenty-eight years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days. A motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying a continuance; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of Appellant and hearsay statements made by the victim; (4) the State committed discovery violations with regard to recorded telephone calls made by Appellant while incarcerated; (5) cumulative errors necessitate a reversal of Appellant’s convictions; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to an excessive sentence with consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Appellant failed to show what the testimony of the missing witness would have been at trial and, therefore, cannot show prejudice from the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance at trial; (3) the trial court properly allowed the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of Appellant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 804(b)(6); (4) Appellant failed to show how he was prejudiced by the State’s alleged discovery violations; (5) cumulative errors do not necessitate a reversal of Appellant’s convictions; and (6) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The appellees claim ownership to two tracts of land listed as parcels 4.00 and 4.01 on the Union County Tax Map. They assert ownership through adverse possession as a result of members of their family allegedly farming and paying taxes on the parcels  ince 1917. The appellant was a bona fide purchaser of parcel 4.00 in 2003. The appellees filed a complaint to quiet title to determine ownership of the land; the appellant countered with a complaint for a declaratory judgment. The trial court consolidated the actions and concluded that the appellees held title to the parcels by adverse possession. The appellant appeals. We reverse.

Appellant is a prisoner challenging a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After the Board denied him parole, the appellant filed a common law writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court denied the appellant’s discovery motions and dismissed his petition with prejudice. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.
 

I agree fully with the majority’s conclusions in this case. I write separately only because I would use different reasoning for holding that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of unclean hands.

A Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Steven Wayne Wilson, of first degree felony murder,see T.C.A.§ 39-13-202(a)(2),and especially aggravated burglary, see id. § 39-14-404. Following the jury’s verdicts, the trial court modified the especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary by operation of law, see id. § 39-14404(d), and imposed an effective sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, also by operation of law, see id. § 39-13-208(c). On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress, (3) the trial court erroneously admitted and excluded evidence during Agent Mark Wilson’s testimony,(4) the trial court erroneously admitted expert  testimony via an unqualified witness,(5)the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence,(6)the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the elements of felony murder as charged in this case, (7) the trial court’s rulings and comments evinced judicial bias requiring recusal, (8) the trial court erroneously excluded as hearsay the statements of two witnesses, (9) the trial court erroneously admitted the autopsy report as an exhibit at trial, (10) the trial court erroneously admitted physical evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (11) the overall conduct of the trial deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial under the Tennessee Constitution, and (12) the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Following an extensive review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Joshua Shell, appeals from the trial court’s order which revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve by incarceration his effective sentence of four years for one count of burglary, three counts of vehicle burglary, and four counts of theft. The State concedes error in the trial court’s proceedings and admits the case must be remanded for a probation violation hearing. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a probation violation hearing.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on the grounds of abandonment by incarcerated parents, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. On appeal, Mother and Father argue that DCS did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination. Father further argues that DCS did not clearly and convincingly prove that termination was in the best interests of the children. Finally, Mother and Father argue that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Petitioner, Alonzo Quawndell Vinson, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. The sole ground for relief presented at the hearing was that Petitioner’s sentence for aggravated assault, imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, is illegal, and the judgment of conviction is therefore void. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

On May 23, 2012, this Court entered an order directing Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Defendant”) to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Defendant responded to the show cause order and admitted that claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act remain outstanding. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Defendant, Randall Mason Nunn, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County to misdemeanor theft of services, a Class A misdemeanor, and to the Class A misdemeanor offense of failure to appear. Pursuant to the agreement, he received concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days with a 75% service of the effective sentence prior to eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status, and related rehabilitative programs. The issue of whether Defendant would serve his sentence totally in confinement or by some other alternative sentence was to be determined by the trial court on a later date announced in open court and acknowledged by Defendant. Defendant, whowas represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, failed to appear for his scheduled sentencing hearing, or for any of the three subsequently scheduled sentencing hearings. Each time Defendant’s counsel announced that Defendant had just reported to counsel that Defendant’s child had a medical condition which required Defendant’s presence at hospitals in Knoxville and later in Nashville. The trial court held the last scheduled hearing with Defendant absent and ordered Defendant to serve his entire sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing he should have been granted alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The City of Etowah appeals a decision of the trial court leaving in place an injunction prohibiting the City from demolishing a house owned by the plaintiff, Edward Lee Carruth. The City’s Building Inspector, on behalf of the City, directed that the house be demolished. He acted pursuant to a city ordinance governing the clearing of unsafe structures. Carruth filed a complaint seeking (1) judicial review of the administrative ruling or, in the alternative, (2) review by writ of certiorari. The trial court issued the writ and entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from demolishing or otherwise destroying the house. Following a bench trial, the court found that (1) there was inadequate proof to sustain the City’s action; (2) Carruth did not receive a hearing from the City prior to the City’s action; (3) the City failed to make findings of fact, as required by statute, in support of its decision; and (4) the cost of repairing the house was less than fifty percent of its value. The City challenges each of the trial court’s determinations and it further challenges the trial court’s conduct of a hearing on a common-law writ of certiorari. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.